Concept

Omnism Objection

Intro

"All religions are really pointing at the same truth. Christians see one face of the diamond, Muslims another, Hindus another. Nobody has the whole picture, so nobody should claim their religion is uniquely true." Most people have heard some version of this, often with the parable of the blind men and the elephant.

It sounds humble and generous. It is also self-defeating.

Look at the actual content. The religions disagree about basic questions, not about details. Is ultimate reality a personal Creator (Christianity, Judaism, Sunni Islam) or an impersonal absolute (Advaita Hinduism) or no self at all (Theravada Buddhism) or two eternal principles (Zoroastrianism) or many gods (classical polytheism)? Those are not five facets of one diamond. They are five different answers to the same question, and they cannot all be true at once.

Take Jesus. Christianity says He is God incarnate, crucified, risen. Islam says He was a prophet who was not crucified and is not divine. Judaism says He was not the Messiah. Bahá'í says He was one of nine equal manifestations of God. At least some of these have to be wrong. They cannot all be facets of the same truth.

The blind-men-and-the-elephant story itself proves the point. Notice who tells the story: someone who can see the whole elephant. The narrator stands outside the blind men, knowing what they cannot. The omnist is claiming exactly that vantage point ("I can see what each religion grasps only partly"), which is itself a religious claim that the religions themselves would reject. The omnist is not being neutral. The omnist is taking a position, the position that the omnist's own framework is the true one, and asking everyone else to fit inside it.

Christianity has a further wrinkle. Its truth rests on a public historical event. Paul wrote, "if Christ has not been raised, our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain" (1 Cor 15:14). Either the resurrection happened or it did not. There is no half-true version of Christianity that survives independent of this question.

Quick reply: "You say all religions have part of the truth. What is the truth they all have part of? Whatever you name will be a specific claim that most of those religions actually deny."

In full

The objection that the world's religions are different attempts to depict the same underlying truth, each capturing a partial facet of an ultimate reality too large for any single tradition to grasp whole. Typical formulation: "No single religion has the whole truth. Each one sees a piece. The Christian sees one face of the diamond, the Muslim another, the Hindu another. We should respect them all as partial encounters with the one Reality." The signature metaphors: the blind men and the elephant, the diamond's many facets, the many fingers pointing at the same moon, the many rivers flowing to the same ocean.

The objection is structurally distinct from Religious Pluralism Objection though the two overlap:

Religious pluralism (Hick's pluralist hypothesis; Coexist-style popular pluralism) is primarily soteriological, its claim is that all major religions are equally valid paths to salvation or to the same divine ultimate.
Omnism is primarily epistemological, its claim is that all major religions contain partial truths about reality, and that the truth-claim of any single religion to be uniquely correct is therefore mistaken.

The two often appear together, but they can be advanced independently. An omnist can hold that the religions all touch real truth without holding that they are all equally efficacious paths; a pluralist can hold all paths are valid without committing to the truth-content of any specific religion's metaphysical claims. This page engages omnism on its own terms, the truth-content claim. See Religious Pluralism Objection for the salvation-and-paths engagement.

The objection's habitats:

Popular, "all religions teach basically the same thing"; Joseph Campbell's mythopoetic universalism (The Hero with a Thousand Faces, 1949; The Power of Myth, 1988); Oprah-cultural omnism; the bookstore section that includes The Tao of Pooh, Ram Dass's Be Here Now, and The Universal Christ (Rohr 2019).
Academic-perennialist, Aldous Huxley (The Perennial Philosophy, 1945), Frithjof Schuon (The Transcendent Unity of Religions, 1948), Huston Smith (The World's Religions, 1958), Karen Armstrong (A History of God, 1993; The Case for God, 2009). The intellectually-serious-respectable form of the claim.
Esoteric-traditionalist, Helena Blavatsky's Theosophy (The Secret Doctrine, 1888), René Guénon, Ananda Coomaraswamy. The 19th-20th-century occult-philosophical lineage that synthesized world-religion vocabulary into a single sophia perennis.
Interfaith-dialogical, A Common Word Between Us and You (2007 Muslim-Christian letter); Parliament of the World's Religions (1893, 1993, ongoing); Karen Armstrong's Charter for Compassion (2009). The diplomatic-pacifist deployment.
Theological-progressive, Marcus Borg (The Heart of Christianity, 2003), John Shelby Spong, Richard Rohr's cosmic Christ, Christians who reframe Christianity as one tradition's encounter with a transreligious Real.

The objection's structure

The standard formulation runs:

Each major religion has produced sincere adherents, saints, philosophers, moral exemplars, and durable communities across centuries.
Each religion has incorporated genuine wisdom about love, justice, compassion, meaning, suffering, and transcendence.
No religion is wholly false; each contains real spiritual truth.
The religions disagree at many points, but their disagreements are perspectival, not substantive. Each is describing the same ultimate reality from a different cultural-historical angle.
Therefore Christianity's exclusivity claim ("no one comes to the Father but through Me," John 14:6) misreads its own tradition: Christianity has one facet of the truth, alongside other facets held by Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, etc.
Therefore the rational, humble, intellectually-mature position is omnism: respect all traditions as partial-truth-vehicles, none as comprehensively true.

Deployment markers:

"Blind men and the elephant", the Indian parable (most often traced to the Udāna Buddhist text, c. 1st c. BCE, though earlier versions exist in Jain and Hindu sources) in which six blind men each touch a different part of an elephant and disagree about what it is. The omnist's deployment: the religions are like the blind men; each grasps part; none grasps the whole. The metaphor frames religious truth-claims as limited-perspective claims.
"Different facets of the same diamond", the geological metaphor: the truth is one, but its presentations differ. Plays on the assumption that the religions are complementary rather than contradictory.
"Many fingers pointing at the moon", the Zen-Buddhist saying (sometimes attributed to the Lankavatara Sutra). The religions are the fingers; the truth is the moon. Don't mistake the finger for the moon.
"Many rivers, one ocean", the Hindu metaphor for the religions converging on Brahman. Vivekananda's address to the Parliament of Religions (Chicago, 1893) deploys this explicitly.
"It's the same God, just different names", the simplest popular form; collapses the question of divine identity into the question of cultural-linguistic labeling.
"Mature faith holds its tradition humbly", the move that frames exclusivity as immature. Conflates epistemic humility (acknowledging one's own fallibility) with epistemic relativism (denying that any tradition can be uniquely true).

Why the objection is rhetorically strong

It sounds humble. Claiming partial truth for everyone sounds more generous than claiming whole truth for one. The omnist's posture is rhetorically attractive in cultures that value tolerance.
It dissolves the offense. The exclusivity of Christianity gives offense (especially in pluralistic Western contexts); omnism removes the offense by reframing the claim.
It honors others' devotion. Audiences respond to the implied respect for religious adherents across traditions; the omnist appears to be the one who honors the world's religious wisdom, while the Christian exclusivist appears to disrespect it.
It accommodates the lived overlap. Genuine overlaps exist (the Golden Rule appears in many traditions; many traditions teach virtues of compassion, honesty, justice). The omnist deploys the overlaps as evidence that the differences are surface.
It can be advanced from inside Christianity. Omnist-friendly Christians (Rohr, Borg, Spong) make the case without leaving the tradition, which neutralizes the "you're attacking Christianity" counter.
It is consistent with the modern Western default epistemology, a soft constructivism that treats truth-claims as cultural-perspective-claims.

The contradictions the omnist position cannot resolve

The objection fails because the content of the world's religious truth-claims includes mutually-contradictory propositions about the same questions, and the omnist's response to those contradictions either (a) reduces the religions to vague platitudes that no actual adherent believes, or (b) covertly imports an external metaphysical framework (Hick's noumenal Real, Schuon's sophia perennis, Theosophical hierarchy) that the religions themselves do not share. The "different facets of one truth" metaphor presupposes a unifying observer who can see all the facets at once, and the omnist's claim to occupy that vantage is itself the sectarian metaphysical claim the omnist accuses the exclusivist of making.

Contradiction 1: Personal vs impersonal ultimate

The religions disagree at the most fundamental level about what kind of thing ultimate reality is.

Personal-creator theism (Christianity, Sunni Islam, Orthodox Judaism, theistic strands of Hinduism, Bhakti, Vaishnavism): ultimate reality is a personal God who creates the world ex nihilo, speaks, loves, judges, acts in history. The world is distinct from God.
Impersonal absolute monism (Advaita Vedanta Hinduism, some forms of Mahayana Buddhism, Neoplatonism, modern non-dual New Age): ultimate reality is impersonal, Nirguna Brahman, the One, consciousness as such. Personality is a derivative māyā (illusion / appearance) of the impersonal absolute; the world is not ultimately distinct from the absolute.
Atheistic / non-theistic (Theravada Buddhism, Jainism, classical Confucianism, Daoist non-personalism): no creator deity; reality is process / dharma / dao / nature. The Buddha's anatta explicitly denies a permanent self or soul.
Dualist (Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism): two coeternal principles, good and evil, light and darkness, in cosmic combat. The eschaton is the defeat of the evil principle, not its absorption into a higher unity.
Polytheist (classical Greek and Roman religion, Vedic Hinduism, Norse, Yoruba, Shinto): many gods, often with distinct domains, sometimes in tension with each other.

These are not five facets of one diamond. They are incompatible answers to the same question: what is fundamentally real? The personal God of Abrahamic monotheism is not the impersonal Brahman; the impersonal Brahman is not the no-self Dharma; the no-self Dharma is not the two-principle dualism; the two-principle dualism is not polytheism. The omnist who says "they're all touching the same Reality" is asserting a sixth metaphysical position, that the real Reality is whatever-can-be-described-incompatibly-by-five-other-positions, and that position is not the position of any of the five. The omnist's "Reality" is a metaphysical postulate the omnist made up.

Contradiction 2: The fate of the self

The religions disagree about what the self ultimately is and what happens to it.

Christianity: the self is a creature, made in the image of God, embodied, eternal, destined for resurrection of the body and either communion with God forever or separation from God forever. Personal identity persists.
Judaism: traditions vary, Pharisaic / Rabbinic Judaism affirms resurrection (Dan 12:2, "many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth will awake"; Mishnah Sanhedrin 10:1); Sadducean Judaism denied it. The dominant rabbinic line affirms personal continuation in olam ha-ba (the world to come).
Sunni Islam: bodily resurrection (Q 75; Q 22:5-7), judgment, heaven or hell. Personal identity persists.
Hinduism (most schools): the atman (true self) is immortal and undergoes samsara (cycle of rebirth) governed by karma until moksha (liberation). On Advaita Vedanta, moksha is the realization that the atman is identical with Brahman, so personal identity dissolves into the impersonal absolute.
Theravada Buddhism: the anatta doctrine denies a permanent self. What persists across rebirths is a causal stream, not an identical subject. Nirvana is the extinguishing of the stream, what remains is famously hard to describe (the Buddha refused the question in the Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta).

The Christian who hopes to see God face to face (1 Cor 13:12) and the Theravada Buddhist who hopes for the cessation of the causal stream that gives the illusion of selfhood are not hoping for the same thing in different vocabularies. The first hopes to continue and be glorified; the second hopes to cease as an identifiable subject. These are not different facets of one eschatological hope. They are incompatible hopes.

Contradiction 3: The identity and status of Jesus

The religions disagree about who Jesus was, and the disagreements are mutually exclusive.

Christianity: Jesus is God incarnate, the second person of the Trinity, who became fully human, was crucified for the sins of the world, was bodily raised from the dead on the third day, and is now seated at the Father's right hand. He is the only mediator between God and humans (1 Tim 2:5). He claimed divine identity (John 8:58 invoking Exod 3:14; John 10:30) and is the unique object of Christian worship.
Islam: Jesus ('Isa) is a prophet of Allah, born of a virgin (Q 19), a messenger (Q 5:75), a word from Allah (Q 4:171), but not divine. Allah is not begotten and does not beget (Q 112; Q 19:35). Jesus was not crucified, "they did not kill him, neither did they crucify him, but it appeared so to them" (Q 4:157). Belief that Jesus is the Son of God is kufr (unbelief, Q 5:72-73; Q 9:30).
Orthodox Judaism: Jesus is not the messiah (the messiah will rebuild the temple, gather the exiles, bring world peace, and inaugurate the messianic age, none of which Jesus accomplished). He is variously regarded as a failed messianic claimant, a heretic, or, in some rabbinic-polemical texts (Toledot Yeshu), a sorcerer. He is not divine.
Hinduism: variant readings, sometimes as an avatar (incarnation of Vishnu in Vivekananda's Neo-Vedantic synthesis), sometimes as a guru or yogi. The historical reception in classical Hinduism predates Christian contact and does not include Jesus as a category.
Buddhism: Jesus is sometimes assimilated as a bodhisattva (in modern interfaith presentations); classical Buddhism predates Christianity and has no category for him.
Bahá'í: Jesus is one of nine Manifestations of God (alongside Krishna, Buddha, Zoroaster, Moses, Muhammad, Báb, Bahá'u'lláh), equal in status, sequentially-progressive, all pointing to the same divine reality.

The omnist who says "all religions see Jesus correctly from their angle" must accept that Jesus is God incarnate (Christianity), Jesus is not God incarnate (Islam, Judaism, Bahá'í), Jesus was crucified (Christianity, Islam negatively, secular history), Jesus was not crucified (Islamic majority reading of Q 4:157), Jesus is the unique mediator (Christianity), Jesus is one mediator among many (Bahá'í, omnist) are all facets of one truth. They are not facets. They are contradictions. At most one of the Jesus is God / Jesus is not God pair can be true. The omnist's "all facets" move requires both to be true simultaneously, which is a contradiction.

Contradiction 4: What salvation is and how it is achieved

The religions disagree about what is wrong with the human condition, what fixing it consists of, and what means accomplish the fix.

Christianity: the problem is sin, moral rebellion against a holy God producing guilt, alienation, and death. The fix is atonement, Christ's death substituting for the sinner's death, applied by faith in response to grace, producing reconciliation with God and eventual resurrection. The mechanism is forensic-relational (justification, adoption) and transformative-mystical (regeneration, sanctification, glorification).
Sunni Islam: the problem is forgetting, humans drifting from submission to Allah. The fix is submission, islam, through the Five Pillars (shahada, salat, zakat, sawm, hajj) and obedience to Allah's law (sharia). Allah forgives the obedient on his prerogative; no atoning sacrifice is needed or accepted (Q 6:164, "no soul earns anything except against itself, and no bearer of burdens bears another's burden").
Hinduism (variant): the problem is ignorance (avidya) producing karmic bondage and samsaric rebirth. The fix is moksha (liberation) through one of the yogas, jnana (knowledge), bhakti (devotion), karma (action), raja (meditation), depending on tradition. The mechanism is gnostic-experiential (realization of atman-Brahman identity in Advaita) or devotional (loving union with the personal deity in Vaishnavism).
Theravada Buddhism: the problem is dukkha (unsatisfactoriness / suffering) caused by tanha (craving) which is caused by avijja (ignorance about the no-self nature of reality). The fix is nibbana via the Eightfold Path, right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration. The mechanism is self-disciplined contemplative practice extinguishing craving over many lifetimes.

These are not five facets of one soteriology. They are five incompatible accounts of (a) what is wrong, (b) what the fix is, (c) how the fix is accomplished. The Christian who is justified by grace through faith in Christ's substitutionary atonement is not having the same experience as the Buddhist who extinguishes craving through the Eightfold Path over countless rebirths. The omnist's "many rivers, one ocean" metaphor presupposes the rivers all flow to the same destination. The destinations of these five soteriologies are not the same.

Contradiction 5: The blind-men-and-elephant metaphor refutes itself

The omnist's signature metaphor undoes the omnist's own claim. Consider the parable carefully:

Six blind men touch different parts of an elephant.
One concludes it's a snake (trunk), another a fan (ear), another a tree (leg), another a wall (side), another a rope (tail), another a spear (tusk).
They disagree because each touches only a part.
The narrator's point: each is partly right, none is wholly right; the truth is the whole elephant.

But notice the structure of the narrator's claim:

The narrator can see. The blind men cannot see the elephant. The narrator can. The parable's force depends on the narrator's non-blind vantage from which the whole elephant is apprehended.
The narrator's vantage is precisely the omnist's claim about themselves. The omnist asserts that they (or some philosophical perspective they share) can see what each religious tradition sees only partially. The omnist's epistemological position is the narrator's, not any of the blind men's.
The narrator's vantage is itself a sectarian claim. From the inside of any of the world religions, the narrator's "I can see the whole elephant" is itself a religious claim, one that the religion in question would not accept. Islam denies that anyone has the vantage from which to claim "Allah is one face of a larger reality"; Christianity denies that anyone has the vantage from which to claim "Christ is one mediator among many." The narrator's vantage is the position of omnism itself, advanced as if it were neutral.
The narrator's vantage requires content the religions deny. To see the whole elephant, the narrator must know what the elephant is. The narrator's elephant is not the Christian Triune God (the religions other than Christianity deny it); not the impersonal Brahman (the personal-theist religions deny it); not the no-self process (the theist religions deny it). The narrator's elephant is whatever-is-described-incompatibly-as-each-of-these, which is the omnist's own metaphysical postulate, not a description of what the religions agree on.

The metaphor, in other words, concedes exclusivism at the meta-level: someone has to be in the position of not being one of the blind men to see the whole. The omnist claims to be that someone. The exclusivist (Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist) also claims to be that someone, but at least the exclusivist makes the claim as a religious claim, openly, defensibly, on the basis of revelation or argument the exclusivist accepts. The omnist makes the same kind of claim while pretending to make no such claim. The omnist is the most sectarian of all, the sectarianism that denies it is sectarian.

This is the meta-objection analytic philosophers raise against pluralism / omnism: it is self-referentially incoherent. To claim "no one religion has the whole truth" requires that some perspective have enough truth to evaluate that claim, and that some perspective is the omnist's. See Alvin Plantinga, "Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism" (1995), and Peter van Inwagen, "Non Est Hick" (1997).

Contradiction 6: The religions deny omnism from inside themselves

The omnist's position is sometimes presented as what the religions themselves teach when properly understood. The historical record on this is unambiguous: the major religions teach exclusivism internally, not omnism. Omnism is a Western academic-modernist projection, not the religions' self-understanding.

Islam, Q 3:85: "Whoever desires other than Islam as religion, never will it be accepted from him." Q 5:72-73: explicit anathema against Trinitarian Christians. The shahada is not a partial truth among many.
Christianity, John 14:6, Acts 4:12, 1 Tim 2:5; the entire New Testament treats Christ as the unique mediator, not one of many.
Judaism, the Shema (Deut 6:4); Maimonides's Thirteen Principles (especially #1-5, on God's incomparable unity); the Aleinu prayer's vision of all nations recognizing YHWH.
Hinduism (classical), the Vedanta darshana itself contains Advaita (non-dual), Vishishtadvaita (qualified non-dual), and Dvaita (dual) schools that disagreed sharply about ultimate reality. Madhva's Dvaita school explicitly anathematized Shankara's Advaita as crypto-Buddhist. The internal Hindu tradition is sectarian, not pluralist.
Buddhism, the Buddha's Anapanasati Sutta and Mahaparinibbana Sutta present the Dhamma as the path, not a path. The Mahayana introduction of upaya (skillful means) permits pedagogical flexibility but does not abandon the doctrinal core.
Sikhism, the Guru Granth Sahib's Ik Onkar (One God) is exclusive monotheism, not pluralism.
Bahá'í, the one omnist-friendly major religion is itself an exclusivist claim that the omnist-friendly reading is true and the exclusivist readings are progressively-superseded. Bahá'u'lláh is presented as the current manifestation, superseding Muhammad, Jesus, and the others. The Bahá'í position is not genuine omnism, it is progressive-revelational omnism with Bahá'u'lláh on top, which is a form of religious exclusivism.

The omnist who says "all religions teach the same thing at depth" must (a) identify the what that they all teach (and that what turns out to be the omnist's position, not anything Islam or Christianity or Buddhism teaches); and (b) tell each of the major religions that its own internal self-understanding is mistaken. The omnist is exactly as exclusivist as the Christian, just exclusivist about a different thing, exclusivist about the omnist's reading of the religions.

Contradiction 7: Christianity's historical truth-condition

A specific further contradiction: Christianity stakes its truth-content on a specific historical event, the bodily resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth in Jerusalem c. AD 33. Paul writes (1 Cor 15:14, c. AD 53-55): "if Christ has not been raised, our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain." This is a truth-condition: a state of affairs whose obtaining or not-obtaining determines the truth-value of the Christian claim.

No other major religion has an analogous structure. Hindu moksha does not stand or fall on a falsifiable historical event. Buddhist anatta is a metaphysical doctrine, not a historical claim. Islam's central claim is the revelation of the Quran, whose external falsifiability is limited (the Quran exists; whether Gabriel delivered it cannot be empirically tested).

The omnist who says "Christianity has one facet of the truth" must accept Christianity's historical-empirical truth-condition into the omnist framework. But if the resurrection happened, if Jesus rose bodily from the dead, then Jesus's self-understanding (the divine identity-claim) is vindicated by the most decisive divine action available, and Christianity's exclusive truth-claim follows from the content of what Jesus claimed. If the resurrection did not happen, Christianity collapses entirely (as Paul concedes), it is not one facet still standing, it is not standing at all. There is no omnist-friendly middle position in which Christianity partially obtains independent of the historicity of the resurrection. See Argument from the Resurrection for the historical-evidential case.

This single feature breaks the omnist symmetry. Christianity's truth-condition is publicly investigable in principle; the omnist's claim that Christianity is one tradition among many requires that this unique structural feature of Christianity be ignored or relocated to mythological-symbolic register, which is the move Christianity itself rejects (1 Cor 15:14 again).

The diagnostic question

When omnism is advanced, the diagnostic question is: "You say all religions have part of the truth. What is the truth that they each have part of?"

The omnist must answer. The answers fall into known categories:

"It's ineffable / can't be put into words.", Then how does the omnist know the religions are encountering it? If the it is ineffable, the omnist has no basis for saying the religions encounter the same it. The claim that the ineffable Reality is one is itself an effable claim about the ineffable.
"Love / compassion / connection / oneness.", The omnist is naming a small subset of what the religions teach (the moral-virtue overlap) and treating it as the whole. The religions disagree about who love is for, what love requires, whom one is connected to, and what the oneness is. The overlap-at-the-surface ≠ same-at-the-depth.
"A higher consciousness / awakening / enlightenment.", This imports a specifically Eastern (Hindu / Buddhist) vocabulary and asks the Abrahamic religions to fit. Christianity, Islam, and Judaism do not teach awakening to a higher consciousness as their soteriology; the omnist is asking them to retranslate their soteriology into a foreign one.
"God / the divine / ultimate reality.", Generic enough to seem ecumenical. But each religion fills in the term differently. God in Christianity is the Triune personal Creator; God in Islam is the non-Trinitarian Allah; God in Advaita is the impersonal Brahman; God in Theravada Buddhism is not a category. The omnist uses one word for five different referents, the textbook fallacy of equivocation.
"A perennial wisdom underlying all religions.", This is Huxley's / Schuon's / Theosophy's answer. It is itself a specific metaphysical claim of one particular philosophical tradition (the perennialist-traditionalist tradition of late-19th and 20th-century Western esoteric philosophy). The world religions do not endorse this claim. Asserting it as the meta-framework is not neutral, it is that tradition's assertion against the others.

Every available answer either (a) reduces the religions to an abstract subset they do not endorse, or (b) imports a specific Western-modernist or esoteric metaphysics as the "neutral" framework. There is no version of the omnist's "truth they all partake of" that is neutral with respect to the religions it claims to harmonize.

Common variants

"There must be some truth in every religion, otherwise they wouldn't have lasted so long.", The Argumentum ad Populum / ad Antiquitatem form. Endurance is evidence of social function, not metaphysical truth. Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, and Christianity have all lasted millennia, they cannot all be true at the points where they contradict each other.
"All religions teach love.", Engaged at Religious Pluralism Objection §"Common variants"; the empirical claim is false (multiple religions teach robust in-group / out-group ethics), and even where overlap exists, love is not used univocally across traditions.
"The Golden Rule appears in every tradition.", True at the surface (Confucius Analects 15:23; Hillel b. Shabbat 31a; Matt 7:12; Mahabharata 13.114). But the Golden Rule alone does not specify who counts as one's neighbor, what love requires, or what the moral order is grounded in. Surface overlap, depth divergence.
"It's the same God, just different names.", Engaged in New Age Spiritualism §"Claim 3"; conflates names with referents. The referent of "Allah" in classical Islamic theology is a strictly unitarian being who cannot have a Son; the referent of "Yahweh-Father-Son-Spirit" in Christian theology is a Triune God. Different referents, not different names for the same one.
"Different roads up the same mountain.", Engaged at Religious Pluralism Objection.
"It's all just about being a good person.", Reduces religion to moralism; ignores that the religions disagree about what a good person is and what being one is for.
"Even the Pope said other religions can be true.", Nostra Aetate (Vatican II, 1965) affirms that other religions contain "rays of that Truth which enlightens all men" while maintaining the Christological anchor, Christ is the Truth from which the rays come. The document is inclusivist, not omnist. See Salvation of the Unevangelized for the in-house Christian inclusivism / exclusivism / restrictivism position spread.