ris3n's Apologetics Codex

Argument

The Original Intention Argument

Original Intention Argument, Master Teleological Syllogism, can you have purpose without God, purpose must be objective, self-created purpose, argument from objective purpose, I create my own purpose, did you create yourself

Fresco of Augustine in bishop's robes at his desk, hand on his chest, with books and an armillary sphere on the shelf behind him

Intro

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Ask people whether their life has a purpose and many will say, "Yes. I create my own." That answer is true about one thing. Every person chooses goals: a career, a family, a cause. Those goals are real and they matter.

There is a second question underneath it, though. Why were you brought into existence at all? What was your life for before you ever chose anything? You did not make yourself. You arrived already existing, and only then started choosing. A choice you make today cannot reach back and set the reason you were made, any more than a house can decide, after it is built, what the builder had in mind.

So if your life has a purpose in that deeper sense, the purpose has to come from a mind that was there first and that does not depend on what you happen to want. This argument lays out that reasoning step by step, gives the evidence that human life really does carry such a purpose, and shows why Christianity names that first Mind as God, who made us "for Himself."

Question cheatsheet 10 questions this page answers
  1. Can you have a purpose without God?
  2. What is wrong with saying "I create my own purpose"?
  3. Does purpose have to be objective?
  4. What is the difference between a chosen goal and an original purpose?
  5. What are the four meanings of purpose?
  6. Doesn't evolution give living things a purpose without God?
  7. What does Augustine mean by "our heart is restless until it rests in You"?
  8. Can an atheist reject this argument?
  9. Does this argument prove the Christian God?
  10. What is the chief end of man?

In full

The Original Intention Argument is a deductive argument from the concept of an ultimate intended purpose, supported by a braided evidential case for its one contested premise. It begins by fixing terms. Purpose means the intended end or reason for which something exists or is brought into existence, and it has four senses: subjective or chosen (an end a person sets for himself), instrumental (what a tool is used for), natural function (what an organ does in the working of the whole, Aristotle's telos) and objective or ultimate intended (the end for which a thing was intended to exist at all). A chosen goal answers "what will I do with my existence?"; an original intended purpose answers "what was my existence intended for?" The spine holds the fourth sense fixed throughout. P1 is conceptual: an intended purpose presupposes an intending mind. P2 applies John Searle's distinction between ontological and epistemic subjectivity: the experience of purpose is a real fact about the subject, but its content is not thereby a fact about the world. P3 is a causal-temporal principle: a being that did not cause its own existence cannot, by later preference, establish the intention responsible for that existence. P4, that human existence has an ultimate intended purpose, is the load-bearing premise and is supported by cross-cultural data on the search for meaning, the felt authority of purpose over preference, a reductio of purpose-relativism, the unlivability of nihilism, and its fit with the doctrine of creation. P5 excludes other human minds as authors of humanity's end. The conclusion follows by elimination: humanity's ultimate intended purpose is grounded in an intending mind prior to and independent of human preference. The argument is valid and its conclusion is deductive given the premises; its evidential weight sits on P4, which an atheist can consistently deny at the cost argued below. Identifying that mind with the God of Christian Scripture is a further step, supplied by the wider Cumulative Case for Christian Theism.

Format note

A braided case runs four kinds of reasoning on one argument instead of choosing one. A deductive spine of numbered premises carries the conclusion, so the argument is valid and every disagreement is forced onto a named premise. Each premise is then held up by an inductive strand (the data that make it probable), an abductive strand (rival explanations of that premise's data, compared on explanatory power, scope, simplicity and how ad hoc they are) and a convergence note (independent disciplines that reach the same premise). The knot names the finding the strands reach only when tied together, which is what the conclusion rests on. An overlap check makes sure no datum is counted twice. A cut test removes each strand in turn and shows which premises still stand, which is the weak point and which have no backup. A likelihood ledger states, datum by datum, how much more expected the evidence is on theism than on its rival, as honest qualitative ranges, never invented precision. A defeater gate answers the single strongest objection to the whole argument before the cheatsheet. A convergence argument is one strand of this format; a braided case uses that strand inside a valid spine.

Here three premises (P1, P2, P3) are conceptual or causal principles, so their strands are short and their job is to show the principles are accepted across the field, by atheists included. The evidential weight sits on P4, and the page spends its length there.

The spine

Definitions. Purpose (in the spine, always sense four): the end for which something was intended to exist. Chosen goal: an end a person sets for his own existence after he exists. Original intention: the intention responsible for a thing's being brought into existence.

# Premise
P1 The intention principle. Every ultimate intended purpose presupposes an intending mind whose intention it is.
P2 Experience is not establishment. A subjective experience of purpose cannot by itself establish an objective purpose for existence.
P3 No retroactive self-authorship. A being cannot retroactively establish, through its own preferences, the original intention responsible for its own existence.
P4 The purpose premise. Human existence possesses an ultimate intended purpose.
P5 No other human author. No other human mind, individual or collective, intended the existence of the human kind and set its end; parents and societies receive human nature and pass it on.
C Therefore humanity's ultimate intended purpose is grounded in an intending mind prior to and independent of human preference.

Validity. By P4, humanity has an ultimate intended purpose. By P1, some mind intends it. That mind is either (a) the human subject himself, by his experience of purpose or by his preferences, (b) some other human mind or minds, or (c) a mind independent of human preference; the three options are exhaustive, since any mind is either human or not, and a human mind is either the subject's own or another's. P2 removes the subject's experience, P3 removes the subject's preferences, and P5 removes other human minds. So (c). The form is a disjunctive syllogism after an exhaustive trichotomy, with modus ponens on P1.

Strength of the conclusion. Deductive: if P1 to P5 are true, C is true. Four honest limits belong here and are repeated in the cut test.

  1. The argument establishes a conditional link with full force. If human existence has an ultimate intended purpose, then an intending source independent of us exists. P1, P2, P3 and P5 are close to uncontested, so the link is the argument's strongest result.
  2. P4 carries the weight. An atheist can consistently deny P4 and keep every personal goal he has. Jean-Paul Sartre did exactly that. The argument does not refute that position by logic; it argues, in the P4 section, that the denial is costly and poorly fits the data.
  3. Objective value without God is a live rival. Secular moral realists such as Erik Wielenberg (Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe, 2005) hold that objective values exist as necessary, ungrounded facts. That position can absorb some of the P4 evidence as evidence of value, without granting an intended purpose. See Godless Normative Realism.
  4. Naming the mind needs more premises. C yields a mind that intended humanity's existence for an end, which is the core of a creator. That this mind is the God of Christian Scripture, triune, good and revealed in Christ, is supplied by other arguments (cosmological, moral, historical) and by revelation, and is stated as the Christian identification under Connection to Scripture below.

P1, The intention principle

Inductive strand

  1. The meaning of the word. An intended purpose is an intention, and an intention is a state of a mind. Wherever "what is this for?" is answered in sense four, the answer names someone's intention: the watchmaker's for the watch, the architect's for the house. See Intentionality.
  2. Sartre's paper-knife. In Existentialism Is a Humanism (1946), Sartre argues that a manufactured paper-knife has an essence before it exists, because an artisan conceived its purpose first. He then reasons that since there is no God to conceive human nature, for human beings existence precedes essence. The leading atheist account of self-made purpose accepts P1 and draws the atheist conclusion by denying P4.
  3. Searle on functions. John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (1995), chapter 1, argues that functions are never intrinsic to the physics of a thing; the heart's pumping is intrinsic, but calling pumping its function assigns it relative to minds and the values they hold. A secular philosopher of mind locates even function-talk in minds; intended purpose, the stronger notion, is mind-dependent a fortiori.

Abductive strand

Explanation of the data (purpose-talk names intentions) Explanatory power Scope Simplicity Ad hoc?
Intended purpose is constituted by an intending mind (P1) Explains every case of artifact purpose and the logic of "intended" All sense-four uses One posit No
Purpose can be intended by no one Fails: an intention no one has is a contradiction None Simple but incoherent Yes
Purpose-talk is only shorthand for natural function Explains organ talk Leaves sense four unexplained Moderate Changes the subject; see the defeater gate

Convergence

Philosophy of language (the semantics of "intend"), philosophy of mind (Searle on intentionality and observer-relative function) and existentialist ethics (Sartre) reach P1 from opposite worldviews. Sartre and Searle are atheists; their agreement with Aquinas on this point cannot be put down to theistic bias.

Objections and rebuttals

  1. "Evolution gives organisms purposes with no mind involved." Rebuttal. Evolution gives organs functions in sense three, analysed as selected effects (Larry Wright, "Functions," Philosophical Review, 1973; Ruth Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, 1984). P1 is about sense four. The argument grants natural function freely and never infers a designer from it.
  2. "P1 is trivial." Rebuttal. Conceptual premises are meant to be close to trivial. The weight of a valid argument should sit on one clearly named premise, and here it sits on P4, where it can be inspected.

P2, Experience is not establishment

Inductive strand

  1. Searle's distinction. Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind, 1992; The Construction of Social Reality, 1995) separates ontological subjectivity (a thing exists only as experienced, as pain does) from epistemic subjectivity (a claim's truth depends on attitudes). Pain is ontologically subjective, yet "she is in pain" is epistemically objective: it is plainly true or false. Applied here, the experience of meaning is a real, objective fact about the person who has it. Its content, "my existence is for this," is a claim about the world, and the experience does not make that claim true.
  2. Felt certainty and error. Vivid dreams, misremembered events and confident mistakes show across ordinary life that the strength of an experience does not settle the truth of its content. See Subjective Experience vs Subjective Reality.
  3. Conflicting senses of purpose. Two people can each feel, with equal conviction, that their lives are for incompatible ends. If the feeling established the purpose, both would be objectively true at once.

Abductive strand

Explanation of P2's data Explanatory power Scope Simplicity Ad hoc?
Experience reports a purpose and can be right or wrong about it (P2) Explains conflict, error and correction All experiences of purpose One distinction No
Experience constitutes the purpose it reports Explains the felt immediacy Fails on conflict and error Simple Must deny that anyone is ever mistaken about his purpose

Convergence

Philosophy of mind (Searle), epistemology (the general gap between appearance and reality; see Inferential and Non-Inferential Knowledge) and moral psychology (people regularly revise what they took their life to be for) reach P2 independently.

Objections and rebuttals

  1. "Reality is subjective, so the distinction collapses." Rebuttal. Ask which claim is being made: that reality itself is subjective, or that one's experience of an independent reality is subjective. The second is true and harmless to the argument. The first is a global claim offered as objectively true, which undercuts itself. See Self-refutation.
  2. "My experience of meaning is enough for me." Rebuttal. Granted as a description of living. P2 concerns what the experience can establish, and that question remains when the experience is satisfying.

P3, No retroactive self-authorship

Inductive strand

  1. Causal priority. The intention responsible for a thing's coming into existence operates before that thing exists. A person's preferences exist only after the person does. Nothing causes its own existence.
  2. The ordinary cases. An adopted child who decides she was born to be a surgeon has chosen a goal; she has not changed why her birth parents conceived her. A sword reforged into a ploughshare gains a new use; it does not acquire a new original intention.

Abductive strand

The only rival is that a later choice can replace the original intention. That works for use (sense two) and for goals (sense one). For original intention it requires the effect to author its own cause, which no one defends once the senses are separated.

Convergence

Metaphysics (the impossibility of self-causation, common to Aristotle, Aquinas and modern accounts of causation), the philosophy of action (intentions precede the acts they explain) and Sartre himself, who holds that each person makes himself only after existing, reach P3.

Objections and rebuttals

  1. "I decide what to do with my existence, and that is my purpose." Rebuttal. That names a chosen goal, sense one, and P3 grants every one of them. The question was whether the existence itself was intended for an end.
  2. "Original intention is irrelevant; only present goals matter." Rebuttal. That is a denial of P4, and is answered there.

P4, Human existence has an ultimate intended purpose

This is the premise an informed atheist denies. It carries the argument, and the strands are given in full.

Inductive strand

  1. The search for meaning is universal and primary. Viktor Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning (1946), drawing on the death camps and on clinical work, held that the search for meaning is a primary human motivation and that meaning is discovered in the world and in one's situation. Michael Steger and colleagues built the Meaning in Life Questionnaire (Journal of Counseling Psychology 53, 2006) to measure both the presence of meaning and the search for it, and both turn up across populations.
  2. Meaning tracks religion more than comfort. Shigehiro Oishi and Ed Diener, "Residents of Poor Nations Have a Greater Sense of Meaning in Life Than Residents of Wealthy Nations" (Psychological Science 25, 2014), using Gallup World Poll data from 132 countries, found that people in poorer nations report more meaning in life, and that greater religiosity explained much of the difference. Human beings look for what life is for, and the answer they find most often names a purpose given from beyond themselves. See Argument from Purpose Meaning and Hope.
  3. Purpose carries authority beyond preference. Susan Wolf (Meaning in Life and Why It Matters, 2010), adapting Richard Taylor's Sisyphus, asks about a man whom the gods have made to love rolling his stone forever. He is satisfied, and Wolf argues that most people still judge his life to lack meaning. People judge lives against a standard their owners did not set, and they apply that standard to themselves. See I Create My Own Meaning Objection Defeater.
  4. The reductio of purpose-relativism. If every self-chosen purpose were as valid as any other, a life spent protecting children and a life spent harming them would be equally valid answers to "what is a human life for?" No one, on reflection, accepts that. Some purposes fit what a human being is, and some violate it. See Subjective Morality Defeater.
  5. Nihilism is unlivable. Albert Camus opens The Myth of Sisyphus (1942) with the claim that the one truly serious philosophical problem is suicide, because the question whether life is worth living presses on everyone. Bertrand Russell, "A Free Man's Worship" (1903), says the soul's habitation can be built only "on the firm foundation of unyielding despair." Thomas Nagel ("The Absurd," Journal of Philosophy, 1971) argues that humans cannot help taking their lives seriously even while seeing reasons to doubt that they matter. Those who argue for a purposeless human existence keep living as if it had a point. See Argument from the Unlivability of Nihilism.
  6. The restless heart. Augustine, Confessions I.1: fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te, "You have made us for Yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in You." The longing reported here is specifically a longing to know what we are for. See Argument from Restlessness and Argument from Desire.

Abductive strand

Explanation of P4's data Explanatory power Scope Simplicity Ad hoc?
Human beings were made for an end by an intending Creator, and perceive it dimly (Imago Dei; Ecclesiastes 3:11) Explains the search, the felt authority, the reductio and the unlivability together All six data One posit No: predicted by the doctrine of creation
No intended purpose; the search is an evolved drive and the authority a projection (Sartre, Russell) Explains the drive's existence Weak on the felt authority and on why nihilism cannot be lived Simple Must treat the strongest judgments about lives as systematically mistaken
Objective value without intended purpose (Wielenberg, Wolf) Explains the authority and the reductio well Weak on the "for" in the search, which asks for an end, not only a value Adds necessary brute values Partly: grants objectivity and stops short of intention

Convergence

Clinical psychology (Frankl), survey research (Oishi and Diener; Steger), analytic philosophy of meaning (Wolf, Nagel), existentialist literature (Camus, and Russell's essay, which concede the need while denying its fulfillment), and classical theology (Augustine, the Westminster Shorter Catechism of 1647, whose first question asks "What is the chief end of man?") reach the same descriptive finding: human beings experience their lives as answerable to an end they did not choose. Several of these witnesses deny the theistic conclusion, so their agreement on the description is not one source repeated.

The knowledge involved may be non-inferential. People do not reach the judgment about the stone-roller by deduction from premises; they see it, as they see that cruelty for fun is wrong. Non-inferential knowledge is still knowledge, and P4 can be known without first knowing God. See Inferential and Non-Inferential Knowledge.

Objections and rebuttals

  1. "The data show that people want a purpose. Wanting is not having." Rebuttal. Agreed for datum 1 alone, which is why it carries least weight. Data 3 and 4 are judgments people make against their own preferences, and those are harder to explain as wish-fulfillment.
  2. "Values can be objective without God, so P4's evidence proves too little." (Wielenberg; see Atheist Moral Realism Defeater.) Rebuttal. That rival absorbs data 3 and 4 as evidence of value. It does not absorb the shape of the search, which asks what human life is for, an end question, and it pays for its objectivity with necessary brute facts that answer to no one. The cut test below records exactly how much this costs P4.
  3. "Being made for a purpose would degrade us into tools." (Kurt Baier, "The Meaning of Life," 1957.) Rebuttal. That worry fits instrumental purpose, sense two. The Christian account is relational: the chief end of man is "to glorify God, and to enjoy him for ever" (Westminster Shorter Catechism, Q1). A person made for communion with the One who made him is honoured by that end.
  4. "This is a God of the gaps." Rebuttal. P4 rests on what is known about human beings, and grows stronger the more is known about the search for meaning and its failure under nihilism.

P5, No other human author

Inductive strand

  1. Parents receive human nature. Parents intend to have a child; they do not design what a human being is, or set the end that human nature is ordered toward. They are themselves instances of the kind.
  2. Societies assign roles. A society can assign a person a role, sense one or two, after the person exists. It cannot author the human kind, which predates every society.

Abductive strand

The only candidate rival is that evolution authored humanity's end. On naturalism evolution has no intentions, so this is a denial of P4, already treated, and a rival to P5 only by changing the sense of "purpose."

Convergence

Biology (human nature is inherited), history (no society precedes human beings) and the naturalist's own account (no human designed the species) reach P5.

Objections and rebuttals

  1. "Humanity as a whole can set its own purpose." Rebuttal. A collective choice is still a set of preferences formed after the existence it would explain; P3 applies to the group exactly as to the individual.

The knot

The strands tie off in one finding that no premise reaches alone: the end human beings answer to arrived before they did.

  • P1 to P3 alone give a conditional. They show what an intended purpose would require, and an atheist can grant all three and walk away by denying that any such purpose exists.
  • P4's data alone show a species that searches for its purpose, judges lives by a standard no one chose, and cannot live as though life were for nothing. Taken alone, that can be read as a deep illusion or as brute objective value.
  • Tied together, they show that the standard human beings feel bound by has exactly the structure of an original intention: it is prior to the person, independent of the person's preference, and addressed to what the person is for. The conceptual premises say such a standard needs an intending mind; the evidence says such a standard is what people actually live under.

On naturalism the felt authority and the conceptual structure of purpose are two unrelated facts, one a product of evolved psychology and the other of the logic of "intend," and their match is coincidence. On theism they match because human beings were made by Someone, for something, and know it dimly. To defeat the argument, an objector has to explain why human beings live under a standard shaped exactly like an intention that, on his view, no one ever had.

The overlap check

The strands come from different methods: conceptual analysis (P1, P3), philosophy of mind (Searle), clinical and survey psychology (Frankl, Steger, Oishi and Diener), analytic ethics (Wolf, Nagel), literature (Camus, Russell) and theology (Augustine, the Westminster divines). Three overlaps are each counted once:

  1. Felt authority and the reductio overlap. Both are judgments that some ends outrank others regardless of preference, so the ledger counts them as one family.
  2. Unlivability and the restless heart overlap. Camus, Russell and Augustine describe the same dissatisfaction from opposite conclusions, so they are one row of evidence, however many authors report it.
  3. The search data and the Argument from Desire overlap. The cross-cultural search for meaning also feeds Argument from Desire and Argument from Purpose Meaning and Hope; in the Cumulative Case for Christian Theism it should be counted in one of those places, not in all three.

The cut test

Cut each strand in turn and ask whether its premise still stands.

Cut this What remains Verdict
Sartre's paper-knife The semantics of "intend" and Searle on function P1 holds
Searle on functions The semantics of "intend" and Sartre P1 holds
The semantics of "intend" Nothing that sense four can stand on without it Single point, analytic: P1 is true by the meaning of "intended"
Searle's ontological and epistemic distinction Felt certainty in error and conflicting senses of purpose P2 holds
The causal-priority principle The ordinary cases, which presuppose it Single point: P3 rests on the impossibility of self-causation, which no participant in the debate denies
Frankl and the survey data (Steger; Oishi and Diener) Felt authority, the reductio, unlivability P4 holds, weaker
Felt authority and the reductio (one family) The search data and unlivability, which an illusion theory can partly absorb P4 holds, much weaker
Unlivability and the restless heart (one family) The search data and felt authority P4 holds, weaker
Felt authority, reductio and unlivability together (the whole phenomenological family) The search data alone, which shows that people want a purpose P4 at risk: its load-bearing strand
The theistic abductive reading The data stand, but Wielenberg's objective-value rival absorbs the authority and the reductio as value P4 at risk against the secular-realist rival; the argument then reaches objective value and stops short of intended purpose
Parents and societies (P5) The naturalist's own account that no human designed the species P5 holds
The identification of the mind as the Christian God C still stands: an intending mind independent of human preference Outside the spine by design: the identification needs further premises

Reading the test. P1, P3 and P5 are the strongest premises; P1 and P3 are principles with no backup by design, and they need none, because denying them requires an intention no one has or an effect that causes itself. P2 is backed twice. P4 is the premise an objector should press, and the load-bearing strand is the phenomenological family: the felt authority of purpose over preference, the reductio, and the unlivability of nihilism. Without that family, P4 falls back on the bare fact that people want purpose. The second pressure point is the secular moral realist, who can accept the phenomenology as evidence of objective value and stop before intention; the reply is that the search is for an end, which value alone does not supply, and the ledger rates that reply as moderate. The argument is consistent with an atheist denying P4; it shows what the denial costs.

The ledger

Prior-agnostic: the ledger does not assume theism is likely or unlikely in advance. It asks only how expected each datum is under each hypothesis. Ranges are qualitative judgments, argued in the premise sections, not measurements.

Datum How expected on theism How expected on naturalism Likelihood ratio (theism : naturalism) Why Independent of the rows above?
Organs and organisms have natural functions High High Roughly even, about 1:1 Selected-effect functions are predicted by both; the argument does not lean on them Yes
Humans universally search for what life is for (Frankl; Steger) High Moderate Modestly favours theism, roughly 2:1 An evolved drive for goals is expected; a drive for the point of existence itself less so Yes
Meaning tracks religiosity more than wealth (Oishi and Diener) Moderate to high Moderate Slightly favours theism Comfort-seeking illusions are possible on naturalism Partly overlaps the row above
Lives are judged against a standard their owners did not choose (Wolf's Sisyphus; the reductio) High Low to moderate Favours theism, roughly 2:1 to 4:1, less against secular realism Expected if humans were made for an end; on naturalism needs brute values or systematic error Yes (one family)
Nihilism cannot be lived, even by its defenders (Camus, Russell, Nagel) High Moderate Modestly favours theism Selection can produce stubborn attachment to life, but not obviously a felt demand for an ultimate point Partly overlaps the row above
The standard has the structure of an intention: prior, independent, addressed to what we are for High Low Favours theism clearly On naturalism the structure of purpose and the felt authority are unrelated facts The conjunction, not a separate row

Net. One row is even and two are slight. The rows that favour theism do so modestly when taken one at a time, and the case is carried by their conjunction: a species that lives under a standard shaped exactly like an original intention. Against a bare naturalism the case is moderate to strong; against a naturalism that adds necessary objective values it is weaker, because that rival absorbs the authority rows and leaves only the end-shaped structure of the search. The argument's deductive conclusion is as secure as P4, and P4 is as secure as the phenomenological family.

The defeater gate

The Equivocation Trilemma. The strongest objection says the argument trades on the word purpose. Steel-manned, it runs as a trilemma.

  1. If purpose in P4 means a chosen goal, P4 is true and P1 is false: a chosen goal presupposes only the person who chooses it.
  2. If it means natural function, P4 is true and P1 is false: Aristotle, Physics II.8, argues that nature acts for the sake of an end without deliberating ("art does not deliberate" either), and modern selected-effect accounts give functions with no designer at all. Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos (2012), even proposes natural teleology without God.
  3. If it means ultimate intended purpose, P1 is true and P4 begs the question, because asserting that human existence was intended for something already asserts an intender.

The reply takes each horn.

  1. Horns one and two are granted, and they do not touch the argument. The spine fixes sense four in the definitions and uses it in every premise. The argument never infers a designer from chosen goals or from natural function; it concedes that both exist without one. Aristotle's natural teleology is fully compatible with the argument, which does not depend on the Fifth Way for its force. (Aristotle himself orders the cosmos toward an unmoved mover that moves things by being loved, Metaphysics XII.7, so even his teleology ends in a final object of desire; the argument does not need that point.)
  2. Horn three is the real dispute, and it does not hold. A premise begs the question when the only reason to accept it is the conclusion. P4 is supported by evidence that does not mention God: the universal search for what life is for, the judgment that the satisfied stone-roller's life still lacks meaning, the reductio of purpose-relativism, and the unlivability of nihilism. Each of these is accepted, as description, by atheists who reject the conclusion. A premise with independent evidence is a premise, whatever it entails.
  3. The objector's best move is therefore to deny P4 outright, as Sartre and Russell did. That is consistent, and the argument says so. It moves the debate onto the ground the argument chose: the objector must now explain why human beings live under a standard prior to their preferences, aimed at what they are for, when on his view no such end exists.

What the gate concedes. The trilemma shows that the argument stands or falls with P4 in sense four. Natural teleology alone does not entail a designer, and no step of this argument says it does.

Concessions

  • Grant: atheists have real goals and live meaningful lives in the everyday sense. Now collect: the question was never whether they choose goals; it is whether their existence was intended for an end, and choosing goals does not answer it.
  • Grant: the experience of purpose is a real, objective fact about a person. Now collect: then its content is a claim that can be true or false, which means there is a fact of the matter about what a life is for.
  • Grant: natural functions exist without a designer. Now collect: then the argument's critics must engage the premise it actually uses, ultimate intended purpose, and the evidence for P4.
  • Grant: objective values might exist without God. Now collect: then the search for what human life is for is still unanswered, since that search asks for an end, and the secular realist owes an account of necessary values that bind persons yet answer to no person.

Cheatsheet

The 30-second version (read aloud). You say you create your own purpose. You do create your own goals, and I respect them. But you did not create yourself. You existed before you chose anything. So whatever your choices do, they cannot reach back and set the reason you were brought into existence. If your life is for something, and the way all of us judge lives says it is, then that purpose came from a mind that was there before you and does not depend on what you want. Christianity names that mind: God, who made you for Himself.

Fast facts:

  1. Sartre (Existentialism Is a Humanism, 1946): the paper-knife has an intended essence because an artisan conceived it; with no God, he concluded, humans have none. He accepts P1 and denies P4.
  2. Searle (The Construction of Social Reality, 1995): pain is ontologically subjective, yet a report that someone is in pain is epistemically objective, plainly true or false.
  3. Oishi and Diener (Psychological Science, 2014): across 132 countries, people in poorer nations report more meaning in life, and religiosity explains much of the gap.
  4. Wolf (2010), adapting Taylor's Sisyphus: a man made to love a pointless task is satisfied, and most people judge that his life still lacks meaning.
  5. Westminster Shorter Catechism (1647), Q1: "Man's chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him for ever."

The closing line. Personal decisions establish the goals you pursue; they cannot establish why you were brought into existence. An ultimate intended purpose needs an intending source prior to and independent of you, and Christianity names that source as God.

Cross-examination

Round 1, Goal or intention

  • Q: Do you have a purpose?
  • If they say: "Yes, I create my own." Then: Did you create yourself?
  • If they say: "No." Then: Then how can a decision you make today establish the original intention for your existence?
  • If they say: "I decide what to do with it." Then: You have named a personal goal, and I grant it. I am asking a different question: was your existence itself intended for an end?

Round 2, The master question

  • Q: If you did not cause your own existence, how could your preferences establish the original intention for which you exist?
  • If they say: "They can't, and there is no original intention." Then: Then you deny P4. Is the life of a man engineered to count grass happily forever as meaningful as yours? If not, what standard are you using, and who set it?

Round 3, Subjective what?

  • Q: Are you claiming that reality itself is subjective, or that your experience of an independent reality is subjective?
  • If they say: "Reality itself." Then: Is that claim objectively true? If so, it refutes itself.
  • If they say: "My experience." Then: Agreed. Then your sense of purpose is a report that can be right or wrong, and we can ask what makes it right.

Round 4, Equally valid?

  • Q: Is every self-chosen purpose equally valid?
  • If they say yes: then protecting children and harming them are equally valid answers to what a human life is for.
  • If they say no: then purpose answers to a standard above preference, which is P4's evidence.

Dodge table

Dodge What it concedes Reply
"Purpose is just what you make it." Chosen goals exist, which the argument grants "Then your purpose begins after you did. What was your existence for before you chose?"
"Evolution gave us purpose." Natural function exists "On your view evolution has no intentions, so it gives function. Do you think human life is for anything?"
"Meaning is subjective." The experience is real "Ontologically, yes. Is the claim 'my life is for this' true or false?"
"We don't need ultimate purpose to be happy." The question of ultimate purpose is left open "Sisyphus can be happy. Is his life meaningful?"
"Objective values exist without God." The authority of value over preference "Grant the values. What is a human life for, and who intended it?"

Live-cite kit

Scripture (ASV):

  • Colossians 1:16: "for in him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers; all things have been created through him, and unto him" (Colossians 1:16, ASV)
  • Revelation 4:11: "Worthy art thou, our Lord and our God, to receive the glory and the honor and the power: for thou didst create all things, and because of thy will they were, and were created" (Revelation 4:11, ASV)
  • Ephesians 2:10: "For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God afore prepared that we should walk in them" (Ephesians 2:10, ASV)
  • Isaiah 43:7: "every one that is called by my name, and whom I have created for my glory, whom I have formed, yea, whom I have made" (Isaiah 43:7, ASV)
  • Romans 11:36: "For of him, and through him, and unto him, are all things. To him be the glory for ever. Amen" (Romans 11:36, ASV)
  • Ecclesiastes 3:11: "He hath made everything beautiful in its time: also he hath set eternity in their heart, yet so that man cannot find out the work that God hath done from the beginning even to the end" (Ecclesiastes 3:11, ASV)

Scholarly:

  • Augustine, Confessions I.1: "You have made us for Yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in You."
  • Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 2, a. 3 (the Fifth Way): things that lack intelligence act for an end only as directed by one with knowledge, "as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer."
  • Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism Is a Humanism (1946): with no God to conceive human nature, existence precedes essence.
  • John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (1995): ontological and epistemic subjectivity are different things.
  • Viktor Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning (1946): meaning is discovered, and the search for it is a primary human motivation.

Aphorism: "You chose your goals. You did not choose your existence. The reason you exist was there first."

Connection to Scripture

  • Colossians 1:16, all things created through Christ and "unto him": the original intention named, with its end.
  • Revelation 4:11, creation "because of thy will": existence grounded in an intending will.
  • Isaiah 43:7, human beings created "for my glory": the ultimate intended purpose stated.
  • Ephesians 2:10, "his workmanship ... for good works, which God afore prepared": an end set before the person exists, P3 in Paul's words.
  • Romans 11:36, "of him, and through him, and unto him": origin, means and end in one mind.
  • Ecclesiastes 3:11, eternity set in the heart: the search for purpose as part of the design.
  • Genesis 1:27, made in the image of God: the end of human nature tied to the One whose image it bears (Imago Dei).

Scholarship

Published academic works this page draws on, each matched to a publisher, index or library catalog record.

See also

Common questions this page answers

Q: Can you have a purpose without God?

You can have goals without God, and many atheists live by good ones. An ultimate intended purpose, the end your existence was intended for, is different: it needs a mind that intended it. Since you did not cause your own existence, your choices cannot supply that intention, so it would have to come from a mind prior to and independent of you.

Q: What is wrong with saying "I create my own purpose"?

Nothing, as a description of choosing goals. It answers "what will I do with my life?" It leaves open "what was my life intended for?", because a choice made after you exist cannot set the reason you were brought into existence.

Q: Does purpose have to be objective?

The experience of purpose is always a real fact about the person who has it. Its content, "my life is for this," is a claim that can be true or false. Most people show they think it can be false when they judge that a happy but pointless life, like someone engineered to count blades of grass forever, still lacks meaning.

Q: What is the difference between a chosen goal and an original purpose?

A chosen goal is an end you set for your existence after you exist. An original intended purpose is the end your existence was intended for before you could choose anything. A house can be turned into a shop, but that does not change what the builder had in mind.

Q: What are the four meanings of purpose?

Subjective or chosen (an end a person sets), instrumental (what a tool is used for), natural function (what an organ does, Aristotle's telos) and objective or ultimate intended purpose (the end something was intended to exist for). The Original Intention Argument uses only the fourth.

Q: Doesn't evolution give living things a purpose without God?

Evolution explains natural functions: hearts pump blood because pumping was selected for. That is purpose in the third sense, and it needs no designer. The argument grants this and makes no inference from it. It asks whether human existence was intended for an end, which evolution, having no intentions, cannot supply.

Q: What does Augustine mean by "our heart is restless until it rests in You"?

In Confessions I.1 Augustine says God made us for Himself, so no created thing satisfies the human heart. The line names both the intended purpose (to be for God) and the evidence for it (the restlessness people feel when they live for anything less).

Q: Can an atheist reject this argument?

Yes, consistently, by denying that human existence has an ultimate intended purpose at all, as Sartre and Russell did. The argument shows the cost: the atheist must then explain why human beings judge lives by a standard no one chose and cannot live as though life were for nothing.

Q: Does this argument prove the Christian God?

It proves, if its premises are true, that humanity's ultimate purpose comes from an intending mind prior to and independent of human preference. Identifying that mind as the God of the Bible draws on other arguments and on revelation. Scripture names Him: all things were created through Christ "and unto him" (Colossians 1:16).

Q: What is the chief end of man?

The Westminster Shorter Catechism (1647) answers its first question: "Man's chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him for ever." That is the Christian statement of humanity's ultimate intended purpose, a relationship with the One who made us.

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