Argument

The Lock and Key Argument

Intro

People are built to look for God. Small children see purpose everywhere and readily guess that someone made the world. Adults all over the globe, in every age, have worshiped. Even trained scientists, when rushed, fall back on "things are made for a purpose." That is the key.

The world, for its part, is built to be searched. It runs on laws simple enough for human minds to discover, it obeys mathematics that people worked out on paper, and it is full of clues that point past itself. That is the lock.

A key and a lock that fit are not proof by themselves. But a fit is exactly what you would expect if one maker cut both, and it is very hard to explain if the key and the lock came from two blind processes that never met. The argument does not say "we want God, so God exists." It says the wanting and the world fit too well to be an accident.

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In full

The Lock and Key Argument is a two-sided fit argument. Its explanandum is not the religious disposition alone, which naturalistic cognitive science of religion explains as a byproduct, nor the world's intelligibility alone, which the discoverability and applicability-of-mathematics arguments address, but the match between them: a mind that spontaneously infers a designing intelligence and seeks it, set in a world whose deep structure rewards rational search far beyond what survival requires. A deductive spine (P1 to P5) carries a likelihood conclusion: the match is far more expected on theism, where one intending Mind is the common cause of faculty and world, than on naturalism, where the faculty's history and the world's structure share no directed cause. Each premise is supported by an inductive strand (developmental and cross-cultural data, physics and mathematics), an abductive strand comparing rival explanations, and a convergence of independent disciplines. The strongest objection, the evolutionary debunking of religious cognition, is answered by a dilemma: a debunker who limits reliable cognition to survival-relevant beliefs loses fundamental physics and mathematics along with God; one who grants reliability beyond survival concedes the very surplus fit the argument explains. The conclusion is confirmatory, not demonstrative: the match is evidence for God, and it adds to the Cumulative Case for Christian Theism.

Format note

This is the first argument built as a braided case: a valid deductive spine, each premise supported by an inductive strand, an abductive strand and a convergence note, a knot that checks the strands are independent, a likelihood ledger, and a defeater gate. The convergence arguments elsewhere in Ris3n Arguments are one strand of this format; here that strand sits inside a spine that forces every disagreement onto a named premise.

The spine

Validity. P1 and P2 establish that the match obtains. P3 says the match is far more expected given a common intending cause than given independent undirected causes. P4 assigns theism to the first case and naturalism to the second. So the match is far more expected on theism than on naturalism, and by P5 it confirms theism over naturalism. The form is a likelihood comparison closed by modus ponens on the likelihood principle.

Strength of the conclusion. Confirmatory, not deductive proof of God. The argument shows the evidence favours theism; how strongly depends on the ranges argued in the ledger, which are judgments, not measurements.

P1, The key: minds disposed to find a designer

Inductive strand

1. Children reason about nature in terms of purpose. Deborah Kelemen's "Are Children 'Intuitive Theists'?" (Psychological Science, 2004) reviews evidence that young children readily explain natural objects by purpose and endorse the idea that nature was made by someone.
2. The bias persists in adults and experts. Kelemen and Evan Rosset (Cognition, 2009) found adults accept unwarranted purpose-based explanations under time pressure. Kelemen, Joshua Rottman and Rebecca Seston (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142, 2013) found that physical scientists at leading universities, when rushed, endorsed more purpose-based explanations of natural phenomena than they did unrushed, though fewer than students and members of the public. The authors read purpose-based reasoning as a cognitive default that training suppresses but does not erase.
3. The disposition is early and natural. Justin L. Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (2004) and Born Believers (2012), argues from developmental and cognitive research that belief in a creator comes naturally to children, who are prepared to see the world as designed.
4. Religion recurs across human societies. Worship, sacred places and burial rites recur across cultures and deep history; see Argument from the Universal Worship Convergence.
5. A longing no finite good satisfies. C. S. Lewis: "If I find in myself a desire which no experience in this world can satisfy, the most probable explanation is that I was made for another world" (Mere Christianity, book 3, chapter 10). See Argument from Desire.

Abductive strand

Convergence

Developmental psychology (Kelemen, Barrett), cognitive science of religion (Guthrie, Boyer, from the opposite philosophical direction), anthropology of worship, and Reidian philosophy of religion (Clark and Barrett, JAAR, 2011) reach the same descriptive claim: belief in a designing mind comes naturally to humans. Critics of the theistic reading accept the description; they dispute the interpretation.

Objections and rebuttals

1. "Children are not intuitive theists. Paul Bloom and Konika Banerjee argue that religion depends heavily on culture, and a child raised alone would not invent God." (Banerjee and Bloom, "Would Tarzan Believe in God?", Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2013.) Rebuttal. P1 does not claim untaught children invent a full doctrine of God. It claims a natural disposition to see design and purpose and to seek a maker, which Banerjee and Bloom do not deny; they argue the specific content comes from culture. A key that needs cutting to its final shape is still a key.
2. "A disposition to believe is not evidence that the belief is true." Rebuttal. Agreed, and the argument never says it is. P1 is one side of a match; the evidence is the fit between P1 and P2, not P1 alone.

P2, The lock: a world built to be searched

Inductive strand

1. Discoverability. Robin Collins, "The Argument from Physical Constants: The Fine-Tuning for Discoverability" (in Jerry Walls and Trent Dougherty, eds., Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God, Oxford, 2018), argues that the constants of physics are set not only for life but for embodied observers to discover the universe's deep structure.
2. Mathematics fits the world. Eugene Wigner, "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences" (Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics, 1960), called the usefulness of mathematics in physics "a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve." See Argument from the Beauty-Mathematics Convergence and Mathematics Requires Christian Theism.
3. Comprehensibility. Einstein: "the eternal mystery of the world is its comprehensibility" ("Physics and Reality," 1936). See Argument from Intelligibility and Laws of the Universe as Witness to Design.
4. Clues that point beyond the world. A universe with a beginning, finely tuned constants, and moral and rational order; see Fine-Tuning Argument and Natural Theology.
5. The habitable place is also the observing place. Guillermo Gonzalez and Jay W. Richards, The Privileged Planet (2004), argue that the conditions for life on Earth also make it a good place to observe the universe. This one is contested among astronomers and carries less weight in the ledger.

Abductive strand

Convergence

Physics (constants and laws), mathematics (applicability), philosophy of science (Wigner, Einstein) and astronomy (Collins, Gonzalez and Richards) reach P2 by different routes; several of the sources are not theists, and Wigner and Einstein offered no theistic reading.

Objections and rebuttals

1. "Of course we find the world understandable; our minds evolved in it." Rebuttal. Evolution selects for the understanding survival needs: food, predators, social life. It does not obviously select for general relativity, number theory or quantum field theory, which is exactly why Wigner called the fit unreasonable.
2. "Maybe the world only looks mathematical because we impose mathematics on it." Rebuttal. Mathematics developed on paper, with no physical target, repeatedly turns out to describe physics discovered later (Wigner's examples). Imposition does not explain prediction.

P3, The fit principle

Inductive strand

1. Ordinary inference. A lock and a key that fit, a socket and a plug, a question and its answer: we infer a common maker when two independently existing things fit each other in a specific way.
2. Scientific practice. Matching structures in independent systems (homology in biology, the same signal in two detectors) are treated as evidence of a common cause; coincidence is the explanation of last resort.

Abductive strand

The rival to P3 is that fits arise by chance. Chance can produce a loose fit; it does not make a specific fit expected. The tighter and more specific the fit, the more a common intending cause outperforms chance.

Convergence

The principle is common to probability theory (the likelihood principle), philosophy of science (inference to the best explanation; see Abductive Reasoning) and everyday reasoning.

Objections and rebuttals

1. "The fit is loose, not tight." Rebuttal. Then the ledger rates it modest, not decisive; P3 still holds, and the argument's strength is argued in the ledger, not assumed.

P4, The hypotheses

Inductive strand

1. Theism. On Christian theism the same God made human beings in His image (Imago Dei) and made a world that declares His glory (Psalm 19:1-2), so a match between seeker and sought is predicted.
2. Naturalism. The faculty is explained by natural selection acting on survival-relevant cognition; the world's structure by physics with no reference to observers. The two stories share no directed cause.

Abductive strand

Naturalism's best move is to deny the match needs explaining, by treating the God-seeking faculty as a misfiring byproduct. That move is the subject of the defeater gate below.

Convergence

Plantinga (Warranted Christian Belief, 2000; Where the Conflict Really Lies, 2011) and the Reidian reading of cognitive science (Clark and Barrett, 2011) independently argue that natural belief-forming faculties carry warrant unless shown unreliable, and that naturalism cannot certify reason's reliability beyond survival. See Argument from Reason, Argument from the Reliability of Reason and Reformed Epistemology.

Objections and rebuttals

1. "God of the gaps." Rebuttal. The argument does not rest on a gap in knowledge; it rests on what we know: the faculty, the structure, and their fit. More science sharpens both sides of the match.

P5, The likelihood principle

Inductive strand

The principle that evidence favours the hypothesis on which it is more expected is standard in probability theory and in scientific confirmation, and is accepted by many critics of theistic arguments.

Abductive strand

Its rival, that evidence confirms nothing without known prior probabilities, would undercut most scientific reasoning as well.

Convergence

Bayesian confirmation theory and the likelihoodist school agree on this comparative use, whatever they think about priors.

Objections and rebuttals

1. "Theism's prior is so low that no likelihood helps." Rebuttal. The ledger is prior-agnostic and the conclusion is comparative. A low prior is a separate argument, answered elsewhere in the Cumulative Case for Christian Theism.

The knot

The strands come from different methods and people: developmental experiments (Kelemen, Barrett), cross-cultural anthropology, analytic philosophy (Plantinga, Lewis), physics and mathematics (Wigner, Einstein, Collins). Two overlaps are counted once: Kelemen's 2004, 2009 and 2013 studies form one family of evidence, and the mathematics row partly overlaps the discoverability row, since mathematical order is part of what makes the world discoverable. The central datum, the match itself, is not any one row; it is the conjunction of the faculty side and the world side, which have independent histories on naturalism.

The ledger

Prior-agnostic: the ledger asks only how expected each datum is under each hypothesis. The ratings are reasoned judgments from the sections above, not measurements.

Net. No single row is decisive, and two are disputed. Together the rows favour theism, because the faculty side and the world side are each somewhat more expected on theism, and their match, which naturalism must treat as the meeting of two unrelated histories, is much more expected on theism. The argument is as strong as the weaker of its two sides plus the specificity of the fit.

The defeater gate

The Debunker's Dilemma. The strongest objection is evolutionary debunking: belief in God arises from a hyperactive agency detector (Stewart Guthrie, Faces in the Clouds, 1993; the term HADD is Barrett's) and other mental tools that misfire as a byproduct (Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained, 2001; Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 2006; Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, 2006, chapter 5). A detector that over-fires explains the belief without any God, so the "key" is just a glitch.

The reply is a dilemma for the debunker.

1. If evolved origin debunks a belief-forming faculty, it debunks reason too. Our reasoning is also evolved. The debunker who says "this belief comes from an evolved tendency, so it is untrustworthy" has a parity problem, which is Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism (Where the Conflict Really Lies, 2011).
2. The usual escape is to trust only survival-relevant cognition. But then the debunker must also distrust general relativity, quantum theory, set theory and the reasoning behind the debunking argument itself, none of which our ancestors needed to survive.
3. The other escape is to grant that our minds track truth far beyond survival needs. Then the debunker concedes exactly the surplus fit between mind and world that P2 and P3 describe, and that naturalism cannot explain.

Either horn costs the debunker more than the argument. A further point: a mere misfiring detector predicts scattered false alarms (faces in clouds, spirits in the wind). It does not predict a world whose deep structure rewards the search with law, order and mathematics. The detector story explains the key; it does not explain the lock, and it cannot explain the fit.

What the gate concedes: debunking arguments do show that the disposition alone cannot carry the argument. That is why the argument rests on the match, never on the disposition by itself. See Genetic Fallacy and Self-refutation.

Concessions

• Grant: the God-seeking disposition has natural causes that cognitive science can study. Now collect: natural causes are how a Creator would build it; a natural mechanism for the key says nothing about who cut the lock.
• Grant: the disposition misfires, producing superstition and idolatry. Now collect: Scripture says the same (Romans 1:21-23); a faculty that can be misused is still a faculty with a proper object.
• Grant: the ledger's ratings are judgments, not numbers. Now collect: then the objector must argue each rating, not wave the whole case away as "just a feeling."

Cheatsheet

The 30-second version (read aloud). Every culture worships, children see design everywhere, and even scientists in a hurry think nature is made for a purpose. That is a key. The world, meanwhile, runs on laws simple enough to discover and mathematics we worked out on paper. That is a lock. I am not saying "we want God, so God exists." I am saying the key fits the lock. If one Maker made both, that is what you'd expect. If our minds and the universe came from two blind processes that never met, the fit is a coincidence you have to swallow.

Fast facts:

1. Kelemen (Psychological Science, 2004): young children readily explain nature by purpose and design.
2. Kelemen, Rottman and Seston (J. Exp. Psych.: General, 2013): physical scientists endorsed more purpose-based explanations when rushed.
3. Wigner (1960): the fit of mathematics to physics is "a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve."
4. Collins (Oxford, 2018): the constants are tuned not only for life but for discovery.
5. Plantinga (2011): if evolution debunks belief in God, it debunks the reason we use to do science.

The closing line. A glitch explains a key that opens nothing. This key opens the universe.

Cross-examination

Round 1, Is the disposition real?

• Q: Do you agree that humans, from childhood, readily see design and purpose in nature?
• If they say yes: then we agree on the key. Now the lock.
• If they say no: point to Kelemen 2004 and 2013, then ask what they would accept as evidence.

Round 2, Is the world discoverable beyond survival?

• Q: Did our ancestors need quantum field theory to survive?
• If they say no: then why do minds built for survival grasp it, and why does the world answer in mathematics?

Round 3, The dilemma

• Q: Does an evolved origin make a belief untrustworthy?
• If they say yes: then reason is untrustworthy too, including your argument.
• If they say only for non-survival beliefs: then physics and mathematics go with God.
• If they say no: then the debunking argument against belief in God is gone.

Dodge table

Live-cite kit

Scripture (ASV):

• Romans 1:19-20: because that which is known of God is manifest in them; for God manifested it unto them. For the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity; that they may be without excuse (Romans 1:19-20, ASV)
• Ecclesiastes 3:11: he hath set eternity in their heart, yet so that man cannot find out the work that God hath done from the beginning even to the end (Ecclesiastes 3:11, ASV)
• Acts 17:26-27: that they should seek God, if haply they might feel after him and find him, though he is not far from each one of us (Acts 17:27, ASV)
• Jeremiah 29:13: And ye shall seek me, and find me, when ye shall search for me with all your heart (Jeremiah 29:13, ASV)
• Psalm 19:1-2: The heavens declare the glory of God; And the firmament showeth his handiwork. Day unto day uttereth speech, And night unto night showeth knowledge (Psalm 19:1-2, ASV)

Scholarly:

• Justin L. Barrett, Born Believers (2012): belief in a creator comes naturally to children.
• Deborah Kelemen, "Are Children 'Intuitive Theists'?" (Psychological Science, 2004).
• Eugene Wigner (1960): "a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve."
• Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies (2011): naturalism and evolution together undercut trust in reason.

Aphorism: "The longing is the key. The universe is the lock. They fit."

Connection to Scripture

• Acts 17:26-27, Paul at Athens: God set humans in the world precisely so that they would seek and find Him, the key and lock in one sentence.
• Romans 1:19-20, God made Himself known both within people and through the things that are made.
• Ecclesiastes 3:11, eternity set in the human heart.
• Jeremiah 29:13, the search that is promised an answer.
• Psalm 19:1-2, a world that speaks.

Scholarship

Published academic works this page draws on, each matched to a publisher, index or library catalog record.

• Konika Banerjee and Paul Bloom, "Would Tarzan believe in God? Conditions for the emergence of religious belief," Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (2013). doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.11.005 PubMed 23238119
• Justin L. Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2004). doi:10.5040/9798216409243
• Justin L. Barrett, Born Believers (2012). Open Library
• Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained (Basic Books, 2001). Open Library
• K. J. Clark and J. L. Barrett, "Reidian Religious Epistemology and the Cognitive Science of Religion," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 79 (2011). doi:10.1093/jaarel/lfr008
• Albert Einstein, "Physics and reality," Journal of the Franklin Institute 221 (1936). doi:10.1016/s0016-0032(36)91047-5
• Guillermo Gonzalez and Jay Wesley Richards, The Privileged Planet (2004). Open Library
• Stewart Elliott Guthrie, Faces in the Clouds: A New Theory of Religion (Oxford University Press, 1993). doi:10.1093/oso/9780195069013.001.0001
• Deborah Kelemen, "Are Children 'Intuitive Theists'?: Reasoning About Purpose and Design in Nature," Psychological Science 15 (2004). doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00672.x PubMed 15102137
• Deborah Kelemen and Evelyn Rosset, "The Human Function Compunction: Teleological explanation in adults," Cognition 111 (2009). doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.01.001 PubMed 19200537
• Deborah Kelemen, Joshua Rottman and Rebecca Seston, "Professional physical scientists display tenacious teleological tendencies: Purpose-based reasoning as a cognitive default," Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (2013). doi:10.1037/a0030399 PubMed 23067062
• C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (1952). Open Library
• Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford University Press, 2000). doi:10.1093/0195131932.001.0001
• Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies (2011). Open Library
• Jerry L. Walls and Trent Dougherty, Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (2018). Open Library
• Eugene P. Wigner, "The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences. Richard courant lecture in mathematical sciences delivered at New York University, May 11, 1959," Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics 13 (1960). doi:10.1002/cpa.3160130102

See also

• Ris3n Arguments, the hub of ris3n's original arguments
• Sensus Divinitatis, the classical name for the key
• Cognitive Science of Religion, the science of the disposition and its debunking readings
• Argument from Desire, the affective side of the key
• Argument from Religious Experience, when the search reports a finding
• Argument from the Universal Worship Convergence, the cross-cultural data for P1
• The Designed Mind, the transcendental case that reason itself needs a designer
• Argument from Reason and Argument from the Reliability of Reason, the parity point in the defeater gate
• Argument from Intelligibility and Laws of the Universe as Witness to Design, the lock
• Argument from the Beauty-Mathematics Convergence and Mathematics Requires Christian Theism, mathematics and the world
• Fine-Tuning Argument, the constants behind discoverability
• Cumulative Case for Christian Theism, where this argument contributes