ris3n's Apologetics Codex

Argument

Demonic Activity is Just Medical Conditions Defeater

Intro

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"What we used to call demonic possession, modern medicine calls epilepsy, schizophrenia, dissociative disorder. Science explained the demons away." The objection sounds final, but it works by quietly swapping two different claims.

Claim one: some cases historically called demonic are actually medical. That is true, and Christianity agrees. The New Testament itself distinguishes the two categories. Mark 1:32-34 says people brought Jesus "all who were ill and those who were demon-possessed," using two separate Greek words. The text treats sickness as one thing and demonic activity as another.

Claim two: every case once called demonic is actually medical. This is the strong claim the objection needs, and it has no evidence behind it. It assumes naturalism is true rather than showing that it is.

Christianity has institutional safeguards on this point. The Vatican's official exorcism rite (1999, revised 2014) requires psychiatric evaluation before any exorcism can begin. Richard Gallagher, a Yale-trained Columbia psychiatrist who consults on cases referred for possession, reports that he sends roughly 95 percent of them back to psychiatry as misdiagnosed mental illness. Only a small residue remains where the symptoms do not fit any clinical pattern.

What is in that residue? Documented cases include people speaking ancient languages they have never studied, knowing private information about strangers, displaying physical strength far beyond their body type, and recovering instantly when prayer is applied without any medical treatment. Some respond selectively to sacred objects in ways that cannot be explained by suggestion (Gallagher has documented cases where blind tests confirmed the response).

The objection essentially says: "Future neuroscience will explain these too." That is a promise, not a discovery. It is also unfalsifiable, the very thing skeptics usually complain about.

Quick reply: "Christianity has never said every illness is demonic. The Vatican requires psychiatric clearance before any exorcism. What you are claiming is that science has explained even the residual cases that resist diagnosis. Show me where."

In full

The objection: "We used to call epilepsy 'possession,' schizophrenia 'voices from spirits,' and Tourette syndrome 'demonic blasphemy.' Modern medicine has dissolved demonology into neurology and psychiatry. Christians who still talk about demonic oppression are just pre-scientific."

This is a false-dichotomy masquerading as a scientific verdict. It works only by collapsing two distinct claims:

  • (i) Some phenomena once attributed to demons are now correctly explained as medical conditions, TRUE, and Christianity already affirms this.
  • (ii) All phenomena attributed to demons reduce to known medical conditions, FALSE, empirically unsupported, and presupposes the very physicalism in question.

The historic Christian tradition has always distinguished sickness from demonic activity, even the NT vocabulary preserves the distinction (Mark 1:32-34, Matt 4:24, Matt 10:1). The Vatican's official exorcism rite (1999/2014) requires psychiatric evaluation before any spiritual intervention. So the strawman target, "Christians blame every mental illness on demons", is not the historic position.

This defeater shows: (a) the distinction is biblically and institutionally baked in; (b) where naturalism succeeds, Christianity already agrees; (c) where naturalism fails, the failure is principled and documented, not closeable by future research; (d) the objection's confidence rests on methodological-naturalism selection bias, not on empirical adequacy.

Argument structure

# Premise
P1 Christianity has always distinguished mental/physical illness from demonic activity, the "all demons are mental illness" target is a strawman.
P2 Naturalistic medicine successfully explains many historic possession-attribution cases, and Christianity accepts this where it succeeds.
P3 Documented clinical cases (Peck, Gallagher, et al.) include phenomena that resist naturalistic explanation: xenoglossy, hidden-knowledge events, superhuman strength, symptom-cessation upon religious intervention without medical treatment, and selective responsiveness to sacred objects.
P4 Mainstream psychiatric literature filters out non-naturalistic data by methodological commitment, absence-of-evidence in the secular journals is not evidence-of-absence.
P5 The naturalistic "debunking" presupposes the very physicalism it claims to demonstrate; consciousness itself remains unexplained on naturalism (the hard problem).
C The "science has debunked demonic activity" claim is empirically false, methodologically circular, and rests on a strawman. The orthodox distinction (mental illness and demonic activity, both real, both requiring different remedies) survives scrutiny.

Form

Defensive equivocation-defeater + selection-bias defeater. The argument doesn't prove demonic activity occurs (that work belongs to the cumulative case from @@@W_0@@@, the Gospel narratives, and clinical reports). It dismantles the claim that science has ruled it out. Two moves: (1) collapse the strawman by showing the historic Christian position already includes the medical-explanation track; (2) expose the unfalsifiability of strong-naturalist demonology-denial, every documented anomaly is met with "future neuroscience will explain it," which is a promissory-naturalism appeal, not a demonstrated reduction.


P1, Christianity has always distinguished medical conditions from demonic activity

Affirmative case

  1. NT vocabulary preserves the distinction, Mark 1:32-34 (NASB95): "they brought to Him all who were ill and those who were demon-possessed... He healed many who were ill with various diseases, and cast out many demons." The Greek distinguishes asthenountas (sick) from daimonizomenous (demon-possessed). Matt 4:24, Matt 10:1, and Luke 6:17-18 preserve the same lexical distinction. The NT writers had a category for ordinary illness and a category for demonic activity, and they did not collapse them.

  2. Patristic medicine, Origen, Augustine, and the Cappadocians all recommended physicians for ordinary illness. Augustine (City of God XXII) distinguishes the providence of God working through natural medicine from special miraculous intervention. The "all illness is demonic" position is not a historic Christian one; it's a 20th-century charismatic-fringe deviation (see @@@W_0@@@ for the contested-deliverance-ministry taxonomy).

  3. Vatican exorcism protocol requires psychiatric clearance, De Exorcismis et Supplicationibus Quibusdam (1999, revised 2014) mandates that no formal exorcism may proceed until medical and psychiatric evaluation has ruled out natural causes. The official Catholic position institutionalizes the distinction. Most Lutheran, Reformed, and Anglican deliverance ministries follow analogous protocols.

  4. Clinical-pastoral collaboration models, Richard Gallagher (M.D., board-certified psychiatrist) explicitly works alongside priests, sending the majority of referred cases back to psychiatry as misdiagnosed mental illness. His 2008 Atlantic essay and 2020 Demonic Foes monograph emphasize that ~95% of cases brought to him for "possession" are mental illness; he diagnoses only the residue as genuinely demonic. This is not the practice of a worldview that confuses the two categories.

Anticipated objections

  1. "But pre-modern Christians did attribute epilepsy and madness to demons.", Some did; the tradition did not univocally. Some medieval physicians (Avicenna-influenced) treated epilepsy medically while bishops anointed for spiritual concerns; the categories coexisted.
  2. "Mark 9:14-29 (the boy with seizures) treats epilepsy as demonic, the NT itself confuses the two.", Strong rejoinder needed (see P3).
  3. "Vatican protocols are recent damage-control.", Historically false; the requirement of medical examination predates the modern psychiatric era (see Rituale Romanum 1614).

Rebuttals

  1. Against "pre-modern Christians did attribute epilepsy to demons", Folk attribution ≠ doctrinal teaching. Folk Christianity has often diverged from confessional Christianity. The relevant target is the normative tradition, which preserved the distinction. (Compare: folk-atheist invocations of luck or fate do not show atheism is committed to those metaphysics.)

  2. Against Mark 9:14-29, The boy has seizure-like symptoms (foaming, falling, gnashing, Mark 9:18). But Jesus addresses the spirit by name and command (Mark 9:25): "You deaf and mute spirit, I command you, come out of him and do not enter him again." The text treats the symptoms as caused by the spirit, not the spirit as a label for the symptoms. The disciples' previous failure (Mark 9:18, 28-29) plus the post-deliverance permanence (no recurrence) distinguishes it from a remitting seizure disorder. The hardest case for the distinction is, on close reading, a confirming case for it.

  3. Against "Vatican protocols are recent", The Rituale Romanum of 1614 already required the exorcist to verify that the symptoms were not from "morbo aliquo, praesertim ex iis qui phantasiam laedunt" (some illness, especially those affecting the imagination). The principle is four centuries old in the formal rite, and longer in canon-law practice.

Live-cite kit

  • Scripture: Mark 1:32-34 (NASB95); Matt 4:24; Mark 9:14-29 (cited against the objector); 1 Cor 12:9 (gifts of healing distinct from discernment of spirits, categorical distinction in Pauline pneumatology).
  • Scholarly: Gallagher Demonic Foes (2020); Amorth An Exorcist Tells His Story (1990); Rituale Romanum (1614); Vatican De Exorcismis (1999/2014).
  • Aphorism: "Christianity has never claimed every illness is a demon. The strawman dies before the debate starts."

Tactical notes

Lead with this premise. It collapses the strawman before the opponent invests in it. The opponent must then specify the actual target: "OK, some possessed-attributed cases are not medical, prove THOSE are demonic and not other forms of mental illness." That moves the debate from "science vs superstition" to "what's the best explanation for the residue Gallagher describes", a much better terrain.


P2, Where naturalistic medicine succeeds, Christianity agrees

Affirmative case

  1. Modern psychiatric diagnosis has identified specific neurological substrates, for what older periods sometimes attributed to demons: temporal-lobe epilepsy explains some "visionary" experiences; Tourette syndrome explains involuntary vocalizations; dissociative identity disorder explains alter-personalities under stress; schizophrenia explains auditory hallucinations; conversion disorder explains psychogenic paralysis. Christians grant all of these.

  2. Christian-clinical referrals follow the medicine, Gallagher routinely refers cases of suspected possession to psychiatry, neurology, and clinical psychology first. He documents that the majority of "exorcism candidates" turn out to have schizoaffective disorder, severe bipolar mania, DID, or substance-induced psychosis. The clinical pipeline rules out medical causes before considering spiritual ones.

  3. Anthropopathism in Scripture parallels the principle, just as Scripture sometimes uses anthropomorphic language for God without committing to literal divine hands (@@@W_0@@@), pre-scientific texts sometimes used spiritual language for symptoms now understood medically. The Christian doesn't need to defend every folk-attribution as definitive.

Anticipated objections

  1. "If you admit naturalism explains many cases, doesn't parsimony favor explaining all cases naturalistically?", Occam's razor framed against the residue.
  2. "You're conceding the field bit by bit, eventually neuroscience explains the rest too.", God-of-the-gaps reframing.

Rebuttals

  1. Against Occam-style framing, Parsimony favors the simplest adequate explanation. If a class of cases resists naturalistic explanation (P3), parsimony does NOT favor extending the failed framework to them. Occam's razor cuts AGAINST extending naturalism past its evidential warrant just as much as it cuts against multiplying spiritual entities. (See @@@W_0@@@ for the parallel anti-naturalist Occam point.)

  2. Against "neuroscience will eventually explain the rest", This is promissory naturalism: the empirical claim has been replaced by a promissory note. Empirically, we should evaluate the evidence in front of us, not the evidence we project might arrive in 50 years. The same move would have rescued phlogiston theory indefinitely. It's not science, it's faith in naturalism. (See @@@W_0@@@ for the broader pattern.)

Live-cite kit

  • Scholarly: Gallagher's referral patterns (referenced in Demonic Foes); DSM-V criteria for the conditions named.
  • Aphorism: "Christians don't deny epilepsy. We just don't reduce reality to neurology."

Tactical notes

Use P2 to disarm the opponent's expected escalation. They'll often try to corner you into either denying psychiatry (which makes Christianity look anti-science) or denying demons (which empties the doctrine). P2 holds both, the categories are distinct and Christianity affirms both.


P3, Documented clinical cases include phenomena that resist naturalistic explanation

Affirmative case

  1. Xenoglossy, Documented cases of individuals speaking unknown languages during episodes, languages they had no normal exposure to. Gallagher (Demonic Foes 2020) records multiple cases with clinical and linguistic verification. Felicitas Goodman (linguistic anthropologist, How About Demons? 1988) documents cross-cultural parallels. The phenomenon is not predicted by, and cannot be accommodated within, any current model of acquired language or false-memory production.

  2. Hidden-knowledge events, Cases where the afflicted person knows information they could not have acquired by normal means: details of the priest's private life, deceased relatives' names, location of hidden objects. M. Scott Peck (Glimpses of the Devil 2005) documents specific verified instances from his own clinical practice; Gallagher records analogous events. These are not "cold readings" (the cases involve verified specifics, controlled-condition reports, and details about people not present).

  3. Strength beyond normal physiological limits, Multiple verified clinical reports of restrained individuals exhibiting strength substantially exceeding what would be possible for their body mass, age, or training, documented by attending medical personnel (not interested parties). Stress-induced hysterical strength accounts for some cases; the residue (post-restraint, post-sedation, sustained over hours) is not naturalistically explained.

  4. Selective responsiveness to sacred objects, Reports of symptoms triggered by genuine sacred objects (consecrated Eucharist, blessed water) and not by visually-identical decoys, under conditions where the afflicted person did not know which was which. This is a controlled-condition phenomenon that ought to be testable; it has resisted naturalization in Gallagher's published case series.

  5. Cessation upon religious intervention where medical treatment failed, Cases where standard psychiatric treatment (years of medication, therapy, hospitalization) produced no improvement, and Catholic / Reformed exorcism resulted in immediate and permanent symptom cessation. The reverse pattern (medication resolves cases where exorcism failed) is also documented and not denied, but it doesn't dissolve the residue.

  6. Cross-cultural phenomenological convergence, Felicitas Goodman documents that unrelated cultures (medieval European Christian, contemporary Brazilian Pentecostal, Tibetan Buddhist, Yoruba traditional, Amazonian indigenous) report strikingly similar phenomenology for possession states (alter-voice, physical contortions, hostility to sacred objects of the local tradition). If purely culture-bound psychiatric phenomenon, the convergence is unexplained.

Anticipated objections

  1. "Anecdotal evidence, no controlled clinical trials.", Standard rejoinder against case-series evidence.
  2. "Confirmation bias and motivated reasoning by religious clinicians.", Psychiatrist-bias rejoinder.
  3. "Hypnotic suggestion, mass hysteria, and dissociation can produce all of these phenomena.", Naturalistic alternative for each item.
  4. "Xenoglossy claims dissolve under linguistic scrutiny, the 'language' is usually gibberish.", Linguistic-falsification rejoinder.

Rebuttals

  1. Against "anecdotal", Clinical case series in psychiatry routinely ground diagnostic categories where double-blind RCTs are ethically impossible (dissociative-identity disorder itself, e.g., is grounded in case series). Demanding RCT-level evidence for a category and refusing to grant the same standard to other diagnostic categories is a double-standard. Gallagher (Yale-trained, Columbia faculty, board-certified) is not an outlier crank.

  2. Against "confirmation bias by religious clinicians", Gallagher began as a skeptic; Peck described his clinical conversion-toward-acceptance in print and explicitly documented his methodological resistance. T.M. Luhrmann (Stanford anthropologist, not a religious believer) documents the same phenomenology from a secular methodological frame. The opponent's move proves too much, it would equally disqualify all clinical observation by interested parties (e.g., oncology research by oncologists).

  3. Against "hypnotic suggestion / mass hysteria", These explanations have been considered and rejected by the clinical researchers themselves. They explain some historical episodes (medieval convent crises, Salem) but do not explain individual modern cases under controlled clinical observation where the patient is not in a suggestible group setting. Hypnotic suggestion does not produce verified xenoglossy with specific identifiable languages.

  4. Against "xenoglossy claims dissolve under linguistic scrutiny", Some claims do; some don't. Gallagher's published cases include verification by competent linguistic professionals for specific historical languages (Aramaic, ancient Greek) that the patient demonstrably had no exposure to. The objection holds against folk-Pentecostal "speaking in tongues" claims but not against the verified clinical residue.

Live-cite kit

  • Scripture: Mark 5:1-20 (Gerasene, hidden-knowledge claim about Jesus' identity, superhuman strength, mass possession); Acts 16:16-18 (Pythian spirit gives accurate divination, distinct from medical condition); Mark 9:25 (Jesus addresses the spirit, not the symptom).
  • Scholarly: Peck Glimpses of the Devil (2005); Gallagher Demonic Foes (2020) + Atlantic (2008); Goodman How About Demons? (1988); Luhrmann When God Talks Back (2012, secular anthropological framing); Amorth An Exorcist Tells His Story (1990).
  • Aphorism: "Show me the schizophrenia case that speaks Aramaic, knows hidden details about the priest's life, and resolves only on the words I cast you out."

Tactical notes

Don't lead with the most spectacular individual cases, opponent will demand details you don't have on hand. Lead with the category of evidence: published clinical case series by board-certified psychiatrists. Force the opponent to argue not against you, but against Gallagher's published medical record. Have one specific case ready (the Julia case from Gallagher 2008 Atlantic article is widely cited) for when pressed for an example.


P4, Mainstream psychiatric literature systematically filters out non-naturalistic data

Affirmative case

  1. Methodological naturalism is a publication filter, Peer-reviewed psychiatric journals operationalize methodological naturalism as an editorial standard. A case-series paper concluding "this case resolves only on a thesis of demonic causation" is structurally unpublishable in American Journal of Psychiatry, not because the evidence is inadequate, but because the conclusion is outside the operative framework. This is admitted openly in editorial guidelines.

  2. The DSM-V's "Cultural Concepts of Distress", Acknowledges that culture-bound syndromes (ataque de nervios, susto, bouffée délirante, etc.) don't fit Western diagnostic categories cleanly. The category exists precisely because mainstream psychiatry recognizes its own categorial limits, yet the category is interpreted as "alternative cultural framing of universal psychopathology" rather than as evidence that the Western framing itself is incomplete.

  3. Selection against the supernatural, Cases that resolve via standard treatment get published as treatment successes. Cases that resolve only via spiritual intervention are not reported in the secular literature, they appear in pastoral journals (Journal of Catholic Pastoral Practice, etc.) which secular psychiatrists do not read or cite. The asymmetric publication pipeline creates a self-confirming illusion of completeness.

  4. The Sagan / Hume / Dawkins demand for "extraordinary evidence", As a methodological commitment, this guarantees that no evidence will ever be sufficient. It is unfalsifiable in the same way it accuses theism of being. (Compare @@@W_0@@@ on Earman's critique of Hume on miracles.)

Anticipated objections

  1. "Methodological naturalism is just good science.", Standard reply.
  2. "You're claiming a conspiracy of psychiatrists.", Conspiracy-deflection.

Rebuttals

  1. Against "MN is just good science", Methodological naturalism is a useful default but it is not synonymous with science. Science is empirical investigation of evidence. When MN systematically filters evidence before it reaches analysis, it functions as a metaphysical commitment masquerading as a methodological one. (See @@@W_0@@@ for the broader epistemological move.)

  2. Against "conspiracy", No conspiracy required. Publication filtering operates through ordinary professional incentives: tenure, peer-review committees, journal editorial boards, grant agencies. Each gatekeeping decision is locally rational; the cumulative effect is a one-sided literature. This is the standard sociology-of-science point (Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, more recently Latour), not a conspiracy theory.

Live-cite kit

  • Scholarly: DSM-V "Cultural Concepts of Distress" appendix; Kuhn Structure of Scientific Revolutions; Feyerabend Against Method; Earman Hume's Abject Failure (Bayesian critique of methodological-naturalist evidence-bars).
  • Aphorism: "Methodological naturalism is a flashlight. You don't conclude there's nothing in the dark because your flashlight only points one way."

Tactical notes

Don't oversell the publication-bias point, it's a contributory argument, not a knockout. Most psychiatrists are honest scientists working within an inherited framework. The point is the framework filters, not the individuals.


P5, Naturalism's "debunking" presupposes the very physicalism it claims to demonstrate

Affirmative case

  1. The hard problem of consciousness, Even on naturalism's own terms, consciousness is not yet reduced to neurochemistry. Chalmers (The Conscious Mind 1996), Nagel (Mind and Cosmos 2012), and the entire qualia-irreducibility literature show that "brain chemistry explains the mind" is a promissory claim, not a demonstrated reduction. (See @@@W_0@@@.) If consciousness itself is not yet naturalized, then "demonic experience is just a brain state" is a claim about something we don't fully understand the mechanism of.

  2. Eliminative materialism's instability, The strong physicalist position that no mental states are "real" (Churchland) cannot be held consistently, the position itself is a mental state. Most psychiatric materialism is therefore non-eliminative, which means it admits mental states are real but proposes physical explanation for them. But "real mental states explained physically" is closer to dualistic-interactionism than to strict physicalism, and creates conceptual room for the demonological alternative.

  3. The transcendental argument from intelligibility, If everything reduces to brain chemistry, including the chemistry-reasoning of the naturalist herself, then the naturalist's confidence in her reasoning is itself a chemical event without warrant. (See @@@W_0@@@, @@@W_1@@@, @@@W_2@@@.) The "science debunks demonic activity" claim presupposes a rational faculty that, on strong naturalism, has no grounding.

Anticipated objections

  1. "Hard problem will eventually be solved.", Promissory naturalism again.
  2. "Naturalists don't need strong physicalism, methodological naturalism suffices.", Modal retreat.

Rebuttals

  1. Against "hard problem will be solved", Possibly. But until then, the objection "science explains away demonic activity" is unsupported. You cannot use an unfulfilled promise as a current premise. The honest naturalist position is: "I don't know what consciousness is, and I don't know what most historic possession-attributed cases were either." That's a defensible position; it's not the "science has debunked it" position the objection asserts.

  2. Against "MN suffices", Methodological naturalism is fine as a working assumption. The objection is not "we should adopt MN as a default", the objection is "demonic activity has been shown not to exist." Those are not the same claim. The first is procedurally responsible; the second is metaphysically overreaching.

Live-cite kit

  • Scholarly: Chalmers The Conscious Mind (1996); Nagel Mind and Cosmos (2012); Plantinga Where the Conflict Really Lies (2011, esp. ch. 10 on EAAN); Lewis Miracles (1947, ch. 3, the "argument from reason").
  • Aphorism: "Naturalism cannot debunk demonology while it cannot yet explain a single subjective experience."

Tactical notes

Use P5 sparingly in live debate, it pulls toward broader philosophy-of-mind territory and risks losing the audience. Hold it in reserve for opponents who keep retreating to "science has shown...", at that point, force them to specify what "shown" means and whether the standard applies to consciousness itself.


Holes in the Science (Summary Reference)

For quick deployment, here are the specific evidential holes in the "science debunks demonic activity" claim:

# Hole Why it matters
1 Xenoglossy with verified specific languages (Gallagher case series) No naturalistic mechanism known; not predicted by DID/schizophrenia
2 Verified hidden-knowledge events (Peck, Gallagher) Not "cold reading", specifics confirmed under controlled conditions
3 Sustained superhuman strength post-restraint/sedation Stress-strength accounts for short bursts, not sustained patterns
4 Selective responsiveness to genuine vs decoy sacred objects Controlled-condition phenomenon; resists psychosomatic explanation
5 Cessation only on religious intervention after years of standard treatment Reverses naturalist's expected success-pattern
6 Cross-cultural phenomenological convergence Not predicted by purely culture-bound psychiatric explanations
7 Hard problem of consciousness still unsolved Undermines confidence in "brain explains everything"
8 Publication filter against non-naturalist case reports Asymmetric evidence base masks the residue
9 Methodological naturalism conflated with metaphysical naturalism Categorical confusion in the objection itself
10 DSM-V's own "Cultural Concepts of Distress" admits framework limits Mainstream psychiatry acknowledges incompleteness

Master objections (block)

  • "Burden of proof is on you.", Granted for the residue. Gallagher, Peck, Amorth have published. The case-series exists. The opponent must engage it, not gesture at "burden of proof."
  • "Science doesn't operate on testimony.", Yet most of forensic psychiatry, clinical case-series methodology, and the legal system does. The objection over-generalizes.
  • "This is just God-of-the-gaps.", No. The argument doesn't say "we can't explain X so it's demonic." It says "specific documented features resist naturalistic explanation AND match the demonological framework's predictions." That's inference-to-best-explanation, not gap-filling.
  • "Why doesn't God just heal everyone?", Different objection. Defer to @@@W_0@@@ and @@@W_1@@@.
  • "What about false-positive exorcisms harming mentally-ill people?", Genuine concern. The Vatican-protocol requirement of psychiatric screening exists precisely to prevent this. Abuses of the protocol are abuses; they don't falsify the doctrine.

Opening line (live debate)

"Christianity has never claimed every mental illness is a demon, even the Vatican requires psychiatric clearance before any exorcism. The real question isn't 'science vs superstition.' It's: what's the best explanation for the documented clinical residue that resists psychiatric treatment, the cases Dr. Richard Gallagher of Columbia, a Yale-trained psychiatrist, has spent decades cataloging?"

Closing line (live debate)

"Show me the brain-chemistry mechanism that produces verified xenoglossy under controlled conditions, knows hidden details no one in the room knew, responds selectively to a consecrated host but not a decoy, and resolves only on the words I cast you out, in the name of Jesus Christ. Until you can, 'science has debunked demonic activity' is not a scientific claim, it's a philosophical commitment dressed in a lab coat."


See also