ris3n's Apologetics Codex

Argument

Christianity Is Idolatry Objection Defeater

Avodah Zarah Objection Defeater, Worshipping Jesus Is Idolatry Objection, Deuteronomy 13 False Prophet Objection, Jesus Is a False Prophet Defeater, Shituf Objection Defeater

Intro

There are ads on our codex that pay for hosting and keep the codex free. If you can, please consider whitelisting ris3n.com or allowing scripts to support the work.

Sponsored

Brands, events, influencers advertise here

This is the objection with the sharpest edge, because it does not say Christians are mistaken. It says Christians are committing the sin the whole Hebrew Bible is against.

The charge is avodah zarah, foreign worship. A man from Nazareth is worshipped, prayed to, and called God. Whatever else that is, the objection says, it is a creature receiving what belongs to the Creator, and the Torah has one word for that.

Deuteronomy 13 is the second half of the charge. It anticipates a prophet who performs genuine signs and wonders, and it says that if he uses them to say "let us go after other gods," Israel is to reject him regardless of the miracles. Jesus worked signs; Jesus is worshipped; therefore, on Deuteronomy 13, he is exactly the figure Moses warned about.

Two things answer it.

First, read the trigger. Deuteronomy 13:2 says the prophet is to be rejected if he says "Let us go after other gods, which thou hast not known, and let us serve them." Both halves matter. The condemned move is turning Israel toward a deity she did not know, a foreign god, one of the gods of the nations round about. Jesus never names one. He recites the Shema as the first commandment, prays to the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, worships in the synagogue and the Temple, and directs everything he says to the God of Israel. Whether he was right about his own identity is a real question. Whether he pointed anyone toward a foreign god is not.

Second, Judaism itself has never agreed on this. Maimonides did classify Christianity as idolatry. But Rabbenu Tam and the Tosafists held that shituf, associating another with God, is not forbidden to Gentiles. Rabbi Menachem Meiri of Perpignan, one of the great medieval Talmudists, held that Christians are "nations bound by the ways of religion" and that the Talmud's laws about idolaters simply do not apply to them. Jacob Emden in the eighteenth century wrote that Christianity had done the world a kindness by spreading knowledge of the God of Israel among the nations.

The confident statement "Christianity is avodah zarah" is one position in a long internal Jewish argument. It is not the verdict of Judaism.

Cheatsheet

The 30-second reply:

Read the trigger in Deuteronomy 13. The prophet is rejected if he says "let us go after other gods, which thou hast not known." That is a foreign deity, one Israel did not know. Jesus recites the Shema as the greatest commandment, prays to the God of Abraham, and never names another god. You can say he was wrong about who he was. You cannot get him under this statute, because the statute's own condition is not met. And on the halakhic question, your tradition is split. Maimonides said idolatry. Rabbenu Tam and the Tosafot said shituf is not forbidden to Gentiles. Meiri said Christians are nations bound by the ways of religion and the idolatry laws do not apply to them. Jacob Emden said Christianity did the world a kindness. This is an argument inside Judaism, not a settled ruling.

The 6 fast facts:

  1. Deuteronomy 13:2 has a two-part trigger: other gods, and gods "which thou hast not known."
  2. Deuteronomy 18:21-22 gives the other test: the prophet whose word does not come to pass. Jesus predicted the Temple's destruction within a generation, and it fell in AD 70.
  3. Meiri exempted Christians. Beit ha-Bechirah: the nations "bound by the ways of religion" are not the idolaters the Talmud legislates about.
  4. Rabbenu Tam and the Tosafot on shituf. Association is not among the prohibitions binding on Noahides (Tosafot, b. Sanhedrin 63b; b. Bekhorot 2b).
  5. Maimonides split Christianity from Islam on exactly this point, classifying Islam as non-idolatrous and Christianity as idolatrous, which shows the ruling turns on the Trinity and incarnation rather than on any general principle about founders.
  6. Daniel 7:14 has a figure other than the Ancient of Days receiving pelach, the Aramaic verb used in Daniel of religious service to deity (3:12, 3:17-18, 6:16).

The 4 strongest counter-moves:

  • "What are the two conditions in Deuteronomy 13:2?" Make the trigger explicit. The statute names its own scope.
  • "Which god that Israel had not known did Jesus name?" There is no answer, because there is no such name in the Gospels.
  • "What did Meiri say about Christians?" Most interlocutors have not encountered him, and he is not a marginal figure.
  • "Maimonides ruled Islam is not idolatry and Christianity is. What is the difference he identified?" The answer is the Trinity, which locates the dispute correctly: this is an argument about the identity of Israel's God, not about which god to serve.

Concessions to make freely:

  • Maimonides did rule Christianity idolatrous, in Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Ma'akhalot Assurot 11:7 and elsewhere, and he is the most authoritative codifier in Jewish history. Pretending otherwise is dishonest.
  • The concern is serious and was earned. Christendom filled its churches with images, venerated saints and relics, and in popular practice frequently blurred lines that its own theology drew carefully. A Jew looking at medieval European Christianity and seeing idolatry was not hallucinating.
  • Christianity's own history contains this worry. The iconoclast controversy of the eighth and ninth centuries, and the Reformed stripping of altars in the sixteenth, were Christians arguing about exactly this question.
  • If the Christian claim is false, Christian worship is idolatry. This should be said plainly. Christians are not asking for a category exemption. They are making a claim about who Jesus is, and if the claim is wrong the worship is wrong. The dispute is properly about the claim.
  • The shituf leniency does not apply to Jews. Rabbenu Tam's position concerns what is permitted to Gentiles under the Noahide framework, not what is permitted to a Jew. Citing it as though it licensed Jewish belief in Jesus is a misuse and a prepared interlocutor will say so.
  • Deuteronomy 13 rightly warns that miracles do not authenticate. Christianity agrees, and its own texts say the same (Matthew 24:24; 2 Thessalonians 2:9). The Christian case does not rest on wonders alone.

What NOT to defend:

  • Do not claim Judaism has ruled Christianity non-idolatrous. It has not ruled either way with one voice.
  • Do not use Meiri or Rabbenu Tam to suggest a Jew may worship Jesus. Neither says that.
  • Do not dismiss the image question. Answer it: Christian theology distinguishes worship (latria) from veneration, Protestant traditions reject images in worship outright, and the Jewish objection has real historical purchase.
  • Do not accuse Judaism of idolatry in return over the Temple, the Shekhinah, or anything else. It is a cheap move and it destroys the conversation.

The closing line:

"You are right that this is the most serious charge you can bring, and I am not going to ask for a technicality. If Jesus is not who he said he was, then what I do on Sunday is idolatry and I should stop. That is the actual question between us. What I am asking is that we ask it, instead of settling it with a verse whose own trigger is a god Israel had not known. Jesus named no such god. He said the first commandment is Hear O Israel, the LORD our God, the LORD is one. Judge the claim. Do not classify it out of existence."

In full

Defeater for the counter-missionary claim: "Worship of Jesus is avodah zarah. Jesus is additionally a false prophet under Deuteronomy 13, which warns that a wonder-worker calling Israel to other gods must be rejected however impressive his signs. Judaism has ruled on this, and the ruling is Maimonides's."

The stated trigger of Deuteronomy 13, the complementary test of Deuteronomy 18, the direction of worship in Jesus's own teaching, the documented division of halakhic opinion on Christianity's status, and the Christian doctrine of divine identity do not warrant treating the objection as a settled legal verdict.

The objection is deployed as the moral centerpiece of counter-missionary argument, and it works because it reframes the conversation from "is this true?" to "is this permitted?" It is also the objection most likely to end a conversation, since a charge of idolatry is not an invitation to further discussion.

The defeat structure is five-pronged.

  1. Deuteronomy 13's trigger is a god Israel has not known. The text: "If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, and the sign or the wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, which thou hast not known, and let us serve them; thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet" (13:1-3). The condition has two components: the gods are acherim, other, and they are asher lo yedatam, unknown to Israel. The chapter continues with the same formula for the enticing relative (13:6) and the apostate city (13:13), both specifying "gods which ye have not known." The statute is aimed at the deities of the surrounding nations. Jesus of Nazareth names none of them, teaches the Shema as the greatest commandment, prays to the God of Israel, and directs his hearers to the Father. Whether his claim about himself is true is a question. Whether he satisfies this statute's condition is not.

  2. Deuteronomy 18 supplies the complementary test, and it is a test of fulfillment. "When a prophet speaketh in the name of the LORD, if the thing follow not, nor come to pass, that is the thing which the LORD hath not spoken" (18:22). Deuteronomy 13 tests direction of worship; Deuteronomy 18 tests whether predictions come true. Jesus predicted the destruction of the Temple within the generation then living, in terms specific enough to be checked, and the Temple was destroyed in AD 70. The two Mosaic tests, taken together, do not disqualify him.

  3. The dispute is over the identity of Israel's God, not over which god to worship. Avodah zarah is service directed away from YHWH toward another. The Christian claim is that the Son shares the divine identity of YHWH, which if true means that worship of him is worship of Israel's God, and if false means Christianity is in grave error. Richard Bauckham's category of "divine identity" is the useful one here: earliest Christian devotion did not add a second deity to the God of Israel but included Jesus within the unique identity of that God, which is why the first Christians, all Jews, continued to insist on strict monotheism while worshipping him. Larry Hurtado's work documents that this devotional pattern appears within the first two decades, among Jews, without any sense that they had left Judaism. The Christian position is a claim about who YHWH is. It may be wrong. It is not a proposal to serve Marduk.

  4. Jewish legal opinion on Christianity's status is genuinely divided. This is the reciprocal concession that the objection's confident framing conceals, and the sources are not obscure:

    • Maimonides classified Christianity as idolatry (Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Ma'akhalot Assurot 11:7; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 9:4), and simultaneously classified Islam as not idolatry. The distinction he drew was precisely the Trinity and the incarnation, which confirms that the ruling turns on the doctrine of God rather than on any general principle.
    • Rabbenu Tam and the Tosafists held that shituf, associating another being with God, is not among the prohibitions binding on Noahides (Tosafot to b. Sanhedrin 63b and b. Bekhorot 2b). This became the working Ashkenazi basis for ordinary commercial and social relations with Christians.
    • Menachem Meiri of Perpignan (1249 to 1315), in Beit ha-Bechirah, developed the category of "nations bound by the ways of religion" (umot ha-gedurot be-darkhei ha-datot) and held that the Talmudic laws concerning idolaters were framed for ancient pagans and do not apply to Christians and Muslims.
    • Moses Rivkes (Be'er ha-Golah on Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 425) observed that Christians believe in creation from nothing, the Exodus, and the divine origin of the Torah.
    • Jacob Emden, an eighteenth-century Ashkenazi authority of impeccable rigor, wrote that Christianity had brought the nations to the God of Israel and to the Noahide commandments, and spoke of the Nazarene's double kindness to the world.

    Jacob Katz's Exclusiveness and Tolerance (Oxford, 1961) remains the standard scholarly account of this internal debate. Its existence does not make Christianity kosher. It does mean the objection is stating one side of a long argument as though it were the verdict.

  5. The Tanakh itself has worship directed to a figure distinguished from the Ancient of Days. Daniel 7:13-14 has one like a son of man come to the Ancient of Days and receive dominion, "that all people, nations, and languages should serve him," using the Aramaic pelach, the verb used in Daniel of religious service to deity (3:12, 3:17-18, 6:16). Joshua 5:14-15 has the captain of the LORD's host accept prostration and instruct Joshua to remove his sandals. Psalm 45:6-7 addresses a figure as God and then says "therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee." Psalm 2:12 commands homage to the Son. Whatever these texts mean, they were in Israel's Scriptures before Christianity existed, and the rabbinic need to legislate against "two powers in heaven" shows that Jews were drawing conclusions from them. See Two Powers in Heaven Argument.

The defeater is targeted. It does not claim that Judaism has approved Christianity, that the shituf leniency applies to Jews, that Maimonides's ruling can be dismissed, or that the concern behind the charge is manufactured. It claims that Deuteronomy 13's trigger is not met, that Deuteronomy 18's test is passed, that the halakhic question is contested within Judaism, and that the real dispute is about who Israel's God is.

Grammar and hermeneutics

The objection is a legal argument from a Hebrew statute, and statutes are read by their conditions.

  • Deuteronomy 13:3 (13:2 in English versions) states a compound condition. Nelekha acharei elohim acherim asher lo yedatam ve-na'ovdem: "let us go after other gods, whom you have not known, and let us serve them." Three elements: motion after (acharei), gods characterized as acherim (other), and a relative clause restricting them to those Israel has not known. Statutory language of this kind is read by its conditions, and the relative clause is not decorative. The same restriction is repeated at 13:7 for the enticing family member and at 13:14 for the apostate city, in each case "gods which ye have not known."

  • Elohim acherim is a fixed phrase with a fixed referent. It occurs some sixty times in the Hebrew Bible and denotes the deities of the surrounding nations: Baal, Ashtoreth, Chemosh, Molech, Dagon, the host of heaven. It is the vocabulary of the first two commandments and of the Deuteronomic polemic against Canaanite religion. It is not a term for a disputed conception of Israel's own God.

  • The rabbinic term avodah zarah is later and broader. Literally "strange service," it is the title of a Talmudic tractate and became the umbrella category in halakhic literature. Because it is broader than elohim acherim, the halakhic question of whether Christianity falls under it is a matter of rabbinic classification rather than of biblical exegesis, which is exactly why Maimonides, Rabbenu Tam, and Meiri could disagree about it. Recognizing which term is being used is what keeps the two arguments distinct.

  • Deuteronomy 18:21-22 gives an empirical test with a stated criterion. Asher yedabber ha-navi be-shem YHWH ve-lo yihyeh ha-davar ve-lo yavo, "which the prophet speaketh in the name of the LORD, if the thing follow not, nor come to pass." Non-fulfillment is the mark. This is checkable in a way that theological classification is not.

  • Genre: Deuteronomy 13 is covenant law with an enumerated scope. It legislates three scenarios (prophet, family member, city), each with the same trigger and each with a prescribed penalty. Applying a criminal statute requires the elements of the offense to be established, and the element specified here is solicitation to serve a previously unknown deity.

  • Pelach in Daniel 7:14 is the operative lexical point on the other side. The Aramaic verb is used in Daniel for the religious service that Nebuchadnezzar demands and that Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego refuse to give to the image (3:12, 3:17-18), and for what Daniel renders to his God (6:16, 6:20). Its use of the one like a son of man in 7:14 assigns to that figure what the book elsewhere reserves for deity.

On the compound trigger of Deuteronomy 13:3, the fixed referent of elohim acherim, the distinction between the biblical phrase and the later halakhic category, the empirical criterion of Deuteronomy 18:22, and the force of pelach at Daniel 7:14, the biblical statutes cited do not reach the Christian case, and the halakhic classification that does reach it is a rabbinic judgment on which the tradition has divided.

Argument structure

Premise Notes
P1 Deuteronomy 13's trigger is solicitation to serve gods Israel has not known. The condition is repeated three times in the chapter (13:2, 13:6, 13:13), and elohim acherim is the fixed biblical phrase for the deities of the surrounding nations. Jesus names none, teaches the Shema as the first commandment, and directs worship to the God of Israel. Trigger-clause argument
P2 Deuteronomy 18:22 tests a prophet by fulfillment, and that test is passed. Jesus predicted the Temple's destruction within the living generation, in checkable terms, and it occurred in AD 70. Complementary-test argument
P3 The dispute concerns the identity of Israel's God, not the choice of a god. Christianity claims the Son is included in the unique divine identity of YHWH, which is a claim about who YHWH is. Hurtado documents the devotional pattern arising among Jews within two decades; Bauckham analyzes it as inclusion within divine identity rather than the addition of a deity. If false, it is grave error; it is not the worship of a foreign god. Category-correction argument
P4 Halakhic opinion on Christianity is divided. Maimonides ruled idolatry, and ruled Islam not idolatry, on the Trinity. Rabbenu Tam and the Tosafot held shituf not forbidden to Noahides. Meiri exempted "nations bound by the ways of religion." Rivkes and Emden went further. Katz's Exclusiveness and Tolerance documents the debate. Internal-legal-division argument
P5 The Tanakh contains service directed to a figure distinguished from the Ancient of Days. Daniel 7:14 (pelach), Joshua 5:14-15, Psalm 45:6-7, Psalm 2:12, and the rabbinic polemic against "two powers" that presupposes Jews were reading them so. Textual-precedent argument
C The idolatry charge does not settle the question; it restates it. The biblical statute's trigger is unmet, its companion test is passed, the halakhic classification is contested inside Judaism, and the Tanakh contains the disputed pattern. The defeater concedes that Maimonides ruled against Christianity, that the historical concern about images was earned, that shituf leniency does not apply to Jews, and that if the Christian claim is false, Christian worship is idolatry.

Master objections to the whole argument

MO1: "Deuteronomy 13's 'gods you have not known' means gods Israel has no authorization to serve. It is not a technicality about whether a name appears elsewhere in Scripture. A deified man is a god Israel did not know, by definition."

  • Three responses. (a) This is the strongest form of the objection and it deserves a serious answer. The phrase does carry the sense of a deity outside Israel's covenantal knowledge, not merely one that is unfamiliar. (b) The reading still requires the disputed conclusion as its premise. To say that Jesus is "a god Israel did not know" assumes he is a distinct deity, which is exactly what Christianity denies and what the argument is about. Applied that way, the statute cannot adjudicate the dispute; it presupposes its outcome. (c) The chapter's own examples fix the frame. Deuteronomy 13 legislates against a city turning to serve the gods of the nations, with the herem penalty, in a context saturated with Canaanite religion. Reading it as a general anti-heresy provision extends it well beyond its stated scenarios.

MO2: "Meiri is an outlier whose work was barely known until the nineteenth century, and modern scholars have questioned whether his leniencies were sincere or defensive, written under Christian censorship. You are leaning on the weakest available authority."

  • Three responses. (a) The transmission history is real and should be acknowledged. Beit ha-Bechirah was not widely available in the medieval period and entered general circulation late, and the sincerity question has been raised in the scholarly literature. (b) Meiri is not the load-bearing authority. Rabbenu Tam and the Tosafot are unimpeachably mainstream, their position on shituf shaped centuries of Ashkenazi practice, and Rivkes and Emden are independent witnesses. Strike Meiri and premise 4 stands. (c) The censorship point cuts against the objection too. If medieval Jewish authorities wrote leniently under Christian pressure, then medieval statements of the harsher view were written under conditions of persecution and polemic, and neither body of text was produced in ideal conditions.

MO3: "The shituf leniency applies to Gentiles, not Jews. For a Jew, worshipping Jesus is unambiguously forbidden by every authority, including the lenient ones. Your citations do nothing for a Jew considering Christianity."

  • Three responses. (a) Correct, and the concessions state it. No authority cited permits a Jew to worship Jesus, and using them that way is a misuse. (b) The citations are offered for a narrower purpose. The objection asserts that Christianity as such is avodah zarah, a claim about the religion, and that claim is contested within Jewish law. The question of what is permitted to a Jew is downstream of whether the Christian claim about Jesus is true. (c) The order of questions is the point. If Jesus is who Christianity says he is, the halakhic classification changes, because the worship is then directed to Israel's God. The classification cannot be used to prevent the prior question from being asked.

MO4: "Christians bow to statues, pray to Mary and the saints, kiss icons, and keep images in their sanctuaries. Whatever your theology says, the practice is idolatry by inspection."

  • Four responses. (a) The observation has real historical force and should not be waved off. Popular Christian practice across many centuries blurred lines its own theology drew, and a Jew forming a judgment by inspection had material to work with. (b) Christian theology has always distinguished the worship due to God alone from the honor given to creatures, and has repeatedly disciplined the boundary. The Second Council of Nicaea (787) formalized the distinction; the iconoclast controversies were Christians fighting about exactly this. (c) Large parts of Christianity reject images in worship entirely. Reformed and most evangelical traditions have no icons, no statues, no prayers to saints. Whatever the objection reaches, it does not reach them, and it therefore cannot be a claim about Christianity as such. (d) The objection targets practice, and the argument concerns the doctrine. If the practice were reformed tomorrow, the objection to worshipping Jesus would remain, which shows that the images are not what the charge is actually about.

MO5: "Maimonides is the greatest halakhic authority in Jewish history and he ruled on this. Producing a list of dissenters does not overturn a ruling of the Rambam."

  • Three responses. (a) His stature is conceded without reservation. (b) Halakhic authority does not work by a single decisive vote, as Judaism itself insists. The Shulchan Aruch carries Isserles's glosses precisely because Ashkenazi practice diverged, and the Tosafist position on shituf governed a great deal of actual Ashkenazi life regardless of the Maimonidean ruling. (c) The specific ruling has an instructive feature. Maimonides classified Islam as non-idolatrous and Christianity as idolatrous, and the difference he identified is the Trinity and the incarnation. That is a theological judgment about the doctrine of God, and it is the very thing under dispute. His ruling therefore records his position on the disputed question rather than settling it independently.

MO6: "You concede that if Jesus is not divine, Christianity is idolatry. Then you have conceded that Jews are right to refuse until the claim is proven, and the burden is entirely yours."

  • Two responses. (a) The burden is accepted. The Christian claim is extraordinary and Christians carry the burden of it. Nothing in this defeater asks a Jew to accept anything on the strength of a legal technicality. (b) The point of the defeater is to permit the burden to be discharged. An objection that classifies the claim as forbidden before it is examined prevents the examination. Removing the classification does not establish the claim; it makes it possible to argue about it, which is the whole objective.

Premise 1, the trigger of Deuteronomy 13 is unmet

Affirmative case

  1. The condition is stated and repeated. 13:2, "let us go after other gods, which thou hast not known, and let us serve them"; 13:6, "let us go and serve other gods, which thou hast not known"; 13:13, "let us go and serve other gods, which ye have not known."
  2. Elohim acherim has a fixed referent across the Hebrew Bible: the deities of the surrounding nations, named repeatedly in the Deuteronomic and Deuteronomistic literature.
  3. Jesus directs worship to the God of Israel. Asked for the greatest commandment, he recites the Shema (Mark 12:29-30). He prays to the Father, teaches his disciples to do so, worships in synagogue and Temple, and observes the festivals.
  4. No foreign deity is named anywhere in the material. The Gospels contain no Baal, no Zeus, no rival cult, no alternative object of devotion.
  5. The chapter's penalties are framed for a community turning to Canaanite religion. The apostate-city provision requires the destruction of the city, which locates the legislation in the context of Israel's settlement among the nations.

Anticipated objections

  1. "Jesus is himself the foreign god. The statute does not require a named pagan deity, only a turning away from exclusive worship of YHWH."
  2. "Deuteronomy 13's principle is that no sign or wonder can authorize a departure from the Torah as given. Jesus altered Sabbath practice and dietary boundaries, which is the departure the chapter forbids."
  3. "You are treating a covenant statute like a criminal code with technical elements. That is a lawyer's reading, not a religious one."

Rebuttals

  1. This assumes the conclusion, which is the difficulty noted at MO1. Whether worship of Jesus is a turning away from YHWH or is worship of YHWH is the question at issue, and a statute cannot decide it by being read with the answer already inserted.
  2. This is a substantive objection and it belongs to a different argument. Whether Jesus taught departure from Torah is treated at Christians Not Under Mosaic Law and Oral Torah Is Binding Objection Defeater. It is worth noting that the Sabbath controversies in the Gospels concern halakhic disputes about what constitutes work, which were live disputes among Jewish parties, and that Jesus's stated position is that he came not to abolish but to fulfill.
  3. Deuteronomy 13 is a criminal statute with prescribed penalties, including execution, and reading criminal law by its stated conditions is the only responsible way to read it. Jewish jurisprudence is famously rigorous about exactly this, hedging capital cases with procedural requirements so demanding that the Mishnah calls a court that executes once in seven years destructive (m. Makkot 1:10).

Premise 2, the fulfillment test is passed

Affirmative case

  1. Deuteronomy 18:20-22 provides the empirical criterion. "When a prophet speaketh in the name of the LORD, if the thing follow not, nor come to pass, that is the thing which the LORD hath not spoken."
  2. The Temple prediction is specific and time-bounded. The destruction of the sanctuary, with not one stone left upon another, within the generation then living.
  3. The Temple was destroyed in AD 70, within the stated window, by Titus's forces.
  4. The prediction is not vague. It names the building, the completeness of the destruction, and a timeframe.
  5. Josephus corroborates the event in detail (Jewish War 6), independent of Christian sources.

Anticipated objections

  1. "The Gospels were written after AD 70. The prediction is a prophecy after the fact, and dating them earlier is a Christian assumption."
  2. "Predicting a Roman destruction of Jerusalem in the first century required no supernatural knowledge. Jesus ben Ananias made similar predictions, per Josephus."
  3. "Deuteronomy 18 also requires the prophet to speak in the name of the LORD and not to lead Israel astray. One passed test does not make a true prophet."

Rebuttals

  1. The dating question is real and is contested on both sides. Arguments for pre-70 composition include Acts ending before the deaths of Paul and James and before the war, and the absence of any reference to the destruction as accomplished in the epistles. Arguments for post-70 composition are also serious. The premise is stated with that caveat and does not claim more than the sources allow.
  2. Conceded, and the parallel is worth naming. Josephus records Jesus ben Ananias crying woe over Jerusalem for years before the war (Jewish War 6.5.3). Political prediction in a volatile province is not miraculous. The premise's claim is narrower: whatever else is true, Deuteronomy 18's disqualifying condition, non-fulfillment, is not met.
  3. Agreed, and that is why both tests are given. Deuteronomy 18 is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one, and Deuteronomy 13 supplies the other. The argument is that neither disqualifies, not that either establishes.

Premise 3, the dispute is about the identity of Israel's God

Affirmative case

  1. The earliest Christian devotion arose among Jews. Larry Hurtado's Lord Jesus Christ documents devotional practice directed to Jesus within the first two decades, in Jewish circles, without any accompanying abandonment of monotheistic confession.
  2. The first Christians maintained strict monotheism explicitly. Paul's formulation in 1 Corinthians 8:6 restructures the Shema itself around the one God and one Lord, which is either the most audacious move in Jewish literature or exactly the claim Christianity makes.
  3. Bauckham's "divine identity" category captures the structure. Jesus is not added alongside God as a second deity but is included within the unique identity of the one God, which is why the earliest texts apply to him the functions Judaism reserved for YHWH alone: creation, sovereignty, and the receipt of worship.
  4. The category matters legally. Avodah zarah is service directed to another. If the Christian claim is true, no service is directed to another.
  5. Maimonides's own distinction confirms the locus of the dispute. He ruled Islam non-idolatrous and Christianity idolatrous, and the difference is the Trinity, which means his ruling is a judgment about the doctrine of God rather than a general classification.

Anticipated objections

  1. "Hurtado and Bauckham are Christian scholars arguing a Christian thesis. Citing them is circular."
  2. "Whatever the first Christians thought they were doing, Judaism judged that they had left. The parting of the ways happened, and it happened for this reason."
  3. "'Divine identity' is a sophisticated way of saying two are one, which is the very thing that cannot be said."

Rebuttals

  1. Both are historians of early Christianity working with standard methods, and their descriptive claims about first-century devotional practice are widely engaged across the field, including by Jewish scholars such as Daniel Boyarin, who reaches complementary conclusions from a different direction. The descriptive point, that the pattern arose among Jews who continued to profess monotheism, is not seriously disputed.
  2. The parting is a historical fact and the premise does not deny it. What is at issue is not whether Judaism separated but whether the separation is correctly described as a departure to another god. The first generation on the Christian side denied that description, and they were Jews.
  3. This is the real objection, and it is a philosophical one rather than a legal one. Whether one essence in three persons is coherent is treated at Trinity and Trinity Violates the Shema Objection Defeater. What matters here is that the question is philosophical and exegetical, which is precisely the argument the idolatry charge is used to prevent.

Premise 4, halakhic opinion is divided

Affirmative case

  1. Maimonides: Christianity is idolatry; Islam is not (Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Ma'akhalot Assurot 11:7; Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 9:4).
  2. Rabbenu Tam and the Tosafists: shituf is not among the Noahide prohibitions (Tosafot to b. Sanhedrin 63b; b. Bekhorot 2b). The position underwrote centuries of ordinary Jewish-Christian commerce, including oath-taking.
  3. Meiri: Christians and Muslims are "nations bound by the ways of religion," and the Talmudic idolatry laws address ancient pagans (Beit ha-Bechirah, across several tractates).
  4. Moses Rivkes: Christians hold creation from nothing, the Exodus, and the divine origin of Torah (Be'er ha-Golah, Choshen Mishpat 425).
  5. Jacob Emden: Christianity brought the Noahide commandments and knowledge of Israel's God to the nations.
  6. The scholarly account is standard. Jacob Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance (Oxford, 1961), traces the development of these positions and their practical consequences.

Anticipated objections

  1. "These leniencies are about how to deal with Christians in commerce and law, not about the theological status of Christian worship. You are conflating practical accommodation with doctrinal approval."
  2. "Every one of these authorities would say a Jew who worshipped Jesus had committed idolatry. Their leniency has no bearing on the question in front of us."
  3. "Emden's remarks are frequently quoted by missionaries and frequently stripped of context. He remained an implacable opponent of Jewish conversion."

Rebuttals

  1. The distinction is fair and is partly right. Much of the Tosafist material is practical, concerned with oaths, wine, and commerce. Meiri's category, however, is explicitly theological in its reasoning, resting on the claim that these nations are restrained by religion in a way ancient pagans were not, and Rivkes and Emden speak to belief rather than to trade.
  2. Granted, and stated in the concessions. No authority cited permits a Jew to worship Jesus. The premise establishes something narrower: that the flat assertion "Christianity is avodah zarah" states one position in a live internal debate.
  3. Accurate, and the caveat should be given whenever he is cited. Emden was firmly opposed to Jewish conversion and his positive assessment concerns Christianity's function among the nations, not its truth for Jews. Quoting him without that context is the kind of selective citation this cluster's house style forbids.

Premise 5, the Tanakh contains service to a distinguished figure

Affirmative case

  1. Daniel 7:14 has all peoples, nations, and languages pelach the one like a son of man, using the verb Daniel employs of religious service to deity.
  2. Joshua 5:14-15: the captain of the host of the LORD receives Joshua's prostration and instructs him to remove his sandals, echoing Exodus 3:5.
  3. Psalm 45:6-7: "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever... therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee."
  4. Psalm 2:12: "Kiss the Son, lest he be angry."
  5. Exodus 23:20-21: the Angel in whom the divine Name resides, with authority over pardon.
  6. The rabbinic anti-"two powers" polemic presupposes that Jews were drawing these conclusions from these texts.

Anticipated objections

  1. "Pelach can mean service in a broad sense, including service rendered to a king. Daniel 7:27 says the same nations serve the saints of the Most High."
  2. "Psalm 45 is a royal wedding song, and 'thy throne, O God' can be rendered 'thy throne is God's throne' or 'thy divine throne.'"
  3. "Psalm 2:12 is textually uncertain. Bar is Aramaic, the Septuagint reads differently, and many translations render it 'do homage in purity.'"

Rebuttals

  1. The Daniel 7:27 parallel is a good catch and should be conceded. The verb does appear there of service rendered to the saints. What weighs against a purely political reading in 7:14 is the immediate context: the figure arrives with the clouds of heaven, which is divine transport elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, and receives an everlasting dominion that shall not pass away, which is not the description of a monarch.
  2. The translation dispute is real and the verse should be cited with it acknowledged. The vocative reading is defensible and widely held, and the alternatives are not absurd. This is a supporting citation, not a load-bearing one.
  3. Conceded, and the verse should probably not be used. The textual difficulty at Psalm 2:12 is genuine and an apologist who leans on it will be corrected. It is listed here for completeness and it is the weakest item in the set.

Live-cite kit

Scripture

Jewish sources

  • Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Ma'akhalot Assurot 11:7 and Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 9:4, cited openly against the position being defended.
  • Tosafot to b. Sanhedrin 63b and b. Bekhorot 2b, on shituf and Noahides.
  • Meiri, Beit ha-Bechirah, "nations bound by the ways of religion."
  • Moses Rivkes, Be'er ha-Golah, Choshen Mishpat 425.
  • Jacob Emden, on Christianity among the nations, with the caveat attached.
  • m. Makkot 1:10, on the reluctance of Jewish courts in capital cases.

Scholarly

  • Jacob Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance (Oxford, 1961), the standard account of the halakhic debate.
  • Larry Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ (Eerdmans, 2003), on earliest devotional practice.
  • Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the God of Israel (Eerdmans, 2008), on divine identity.
  • Daniel Boyarin, The Jewish Gospels (New Press, 2012), reaching complementary conclusions from a Jewish direction.
  • Michael L. Brown, Answering Jewish Objections to Jesus, vol. 2 (Baker, 2000).

Aphorism

  • "The statute names its own scope. Read the relative clause."
  • "Maimonides said Christianity is idolatry and Islam is not. The difference he named is the Trinity. That is not a ruling on the argument; it is a vote in it."
  • "If he is not who he said he was, I am an idolater. Judge the claim."

Tactical notes

  • Do not get defensive. A charge of idolatry is meant to feel final. Answer it calmly and structurally, and the finality dissolves.
  • Read Deuteronomy 13:2 aloud, whole, and ask what the two conditions are. Do not paraphrase.
  • Concede the images question before it is raised. It is the strongest emotional part of the objection, and volunteering it disarms the exchange.
  • Concede Maimonides immediately. Trying to minimize him signals that you do not know how significant he is.
  • Introduce Meiri and Rabbenu Tam as a question: "Are you familiar with Meiri on the nations bound by religion?" This avoids the appearance of lecturing a Jew about Jewish law, which is intolerable and will end the conversation.
  • Say the hard sentence out loud: if Jesus is not divine, Christian worship is idolatry. Nothing in this defeater works without it, and it is the sentence that establishes you are arguing honestly.
  • Never counter-accuse. No jabs about the Temple, the Shekhinah, kissing the Torah scroll, or anything adjacent. It is a cheap trade and it forfeits the moral ground the concessions have bought.
  • What NOT to defend: that Judaism has ruled Christianity non-idolatrous; that shituf leniency covers Jews; Psalm 2:12 as a proof text; any minimization of medieval Christian image practice.

See also

Common questions this page answers

Q: Is worshipping Jesus idolatry according to Judaism?

Judaism has not answered this with one voice, which is the part the objection usually omits. Maimonides classified Christianity as idolatry (Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Ma'akhalot Assurot 11:7), and he is the most authoritative codifier in Jewish history. But Rabbenu Tam and the Tosafists held that shituf, associating another with God, is not among the prohibitions binding on Noahides, and that position underwrote centuries of ordinary Ashkenazi practice. Rabbi Menachem Meiri of Perpignan held that Christians are "nations bound by the ways of religion" and that the Talmud's laws about idolaters do not apply to them. Moses Rivkes noted that Christians affirm creation from nothing, the Exodus, and the divine origin of the Torah, and Jacob Emden wrote that Christianity had brought knowledge of Israel's God to the nations. None of these permits a Jew to worship Jesus, and none should be cited as though it did. What they establish is that the flat assertion "Christianity is avodah zarah" states one side of a long internal Jewish debate. Jacob Katz's Exclusiveness and Tolerance (Oxford, 1961) is the standard scholarly account.

Q: Does Deuteronomy 13 make Jesus a false prophet?

Not on the statute's own terms, because its trigger is not met. Deuteronomy 13:2 condemns a prophet who says "Let us go after other gods, which thou hast not known, and let us serve them," and the same restriction is repeated at 13:6 and 13:13. The phrase elohim acherim occurs about sixty times in the Hebrew Bible and denotes the deities of the surrounding nations, Baal, Ashtoreth, Chemosh, and the rest. Jesus names none of them. Asked for the greatest commandment he recites the Shema, he prays to the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and he worships in synagogue and Temple. Whether his claim about his own identity is true is a genuine question. Whether he solicited Israel to serve a god she had not known is not, and reading the statute as though "a deified man" automatically satisfies its condition assumes the conclusion the argument is about.

Q: What is shituf?

Shituf means "association" or "partnership," and in halakhic literature it names the belief that associates another being with God without denying God's existence or sovereignty. The Tosafists, following Rabbenu Tam, held that shituf is not among the prohibitions binding on Noahides, that is, on Gentiles (Tosafot to b. Sanhedrin 63b and b. Bekhorot 2b). This became the practical basis on which Ashkenazi Jews conducted commerce and accepted oaths from Christians for centuries. It is important to be precise about what the position does and does not say: it addresses what is permitted to Gentiles under the Noahide framework, not what is permitted to a Jew. Every authority cited would say that a Jew worshipping Jesus had committed idolatry. Christians who cite shituf as though it licensed Jewish belief in Jesus are misusing it, and a prepared interlocutor will correct them.

Q: How do Christians answer the charge that they worship a man?

By denying the description rather than seeking an exemption from the rule. The Christian claim is not that a creature has been elevated to divine status but that the eternal Son, who shares the one divine identity of the God of Israel, took a human nature. Richard Bauckham's analysis of "divine identity" describes the structure: the earliest Christians did not add a second deity alongside the God of Israel but included Jesus within that God's unique identity, which is why they went on insisting on strict monotheism. Larry Hurtado's work documents that this devotional pattern appears within about two decades, among Jews, with no accompanying sense of having left Judaism. The honest Christian position also states the cost of the claim: if Jesus is not who he said he was, then Christian worship is idolatry and Christians would be the first to say so. The dispute is properly about the identity claim, not about the legal classification.

Q: Why did Maimonides rule that Islam is not idolatry but Christianity is?

Because the difference he identified is the Trinity and the incarnation. Maimonides classified Islamic monotheism as compatible with the prohibition and Christian Trinitarian worship as violating it, and the reasoning turns entirely on the Christian doctrine of God rather than on any general principle about religions or their founders. This is worth surfacing, because it locates the dispute correctly. Maimonides's ruling is not an independent legal fact that settles the theological question; it is a judgment that presupposes an answer to the theological question. If the Christian claim about the Son's inclusion in the divine identity is true, then Christian worship is directed to the God of Israel and the classification changes. If it is false, the classification stands. Either way, the argument has to be conducted at the level of the claim.