ris3n's Apologetics Codex

Argument

Atheism as Religion

Intro

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"I'm not religious. I just don't believe in God."

Atheists often say this to step out of the conversation that religious people have to be in. They want to be in the neutral, default seat. The argument here is that they are not in the neutral seat. They are in another religious seat.

Religious studies scholars stopped using "belief in God" as their main test for what counts as a religion a long time ago. The reason is simple. Many famous religions don't fit that test. Theravada Buddhism does not worship a creator. Jainism explicitly denies one. Confucianism, in its functional form, has no deity at all. Yet every textbook calls these religions. So the field switched to a different test: does the worldview do the work that religion does in human life?

The standard test today is Ninian Smart's seven dimensions. A religion typically has: (1) teachings about ultimate reality, (2) a foundational story of where we came from and where we are going, (3) a moral framework, (4) repeated rituals and practices, (5) characteristic experiences and emotions, (6) a community and authority structure, and (7) symbols, sacred figures, and sacred spaces.

Committed atheism hits all seven. New Atheism teaches a worldview about ultimate reality (matter is all there is). It has an origin story (cosmic and biological evolution as a closed system). It has a moral framework (secular humanism). It has rituals (Reason Rallies, Sunday Assembly, FFRF gatherings). It has experiences (the awe-of-the-universe trope). It has community and authority (Dawkins, Harris, Hitchens, the Four Horsemen). It has symbols and sacred figures (Darwin, Einstein quotes, the scarlet A).

This argument is not trying to prove that atheism is false because it is religion-shaped. Being a religion does not make a worldview wrong. The point is that the rhetorical move where atheism gets to dodge every criticism aimed at religion by saying "but I'm not religious" no longer works. Once atheism is on the same shelf as the other worldviews, it has to answer questions on the same footing.

The quick reply: "By the standard scholars actually use, your worldview is a religion too. Welcome to the conversation."

In full

A meta-apologetic argument paralleling Atheism is a Belief: committed atheism, particularly New Atheism, secular humanism, and Marxist-Leninist state atheism, exhibits all the structural features by which scholars of religion classify worldviews as religious. Therefore atheism is itself a religion (or, more precisely, a category of religions, since it has internal sects). The argument is empirically testable, doesn't depend on the contested etymology of atheism (covered in Atheism is a Belief), and aligns with how religious-studies scholarship actually classifies worldviews. This page is structured as debate prep, each premise carries a second-order positive case, anticipated opponent objections, rebuttals, a live-cite kit, and tactical notes for live deployment.

Argument structure

# Premise
P1 Religion is properly identified by its functional features (Smart's seven dimensions; Tillich's "ultimate concern"), not by belief in a deity.
P2 Modern committed atheism (New Atheism, secular humanism, state atheism) exhibits all seven functional dimensions of religion.
C Therefore atheism is a religion (more precisely, a category of religions), and its rhetorical immunity to "religion-criticism" collapses.

Form

Functional-classification argument. Not a deductive proof against atheism's truth, being a religion is not itself a defeater for any religion. The argument's force is dialectical: it removes the rhetorical immunity atheism claims under the "I'm not religious, I just have no beliefs" framing. The conclusion is sociological-classificatory, not truth-evaluative. It opens space for further first-order arguments to engage atheism on the same evidential footing as theism.

P1, Religion is identified by functional features, not by deity-belief

Affirmative case (second-order arguments)

  1. The substantive (deity-requiring) definition fails on uncontroversial cases. Theravada Buddhism does not posit a creator deity (the Buddha is not God; gods exist within the system but are themselves bound by karma and not objects of ultimate worship). Jainism explicitly denies a creator. Confucianism in its functional form is non-theistic. Daoism is largely non-theistic. State Shinto is debatable. Yet every introductory religious-studies textbook classes these as religions. If the deity-requirement were the criterion, half of comparative-religion scholarship would be miscategorized. The substantive definition is empirically inadequate.
  2. Scholarly convergence on functional definitions. 20th-century religious-studies converged on functional / structural definitions precisely because the substantive definition failed: Émile Durkheim (The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, 1912), religion as social-cohesion practice oriented toward the sacred; Paul Tillich (Dynamics of Faith, 1957), religion as "ultimate concern"; Clifford Geertz (The Interpretation of Cultures, 1973), religion as symbol-system establishing pervasive moods and motivations; Ninian Smart (The World's Religions, 1989), seven dimensions framework. These are the operational standards in academic religious-studies departments worldwide.
  3. Smart's seven dimensions are the working diagnostic kit. A worldview is classified as religious to the extent that it exhibits: doctrinal (metaphysical claims about ultimate reality); mythic / narrative (foundational origin-and-destiny story); ethical (moral framework grounded in the doctrinal commitments); ritual / practice (repeated identity-reinforcing actions); experiential (the emotional / existential states the worldview produces); social / institutional (community, in-group identity, authority structure); material (symbols, sacred spaces, sacred figures, sacred texts). The presence of all seven (or even most) is the working test.

Anticipated objections

  1. "Religion requires belief in God or the supernatural, that's just what the word means." The substantive-definition appeal.
  2. "Functional definitions are too broad, anything becomes a religion (sports fandom, political ideology)." The over-generation objection.
  3. "This is a Western academic invention, non-Western traditions don't share this concept."

Rebuttals

  1. The substantive definition fails on the established taxonomy. As above (point 1), Theravada Buddhism, Jainism, Confucianism, Daoism. The objector who insists on the substantive definition either has to (a) stop classing these as religions (which contradicts uniform academic and popular usage) or (b) admit the substantive definition needs amendment. Failure mode: definition that excludes paradigm cases.
  2. The over-generation worry has a built-in answer: degree of fit. Sports fandom has some dimensions (rituals, identity-markers, sacred figures) but not others (no doctrinal claims about ultimate reality, no foundational origin-narrative, no comprehensive ethical framework). Political ideologies vary, Marxism-Leninism scores high (full doctrinal-mythic-ethical-ritual structure), centrist liberalism scores low (it lacks ultimate-concern features). The diagnostic produces gradations, not binary verdicts. Committed atheism scores high on all seven, which is the relevant claim.
  3. The functional definition is empirically defensible across cultures. The category "religion" is admittedly Western-academic in name, but the phenomena the category tracks (worldview, ultimate concern, ritual practice, sacred narrative, communal identity) are observably universal. Scholars studying non-Western traditions on their own terms (Wilfred Cantwell Smith; Jonathan Z. Smith) have engaged this concern; the working consensus is that the functional definition tracks real cross-cultural phenomena, not Western projection. Failure mode: conflating the category-label's origin with the category's empirical adequacy.

Live-cite kit

  • Scholarly: Smart, The World's Religions (1989; multiple eds.); Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (1957); Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (1973); Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912); Dworkin, Religion Without God (2013), develops the explicit category of "religious atheism."
  • Aphorism: "If your definition of religion excludes Buddhism, your definition is broken."

Tactical notes

  • Lead with the Buddhism / Jainism point, it's intuitive and most opponents have not thought through whether their definition handles those cases.
  • If the opponent insists "fine, I just won't class Buddhism as a religion," that's a win. They've conceded that their concept of religion is non-standard; the rest of the conversation can proceed on the standard concept.
  • Don't get pulled into definitional warfare in the abstract. The point of P1 is to get the functional-classification toolkit on the table; P2 then runs the diagnostic.

P2, Modern committed atheism exhibits all seven dimensions

Affirmative case (second-order arguments)

  1. Doctrinal, metaphysical naturalism is a positive cluster. Matter and energy are fundamental; there is no God; mind reduces to brain; morality is constructed (or naturalistic-realist with metaphysical cost, see Atheism Moral Neutrality Failure); meaning is subjective. These are positive claims about ultimate reality, not the absence of claims. See Naturalism. Committed atheists hold these as settled, books are written defending them; conferences are organized around them.
  2. Mythic / narrative, the cosmological-evolutionary grand story. Big Bang → galactic formation → solar formation → abiogenesis → evolution → Homo sapiens → secular Enlightenment → scientific civilization (or eventual heat death). Complete origin-and-destiny narrative, taught with the same totalizing scope as Genesis-to-Revelation. Carl Sagan's Cosmos is the canonical popular presentation; Neil deGrasse Tyson's reboot continues the tradition.
  3. Ethical, secular humanism is a specific ethic. Paul Kurtz's Humanist Manifesto I (1933), II (1973), III (2003); Sam Harris's The Moral Landscape (2010); Peter Singer's utilitarian extension. The ethic has sacred values (rationality, autonomy, scientific progress, individual flourishing, equality, harm-reduction). Violations of these values produce moral outrage in committed atheists indistinguishable from religious moral outrage.
  4. Ritual, Sunday Assembly, Reason Rallies, secular liturgies. Sunday Assembly was founded explicitly as an atheist church-equivalent (2013, London; now international). Reason Rallies (2012, 2016, National Mall, DC) were mass-mobilization events. Secular weddings, funerals, and humanist coming-of-age ceremonies fill the ritual gap. The "I believe in science" yard signs (post-2017) are creedal markers. Darwin Day (Feb 12) is observed as commemorative ritual.
  5. Experiential, the awe-of-the-cosmos discourse. Sagan's "pale blue dot" sequence, Tyson's Cosmos, Dawkins's "magic of reality," Krauss's "stardust" rhetoric, all function as numinous experience, producing the same emotional structure (wonder, smallness, transcendence-of-self, connection-to-the-whole) that religious traditions describe as encounter with the sacred. Sam Harris's Waking Up (2014) explicitly seeks to recover religious-experiential content for atheism.
  6. Social / institutional, clear in-group identity and infrastructure. "Brights," "freethinkers," "skeptics," "rationalists" as in-group labels; "the religious" as out-group framing; conferences (American Atheists annual, FFRF Convention, Skepticon, CSICON); organizations (Freedom From Religion Foundation, American Atheists, Center for Inquiry, American Humanist Association); a recognized priesthood (the Four Horsemen, explicit religious metaphor, used by the movement itself in the 2007 video and subsequent canonization).
  7. Material, sacred figures, texts, spaces, symbols. Sacred figures: Darwin, Russell, Hitchens, Sagan, Dawkins, Tyson. Sacred texts: On the Origin of Species, The God Delusion, Cosmos, The End of Faith, God Is Not Great. Sacred spaces: museums of natural history (especially the Hall of Human Origins), CERN, Cape Canaveral. Symbols: the atomic-orbital "atheist A," the Darwin fish, the FSM (Flying Spaghetti Monster) parody-icon, the "scarlet A" Out Campaign letter (Dawkins's 2007 initiative).

Anticipated objections

  1. "Atheism is just one belief, not a worldview." The bare-proposition retreat.
  2. "Calling atheism a religion is just a tu quoque." The bad-faith-attack-disguised-as-classification objection.
  3. "Atheism doesn't have rituals or sacred figures, you're stretching." The empirical-denial objection.
  4. "Even granting all this, the content of atheism is the absence of god-belief, not the presence of these features."

Rebuttals

  1. Atheism bare is one proposition; atheism as practiced is a cluster. Granted, the proposition "no God exists" is one belief. But the committed version of atheism that writes books, runs organizations, holds conferences, and publishes manifestos is always a cluster, metaphysical naturalism, evolutionary cosmology, secular ethics, identity markers. The functional-religion argument targets the committed version, not the bare proposition. The bare-proposition retreat is rhetorically convenient but empirically rare; most self-identified atheists in the post-2000 New Atheist context are committed-version atheists. Failure mode: bare-proposition retreat to escape the data about actual atheist communities.
  2. It is not a tu quoque. A tu quoque has the form "you're guilty of X, therefore your accusation that I do X fails." This argument is not responding to an atheist accusation that Christianity is religious; it is making a category claim (by the operative scholarly definition of religion, atheism falls in). The classification has implications for legal status (see Torcaso v. Watkins, 1961; Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 7th Cir. 2005), sociological analysis, and rhetorical immunity. The argument is descriptive, not retaliatory. Failure mode: misdiagnosis of argumentative form (treating a classification as an attack).
  3. The empirical-denial fails on inventory. Sunday Assembly: founded explicitly as atheist ritual gathering (2013). Reason Rallies (2012, 2016): mass-mobilization events with explicit religious-event structure. Four Horsemen video (2007): treated as foundational text. Brights movement (Dennett, Dawkins): explicit identity-formation initiative. The Out Campaign (Dawkins, 2007): explicit creed-display project. r/atheism (founded 2008, peak ~2.5M subscribers): online congregation. The empirical inventory contradicts the objection point-by-point.
  4. The "content vs features" distinction concedes the classification. If the content of atheism is "no God exists" but the practice is the seven-dimensional structure, the practice is religious-by-classification while the content is creedal-by-classification. This is parallel to how Buddhism's content (no creator deity; impermanence; suffering; no-self) is distinct from its practice (seven dimensions); we still class Buddhism as religious because of the practice. The same logic classes atheism as religious. Failure mode: selective application of the classification standard (Buddhism gets classed by practice, atheism demands to be classed by content alone).

Christian satisfaction

Not directly applicable, this is a defeater argument, not a comparative-religion case. But the biblical anthropology (Romans 1:18-25) predicts exactly this pattern: humans are inveterately religious; suppression of true worship redirects to false worship; atheism does not eliminate religion, it relocates it. Atheism's seven-dimensional structure is what Romans 1 predicts, the sensus divinitatis is not turned off by professed unbelief; it surfaces as an alternative-religious structure.

Live-cite kit

  • Scripture: Romans 1:21-25, "professing to be wise, they became fools… they exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator"
  • Legal: Torcaso v. Watkins (1961, U.S. Supreme Court), explicitly classed "secular humanism" among "religions which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God"; Kaufman v. McCaughtry (7th Cir. 2005), atheism is a religion for First Amendment purposes
  • Scholarly: Dworkin, Religion Without God (2013); McGrath, The Twilight of Atheism (2004); Vitz, Faith of the Fatherless (1999, rev. 2013); Zuckerman, Society Without God (2008); Haidt, The Righteous Mind (2012); Mary Eberstadt, How the West Really Lost God (2013)
  • Aphorism: "Sunday Assembly is what it looks like when religion sneaks back in the side door of a worldview that locked it out the front."

Tactical notes

  • Run the seven-dimension diagnostic out loud for the audience. The cumulative effect is overwhelming; any one dimension is contestable, all seven together are not.
  • The Torcaso v. Watkins citation is a heavy hitter, atheists routinely cite the Establishment Clause to exclude religion from public life; this case shows the Court has classified atheism as religion under that clause. Use it for the rhetorical reversal.
  • The state-atheism case (Marxist-Leninist) is the historical reductio: no one disputes that Soviet atheism functioned religiously (Lenin-tomb pilgrimages, party catechism, dialectical-materialism narrative, anathematized heretics). The argument extends the same analysis to softer (Western, voluntary) forms of committed atheism. Use the historical case to anchor the structural claim.
  • Don't claim every individual atheist exhibits all seven dimensions. The argument is about committed worldview atheism (the kind that organizes, evangelizes, identifies). Passive non-thinkers are exempt, they are not the target.

Why this argument is stronger than the etymology argument

The etymology argument (Atheism is a Belief) wins the definitional fight, but atheists can immediately retreat to "well, I'm only making a psychological claim about my own lack of belief." The etymology argument doesn't follow them there.

The functional argument does follow them. Even granting "I just lack belief in gods," the question becomes: do you function as someone with metaphysical commitments, moral framework, community, ritual, sacred texts and figures? For any committed atheist who reads Dawkins, attends Reason Rallies, adopts secular-humanist ethics, and identifies as part of the "rationalist community," the answer is yes, and the religion classification follows by P2.

Pair the two arguments in conversation: the etymology argument cuts off the lack-of-belief retreat at the definitional level; the functional argument cuts off the bare-proposition retreat at the practice level. Together they exhaust the rhetorical exits.

Legal recognition (U.S.):

  • Torcaso v. Watkins (1961, U.S. Supreme Court), the Court explicitly classed "secular humanism" among "religions which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God."
  • Kaufman v. McCaughtry (7th Cir. 2005), atheism is a religion for First Amendment Establishment-Clause and Free-Exercise purposes; the court ruled prison authorities had to accommodate an atheist study group on the same terms as religious ones.

Philosophical recognition:

  • Ronald Dworkin, Religion Without God (Harvard, 2013), develops the explicit category of "religious atheism," atheism that has the structure of a religion without a deity.
  • Alister McGrath, The Twilight of Atheism (2004), sociological-religious analysis of organized atheism as a faith-tradition.
  • Paul Vitz, Faith of the Fatherless (1999, rev. 2013), psychological-religious profile of major atheists.

Sociological data:

  • Phil Zuckerman, Society Without God (2008); Faith No More (2012), documents secular communities as functional-religious.
  • Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind (2012), moral-foundations theory shows secular ideologies recruit the same psychological architecture as religions (sacralization, in-group bonding, purity intuitions).
  • Mary Eberstadt, How the West Really Lost God (2013), sociological argument for the family-and-meaning-collapse correlates of Western secularization.

Historical case, state atheism as obvious religion:

Marxist-Leninist atheism had:

  • Lenin-tomb pilgrimages (sacred space)
  • Party catechism (doctrinal, The State and Revolution; What Is to Be Done?)
  • Sacred narrative (dialectical materialism, Big Bang of human society)
  • Anathematized heretics (Trotskyists, capitalists, "kulaks")
  • Ritual (May Day parades, party congresses, oaths)
  • Persecuted dissenters as religious authorities persecute heretics (gulag system; show trials)

No one disputes Soviet/state atheism functioned religiously. The argument extends the same analysis to softer (Western, voluntary) forms of committed atheism, the structural fingerprint is the same; only the coercive apparatus differs.

Master objections to the whole argument

  1. "Even if atheism is religious, that doesn't make it false.", Reply: granted, and the argument never claims otherwise. The classification is dialectical, not truth-evaluative. It removes atheism's rhetorical immunity to religion-criticism (the "I'm just rational, you're the religious one" move) and forces the conversation onto the same evidential footing for both sides. The truth-question is taken up in the positive arguments (see Cumulative Case for Christian Theism).
  2. "This is just an unfair label-game intended to demean atheism.", Reply: the argument uses the operative scholarly classification of religion (Smart's seven dimensions; Dworkin's Religion Without God; the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in Torcaso). If applying the standard scholarly classification is a "label-game," then religious-studies as a discipline is a label-game. The objector cannot insist that the standard classification be applied except to atheism; that's special pleading. Failure mode: special pleading.
  3. "Functional religion is empty, every committed worldview is functionally religious by your standard.", Reply: many committed worldviews are functionally religious by the seven-dimension standard (Marxism-Leninism; National Socialism; aspects of strong nationalism). The classification is doing real work in those cases, predicting in-group/out-group dynamics, ritualization, sacralization. Atheism falls into the same category; the classification is consistent, not inflated. The standard is not "any conviction is religion"; it is "worldview exhibiting all seven dimensions is religion." Most personal preferences and political opinions don't qualify.
  4. "The Buddhist counterexample is contested, some scholars argue Buddhism isn't a religion.", Reply: this concedes the broader point. If "Buddhism isn't a religion" is a defensible scholarly position, then the substantive (deity-requiring) definition of religion is contested and we are operating in a debate where functional definitions are also on the table. The atheist who rejects the functional definition for atheism cannot simultaneously rely on the substantive definition to handle the Buddhism case; that's selective use. Either way, the functional definition is in play and atheism is classified as religious.

Tactical opening / closing

Opening line: "I want to suggest something that may sound provocative: contemporary committed atheism, the New Atheist movement, secular humanism, what you find on r/atheism, is itself a religion by the standard scholarly definition. It scores high on all seven of Ninian Smart's dimensions of religion. Want me to walk through them?"

Closing landing strip: "The point isn't to win a label-fight. The point is that once we agree atheism is doing the same kind of work religion does, providing meaning, community, identity, moral framework, ritual, we can stop pretending only one side has skin in the game. We're both staking claims about ultimate reality. Now let's actually compare the claims."

Connection to Scripture

While this is primarily a sociological-philosophical argument, two biblical observations support it:

  • Romans 1.18-21, "professing to be wise, they became fools, and exchanged the glory of the incorruptible God for an image… they exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator." Paul's anthropology: humans are inveterately religious; suppression of true worship redirects to false worship. Atheism does not eliminate religion, it relocates it.
  • Reformed Epistemology / sensus divinitatis, the universal-religious-faculty doctrine (Calvin, Institutes I.3.1; Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 2000), predicts the seven-dimensional fingerprint as residual or substituted sensus-functioning even where God-belief is repressed.

Patristic / scholarly note

Patristic / classical:

  • Augustine (De Civitate Dei, c. AD 413-426), engages Roman civic religion as a de facto religious system serving identity and political function; the civic religion analytic generalizes
  • Tertullian (Apology, c. AD 197), analyzes the religious shape of Roman state piety

Modern engagement:

  • Ronald Dworkin (Religion Without God, 2013), develops "religious atheism" as an explicit category
  • Alister McGrath (The Twilight of Atheism, 2004), sociological-religious analysis of organized atheism
  • Paul Vitz (Faith of the Fatherless, 1999, rev. 2013), psychology of major atheists; documents the religion-shaped-substitution pattern
  • Frank Turek (Stealing from God, 2014), popular-level frame
  • Os Guinness (Long Journey Home, 2001), cultural-philosophical engagement

Sociological / psychological:

  • Phil Zuckerman (Society Without God, 2008; Faith No More, 2012)
  • Jonathan Haidt (The Righteous Mind, 2012), moral-foundations theory
  • Mary Eberstadt (How the West Really Lost God, 2013)
  • Christian Smith (The Sacred Project of American Sociology, 2014), adjacent argument: sociology itself is a religious project

Religious-studies frameworks:

  • Ninian Smart (The World's Religions, 1989), seven dimensions
  • Paul Tillich (Dynamics of Faith, 1957), ultimate concern
  • Émile Durkheim (The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, 1912), sacred-profane / social-cohesion
  • Clifford Geertz (The Interpretation of Cultures, 1973), symbol-system definition

What this argument doesn't prove

  • Not that atheism is false. Being a religion is not a defeater for any religion's truth-claim.
  • Not that all atheists are religious atheists. A passive non-thinker who has never engaged the question may genuinely just lack belief without structural commitments. The argument targets committed worldview atheism, which is what Dawkins-Hitchens-Harris-style atheism actually is.
  • Not that atheism and Christianity are equivalent. Both being "religions" by the functional definition doesn't equalize their truth-status. The argument is about classification, not adjudication.

See also