Argument

Argument from Desire

Intro

Hunger points to food. Thirst points to water. Loneliness points to other people. Every built-in human desire seems to track something real that satisfies it.

But there is one longing that nothing in this world ever fills. C.S. Lewis called it Joy; the German word is Sehnsucht, a kind of bittersweet ache. You feel it in a piece of music, in a perfect autumn day, in a memory that almost hurts. The moment you reach for what triggered it, the trigger turns out to be a signpost, not the destination. Even great love affairs, careers, and travels leave the ache.

Lewis's move is short: if every other natural desire points to something real, this one probably does too. And since nothing in this world fills it, the thing it points to is not in this world. Augustine got there 1500 years earlier in the opening of his Confessions: "Our hearts are restless until they rest in You."

This is not a knock-down proof. It is an invitation to take a clue seriously. The clue is that your heart keeps reaching for a country you have never visited. Christianity says: it is not crazy that you feel this; it is exactly what we would predict if you were made for God.

Quick reply in conversation: "You know that ache that nothing in this world quite fills? What if it isn't a glitch, what if it is a clue?"

In full

C. S. Lewis's existential argument: every natural innate desire has an object that satisfies it; we have an innate desire that no temporal object satisfies (the Sehnsucht / Joy longing); therefore the object of that desire is not of this world, God / heaven. Augustine's cor inquietum ("our hearts are restless until they rest in You") is the classical antecedent. This page is structured as debate prep: per-premise affirmative case, anticipated objections, numbered rebuttals (1:1), live-cite kit, and tactical notes for engagement with Freudian projection-theorists, evolutionary deflationists, and "the desire is for X mundane thing" replies.

Argument structure (Lewis's primary form)

Form

Analogical reasoning from established correspondence (specific natural desires ↔ real fulfillments) extended to the deepest longing; abductive in that the existence of God is the best explanation of a persistent desire that no temporal object satisfies. The argument is not strictly deductive, it depends on the inductive generalization from observed natural desires and on the abductive inference from the transcendent character of the longing to a transcendent object. The argument is most powerful as one premise in the cumulative case, paired with Argument from Beauty (beauty triggers Sehnsucht), Argument from Religious Experience, and Argument from Purpose Meaning and Hope.

P1, Every natural innate desire has a real object that fulfills it

Affirmative case (second-order arguments)

1. The induction from biological-psychological desires. Hunger corresponds to food; thirst to water; sexual desire to sexual union; the desire for friendship to other persons; the desire for knowledge to knowable truths; the desire for sleep to rest. The pattern is striking and empirically robust, natural innate desires consistently track real fulfillments. The induction from many cases licenses a general expectation that innate desires have real objects.
2. The natural / unnatural distinction is principled. Lewis distinguishes natural desires (innate, universal, persistent across cultures, present from early development, persistent against cultural suppression) from conditioned desires (learned, culturally specific, fashion-dependent, manipulable). The natural desires are the ones with real objects; conditioned desires can lack them (the desire to fly without wings, the desire to be a celebrity). The Sehnsucht-Joy longing is natural by every criterion: universal, ancient, persistent against fulfillment, present even where unwelcome.
3. The teleological structure of biological systems. Living systems exhibit pervasive teleological structure, eyes are for seeing, hearts are for pumping blood, hunger is for eating. The teleology of innate desire (desire-as-aimed-at-fulfillment) is structurally consistent with this broader biological teleology. It would be metaphysically anomalous if one innate desire (and only one, the Sehnsucht longing) had no corresponding real object, while every other innate desire did. The exception would require explanation; the rule does not.
4. Augustine's cor inquietum as classical-tradition observation. The pattern of restless-heart-toward-God has been documented in the Christian tradition for two millennia, Confessions 1.1 is its locus classicus. Augustine's introspective method treats his own desire-pattern as evidence about the human design; the consistency of this report across countless converts, mystics, and theologians (East and West, Catholic and Protestant) is itself substantial weight on the real-object side.

Anticipated objections

1. "Not every desire has a real object, humans desire to fly without wings, to live forever as superhumans, to be invulnerable. These desires lack (this-worldly) fulfillment."
2. "The natural / unnatural distinction is unprincipled, it begs the question by classifying desires-with-fulfillment as 'natural' and desires-without as 'unnatural.'" (Anthony Kenny, What I Believe, 2006.)
3. "Even granting the pattern, induction from observed cases doesn't licence inference to every desire, there could be exceptional cases."
4. "The tradition's testimony is biased, Christian writers report Christian experiences."

Rebuttals

1. The cited counter-examples are conditioned / fantastic desires, not natural innate ones. The desire to fly is a culturally-mediated wish (children who never see flight rarely "want to fly"; the desire is shaped by stories, observation, ambition). The desire to be invulnerable is a fear-driven fantasy, not an innate biological-psychological need. None of these are natural in Lewis's sense, universal-from-infancy, present-without-cultural-cue, persistent-against-suppression. The argument's premise is about natural desires, not about the wider class of human wants. Failure mode: equivocation between desire (any want) and natural innate desire (the technical class).
2. The natural / unnatural distinction is principled and operationally testable. Criteria (Kreeft, Heaven, 1989, ch. 1; following Lewis): (a) cross-cultural universality, (b) presence from early childhood, (c) persistence against cultural suppression, (d) experience as deeply rooted rather than fashionable, (e) intensification rather than diminution upon partial-fulfillment. Hunger, thirst, sexual desire, social belonging, knowledge, transcendence, all meet the criteria. Wanting-to-be-a-celebrity, wanting-to-be-superhuman, none meet them. The distinction is not ad hoc; it is well-grounded in developmental psychology and cross-cultural anthropology. Failure mode: circularity charge that misreads the criteria as definitional rather than empirical.
3. The induction is strong because the only candidate exception is itself explained by the inference, the Sehnsucht longing has a transcendent object. The objection asks "could there be exceptions?", but the only candidate exception (the deepest human longing) is precisely the data the argument is interpreting. If we already had an explanation of the Sehnsucht longing as exceptional-without-object, the objection would have force. Since we don't, the induction stands; the transcendent-object inference is the natural extension. (This is parallel to the structure of cosmological argument: the only candidate exception to causation, God, is itself the conclusion of the argument, so the induction stands.) Failure mode: demanding higher inductive certainty than the empirical pattern licenses.
4. The tradition's testimony is corroborated by non-Christian witnesses. The Sehnsucht-experience is reported by Plato (the eros tradition), the Sufis (the ishq of mystical Islam), the Hindu bhakti tradition (viraha, longing for the absent Krishna), the Romantic poets (Goethe, Schiller, Wordsworth, Keats), agnostic philosophers (Bertrand Russell on the "ache of unsatisfied longing"), and contemporary secular psychologists (Viktor Frankl on the will-to-meaning). The cross-traditional report is not parochially Christian; the Christian tradition has interpreted the universal longing in light of the Christian gospel, but the longing itself is documented across humanity. Failure mode: parochialism charge that ignores cross-traditional corroboration.

Live-cite kit

• Scripture: Ecclesiastes 3:11 ("He has set eternity in their heart"); Psalm 42:1-2 (deer panting for water); Romans 8:22-23 (creation groaning).
• Scholarly: C. S. Lewis (Mere Christianity, Bk III, ch. 10; Surprised by Joy, 1955; The Weight of Glory, 1949 sermon); Peter Kreeft (Heaven, the Heart's Deepest Longing, 1989); Augustine (Confessions 1.1).
• Aphorism: "Every other hunger has its bread; only one hunger remains, and the question is whether it has its Bread."

Tactical notes

• Lead with the biological-pattern induction, it is concrete and intuitive. List the desires-with-fulfillments rapidly to establish the pattern before deploying the Sehnsucht move.
• Use the natural/unnatural criteria to preempt the "humans desire to fly" objection. State the criteria up front; the objector is already ruled out.
• Do not stake the argument on the natural/unnatural distinction being immune to objection, it is contested, and Lewis would concede it is principled-but-defeasible. Lean on the cumulative fit between the longing-data and the theistic explanation.

P2, Humans have an innate desire that nothing finite (in this world) satisfies

Affirmative case (second-order arguments)

1. The phenomenology of Sehnsucht / Lewis's "Joy". Lewis's Surprised by Joy (1955) is the autobiographical mapping: certain experiences (the smell of a forest, a passage of music, a glimpse of distant hills) produce a longing-for-we-know-not-what, distinct from the satisfaction of any of the immediate causes, distinct from any nameable object, more poignant than the experience that triggered it. The phenomenon is recognized cross-traditionally as Sehnsucht (German Romantic), desiderium (Latin Christian), eros (Platonic), ishq (Sufi), viraha (Hindu bhakti). The phenomenology is robust and well-documented.
2. The pattern of finite-satisfaction-failure. Each finite candidate object that humans pursue as the deepest object of longing, career success, romantic love, family, fame, knowledge, travel, even religious experience, produces, upon attainment, the same persistent longing rather than its dissolution. Every finite success is followed by the question "is this all?", and the answer is "no, there is more." The repeated failure of finite goods to dissolve the longing is empirical; it is observable in biographical literature, in clinical psychology (the "midlife crisis" phenomenon), in the wisdom literature of every culture (Ecclesiastes is the locus classicus). The longing is underdetermined by any finite object.
3. The persistence against fulfillment. Unlike biological desires that diminish upon satisfaction (eat → no longer hungry), the Sehnsucht longing intensifies upon partial-fulfillment. Beautiful music feeds the longing rather than satisfying it; love feeds the longing; achievement feeds the longing. This intensification-on-fulfillment is precisely the structural mark of a longing whose true object exceeds every finite container. Augustine again: the more the soul tastes God's gifts, the more it longs for God Himself.
4. The infinite-magnitude character. The longing is not just "more than what I have" but infinite in magnitude, the desire is for complete satisfaction, eternal duration, perfect love, full knowing. No finite object could meet such a specification even in principle. The desire's form is for an infinite object; the conclusion that an infinite object exists fits the form.

Anticipated objections

1. "The desire is just for more, more pleasure, more achievement, more love. There's no infinite magnitude; we just always want more than we have."
2. "The desire can be satisfied by naturalistic means, a fulfilling career, deep relationships, meaningful contribution. The 'no finite object satisfies' premise is false; many people are satisfied."
3. "The desire is a malformation, an evolutionary by-product of brains that overshoot their design parameters; treat it as anomaly rather than data."
4. "The 'longing for infinity' is a Christian-cultural artifact, not a universal human experience."

Rebuttals

1. "Just wanting more" misdescribes the phenomenology. The Sehnsucht longing is not for a quantitative increment ("more of the same"); it is for a qualitative satisfaction ("something else, something elsewhere"). The clue is the direction of the longing: it is outward and upward, not more-of-current-experience. A person sated with food still has Sehnsucht; the longing does not vary inversely with current satisfaction. The "just wanting more" reading conflates appetite (which can be sated) with longing (which the data show cannot, by finite means). Failure mode: redescription of phenomenologically distinct experiences as the same.
2. The "naturalistically satisfied" claim does not survive examination. Apparently-satisfied naturalists who deny the Sehnsucht longing typically (a) have not reflectively attended to the phenomenology (not all reflective deniers actually have looked), (b) report similar longing in artistic, romantic, or grief-stricken moments while denying it in ordinary contexts (suggesting a denial-strategy rather than absence), or (c) have constructed a worldview in which the longing is reframed as "appreciating life as it is", which is itself a response to the longing, not its absence. The phenomenon shows up in the testimonies of even committed naturalists in their less-guarded moments (Russell's "ache of unsatisfied longing"; Camus's absurd; Nagel's cosmic significance concession). Failure mode: unrepresentative sampling that excludes one's own deeper testimony.
3. The evolutionary-byproduct deflation faces the useless desire problem. Evolution typically does not generate desires-without-corresponding-fulfillment, selection would tend to eliminate desires that systematically fail of their objects (such desires are wasteful of psychological energy and depressing). The persistence of a universal desire that no available object satisfies is anomalous on naturalism. The objection retreats to "it's a maladaptive byproduct", but maladaptive byproducts of this universality and persistence are rare and require specific explanation, not appeal to the generic possibility of byproducts. Failure mode: explanatory hand-waving with "byproduct."
4. The cross-traditional documentation rules out cultural artifact. Sehnsucht (German Romantic; Christianity-adjacent but not specifically Christian); eros (Platonic; pre-Christian); ishq (Sufi Islamic); viraha (Hindu bhakti); the Buddhist diagnosis of dukkha as universal dissatisfaction (which then receives the non-theistic Buddhist resolution); the secular-existential testimony of Camus, Sartre, Frankl, Yalom. The longing is documented across radically different theological frames; the interpretation varies, but the phenomenon is universal. The Christian tradition reads it as longing-for-God; that reading is one interpretation among several; the fact of universal longing is not Christian-cultural. Failure mode: cultural-parochialism charge that fails the cross-cultural test.

Live-cite kit

• Scripture: Ecclesiastes 1-2 (Solomon's exhaustive testing of finite goods → vanity of vanities); Psalm 63:1 (soul thirsting in dry land); John 4:13-14 (Jesus to Samaritan woman: this water → no more thirst); Philippians 3:8-14 (Paul pressing on toward upward call).
• Scholarly: Lewis (Surprised by Joy, 1955; The Weight of Glory, 1949); Augustine (Confessions 10); Pascal (Pensées §425/148, the infinite abyss); Kreeft (Heaven, 1989).
• Aphorism: "If a man's reach should exceed his grasp, what's a heaven for?" (Browning)

Tactical notes

• Use personal testimony examples: read the Lewis passage, read Augustine, read Pascal, read Russell's Free Man's Worship line. The form of the longing-testimony across these radically-different authors is the most powerful teaching device.
• For the apparently-satisfied opponent: gently probe with the Ecclesiastes question, "have you tested everything? Money, fame, sex, knowledge, achievement, even all together, do they satisfy completely, with no residual longing?" The honest opponent will admit residue; the dishonest opponent will perform satisfaction unconvincingly.
• Do not pathologize the opponent's denial, the Sehnsucht phenomenon is genuinely deniable in particular moments (busy lives, distracting pleasures, well-defended worldviews). Patient pressing usually surfaces it; bullying does not.
• For the artistic / romantic opponent: lean on the Sehnsucht-as-trigger-of-art point. Why do we make and listen to sad music? Why does great romantic literature involve unfulfilled love (Tristan and Isolde, Romeo and Juliet, Cyrano)? The attractive incompleteness of human longing is a clue.

P3, The object that satisfies an innate desire no temporal object satisfies must be transcendent

Affirmative case (second-order arguments)

1. From the desire's form to the object's form. P1 establishes that natural innate desires have real objects; P2 establishes that the Sehnsucht longing is unsatisfied by any finite object. Combining: the real object that satisfies the Sehnsucht longing is not finite. Not-finite = transcendent (above and beyond the finite world). The inference is structural: from the desire's form (longing-for-infinite) to the object's form (infinite/transcendent).
2. The Christian identification of the transcendent object. The Christian tradition identifies the transcendent object as God Himself, encountered in the Beatific Vision and the New Heavens / New Earth (1 Corinthians 13:12; Revelation 21-22; 1 John 3:2). The Christian identification fits the longing's specifications: God is infinite, eternal, perfect Love, perfect Knowing, the satisfying counterpart to the longing's "complete satisfaction, eternal duration, perfect love, full knowing" form.
3. Convergence with Argument from Religious Experience. Many people across cultures report religious experiences that they describe as partial fulfillment of the deepest longing, a tasting, an anticipation. (See William James, Varieties; Augustine Confessions 7-9; Teresa of Avila; modern conversion testimonies.) The convergence between desire-argument and experience-argument is striking: the longing predicts the existence of the object; the experience attests partial encounter with the object. Cumulative force.
4. Negative-corroboration: alternative fulfillments fail. Buddhism's response (extinguish the longing through detachment) treats the longing as illness; Hindu advaita (recognize the longing's object is the deepest Self) treats it as recognition rather than relationship; secular naturalism (live without resolution) treats it as endurable absurdity. Each of these alternatives implicitly concedes the longing is real; none provides an object that fits the form. The Christian transcendent-personal-object answer alone fits the form.

Anticipated objections

1. "Wish-fulfillment / projection (Feuerbach, Freud): the desire for God is a projection of unmet wishes, it shows nothing about reality, only psychology."
2. "The transcendent object could be impersonal, Brahman, the Tao, the One, not the personal Christian God."
3. "Even granting transcendence, this is at best generic theism. Why Christian theism specifically?"
4. "You're using the existence of the desire to justify belief in its object, but that's just an existential argument, not an evidential one."

Rebuttals

1. The Feuerbach-Freud projection-charge cuts both ways and is methodologically suspect. First, the tu quoque: atheism can be its own projection, the wish for autonomy, freedom from divine accountability, escape from cosmic judgment. Plantinga and McGrath have developed this counter-argument; it deflates the projection-objection by symmetry. Second, the projection-objection commits the genetic fallacy, explaining the origin of a belief is not the same as refuting the truth of the belief. Even if the desire arises by some psychological mechanism, the question of whether the desire's object exists is separate. The argument from desire establishes the existence of the satisfying object, not merely its psychological function. (Lewis, Mere Christianity III.10, explicit response.) Failure mode: projection (the projection-charge is itself a projection of psychological-reductive frame onto an explanatory question).
2. The personal character of the Sehnsucht longing favors a personal transcendent object. The phenomenology of the longing is for, for completeness, for relationship, for recognition, for love. These are interpersonal desires; their satisfaction requires a Person. An impersonal transcendent (Brahman, Tao, the One) is transcendent but not personal; it cannot fit the relational specifications of the longing. (Parallel to the conscience-argument: the personal phenomenology favors a personal source.) Christianity's Trinitarian-personal God uniquely fits both the transcendent and personal aspects of the longing's form. (See P1 of Christian God is the Only True God.) Failure mode: non-personal grounding that ignores the relational form of the longing.
3. This argument warrants the conclusion of a transcendent personal source of human longing; the move to specifically Christian theism uses additional arguments. As with Argument from Conscience P4 and Argument from Beauty P3, the desire-argument is one premise in a cumulative case for Christian theism; the move requires the historical case (resurrection), the comparative-religion case (Christian God is the Only True God), and the fulfillment of the OT redemptive narrative. The desire-argument's role is to refute naturalism and pure-impersonalism; the further specifications come from other arguments.
4. The argument is evidential-existential, not purely existential. The premise about innate-desires-having-objects is empirical (the biological induction); the premise about the Sehnsucht longing is phenomenological (the testimony of the relevant experience). The conclusion follows from these by analogical and abductive inference. The argument is evidential in form; calling it "merely existential" misclassifies it. (The same strict-evidentialism would also reject most historical and philosophical arguments.) Failure mode: narrow-evidentialism that would also undermine the objector's own commitments.

Live-cite kit

• Scripture: John 4:13-14; Revelation 21:1-5; 1 Corinthians 13:12; 1 John 3:2; Psalm 17:15.
• Scholarly: Lewis (Mere Christianity III.10; The Weight of Glory); Augustine (Confessions 1.1; 10); Pascal (Pensées §425); Plantinga (Warranted Christian Belief, 2000).
• Aphorism: "We are far too easily pleased." (Lewis, The Weight of Glory)

Tactical notes

• For the Hindu/Buddhist opponent: focus on the personal character of the longing. Their alternative (impersonal transcendent + extinguish-the-self) does not actually fit the relational form of the longing.
• For the Freudian/projection opponent: deploy Plantinga's tu quoque immediately. Ask: "would you accept a parallel projection-explanation of atheism? If not, why is projection an asymmetric tool?"
• Do not over-promise, the argument warrants belief in a transcendent personal source; it does not deliver Christian theism alone. Be honest about the cumulative-case structure.
• For the artistic / Romantic opponent: this argument is unusually well-suited to them. Lewis, Pascal, Augustine, Wordsworth, Keats, the Romantic poets, there is enormous shared vocabulary. Lean on the cultural overlap.

Conclusion

A transcendent personal object exists that satisfies the deepest human longing, God, encountered in the Beatific Vision and the New Heavens and New Earth. The deepest human longing is not a defect or illusion but a signpost. It points beyond all finite goods to an infinite Good that can satisfy it. That infinite Good is God; the satisfying union with Him is the eschatological vision (Christian: the Beatific Vision; the New Heavens and New Earth). The argument is best-explanation, abductive, cumulative with Argument from Beauty, Argument from Religious Experience, and Argument from Purpose Meaning and Hope. Augustine's classical formulation remains the most-quoted: "You have made us for Yourself, O Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in You."

Master objections to the argument as a whole

1. "Lewis's argument is sentimental and unphilosophical." Reply: it has been carefully formalized (Robert Holyer, "The Argument from Desire", Faith and Philosophy, 1988); the analytic-philosophical engagement affirms its evidential weight while noting (correctly) that it is best-explanation, not deductive proof. The "sentimental" charge is rhetorical, not argumentative.
2. "This is just Pascal's Wager dressed up as an argument." Reply: distinct in form. The Wager is a decision-theoretic argument under uncertainty; the desire-argument is an inference-to-best-explanation about the existence of an object. They engage different epistemic registers.
3. "Even granting the desire and its object, why must the object be God specifically?" Reply: the argument warrants a transcendent personal object that satisfies infinite-relational longing. The identification with God uses additional considerations from comparative-religion, historical case, and Trinitarian theology. See Christian God is the Only True God.
4. "You're using a feeling to derive a fact, that's bad epistemology." Reply: phenomenological evidence is real evidence in philosophy. The alternative, refusing to count any qualitative experience as data, is unliveable scientism that would also rule out the evidence on which scientism itself rests. The desire is data; the inference is abductive.

Tactical opening / closing

Opening line: "What is it that you most deeply want? Not surface things, what is the longing underneath the longings, the one that nothing you've achieved has fully quieted?"

Closing landing strip: "The longing is the clue. It does not prove God by force, but it raises the question: what kind of object would fit the shape of this longing? The Christian answer is the only one that fits the relational, infinite, eternal specifications. The next question is whether the answer is true."

Pascal's "infinite abyss" formulation

"What else does this craving, and this helplessness, proclaim but that there was once in man a true happiness, of which all that now remains is the empty print and trace? This he tries in vain to fill with everything around him, seeking in things that are not there the help he cannot find in those that are, though none can help, since this infinite abyss can be filled only with an infinite and immutable object; in other words by God himself." , Pensées 425/148 (1670)

Lewis's "Joy" / "Sehnsucht" formulation

"If I find in myself desires which nothing in this world can satisfy, the only logical explanation is that I was made for another world.", Mere Christianity, Bk III ch. 10 (1952)

"There was no doubt that Joy was a desire... But a desire is turned not to itself but to its object. Not only that, but it owes all its character to its object.", Surprised by Joy (1955)

Connection to Scripture

• Ecclesiastes 3:11, God "set eternity in their heart"
• Ecclesiastes 1-2, Solomon's exhaustive testing of finite goods → vanity of vanities
• Psalm 42:1-2, "as the deer pants for the water brooks, so my soul pants for You, O God"
• Psalm 63:1, "my soul thirsts for You, my flesh yearns for You"
• John 4:13-14, Jesus to the Samaritan woman; Sehnsucht-fulfillment promise
• John 6:35, "I am the bread of life; he who comes to Me will not hunger"
• Romans 8:18-25, creation's groaning; cosmic Sehnsucht
• 1 Corinthians 13:12, "now we see in a mirror dimly, then face to face"
• 1 John 3:2, "we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is"
• Revelation 21:1-5, eschatological satisfaction; God dwelling with humans

Patristic / scholarly note

Classical / patristic / medieval:

• Augustine (Confessions 1.1), "You have made us for Yourself, O Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in You", classical formulation
• Gregory of Nyssa, epektasis: the soul's eternal stretching-forward into God; even in beatific vision, desire is satisfied-and-renewed
• Bernard of Clairvaux (On Loving God, c. 1126), four-stage progression of love
• Pseudo-Dionysian / Bonaventuran mystical tradition, itinerarium of the soul to God

Modern:

• Blaise Pascal (Pensées §425/148, 1670), the "infinite abyss" formulation
• C. S. Lewis, modern locus classicus: The Pilgrim's Regress (1933), Mere Christianity III.10 (1952), Surprised by Joy (1955), The Weight of Glory (1949 sermon)
• Peter Kreeft (Heaven, the Heart's Deepest Longing, 1989); Kreeft & Tacelli (Handbook of Christian Apologetics, 1994)
• James K. A. Smith (Desiring the Kingdom, 2009; You Are What You Love, 2016), desire-anthropology
• Robert Holyer ("The Argument from Desire", Faith and Philosophy 5/1, 1988), analytic-philosophical engagement
• John Henry Newman (Apologia Pro Vita Sua, 1864), desire-and-conscience interplay

Critics / alternative accounts:

• Sigmund Freud (The Future of an Illusion, 1927), wish-fulfillment account
• Ludwig Feuerbach (The Essence of Christianity, 1841), projection account
• Anthony Kenny (What I Believe, 2006), natural/unnatural distinction collapse
• Buddhist tradition, the longing as dukkha to be extinguished, not satisfied
• Hindu advaita, the longing as recognition of the Self, not relationship

Inference rules used

• Analogical Reasoning, natural-desire-corresponds-to-object pattern extended to the deepest longing
• Modus Ponens, if desires correspond to reality, ultimate longing corresponds to ultimate reality
• Inference to the Best Explanation, God as the best explanation of the persistent infinite longing

See also

• Argument from Religious Experience, the experiential dimension of encounter with God; complements the desire dimension
• Argument from Purpose Meaning and Hope, the existential-fit case; sister argument
• Argument from Beauty, beauty often functions as trigger of Sehnsucht; the two converge on the experiential-aesthetic-existential dimension
• Argument from Conscience, sister phenomenological argument from moral experience
• Moral Argument, parallel transcendental-grounding structure
• Pragmatic Argument, Pascal's Wager + James's "will to believe"; complementary practical-decision frame
• Christian God is the Only True God, the cumulative comparative case
• C.S. Lewis (entity)
• Augustine (entity; the cor inquietum tradition)
• Gregory of Nyssa (entity; the epektasis doctrine)
• Blaise Pascal (entity; the infinite-abyss tradition)
• Arguments, master index