# Predicate and Predication

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![Marble bust of Aristotle, Roman copy after Lysippos](/codex/assets/aristotle-bust-altemps-after-lysippos.jpg)

## Intro

Every sentence that makes a claim has two parts. The **subject** is what you are talking about. The **predicate** is what you say about it. In "God is good," the subject is *God* and the predicate is *good*. **Predication** is the act of saying something about something.

That sounds simple, but a great deal of apologetics turns on it. Many objections to Christianity work by attaching a word to the wrong subject, or by using a word in one sense and then quietly switching to another. "If evil is nothing, then evil does not exist." "Jesus died, so he cannot be God." "If God is good, he must be good the way I am good." Each of these is a mistake about predication, and each falls apart once you ask two questions: *what is this word being said of*, and *in what sense is it being said*?

Knowing how predicates work lets you slow an argument down and find the exact word where it went wrong.

## In full

A predicate is the term in a proposition that is affirmed or denied of a subject; predication is the act of so affirming or denying. [Aristotle](/codex/aristotle/) defined the simple statement as "an affirmation or denial of something about something" (*De Interpretatione* 6, 17a25), distinguished what is *said of* a subject from what is *present in* a subject (*Categories* 2), and sorted the highest kinds of predicate into ten categories (*Categories* 4). Porphyry's *Isagoge* (c. 270) organised the ways a predicate can relate to its subject into the five predicables, which became the textbook of medieval logic. [Thomas Aquinas](/codex/thomas-aquinas/) added the theory that governs talk about God: terms are predicated univocally, equivocally or analogically, and the perfections of creatures are said of God analogically (*Summa Theologiae* I q.13 a.5). Aquinas, following Aristotle (*Metaphysics* V.7, 1017a31-35), also distinguished two senses of "is": the being of a thing in the categories, and the truth of a proposition, so that privations such as blindness and evil can be truly predicated without being things (*ST* I q.48 a.2 ad 2). In the modern period Kant denied that existence is a "real predicate" (*Critique of Pure Reason* A598/B626), and Frege recast predicates as incomplete, "unsaturated" functions from objects to truth values ("Function and Concept," 1891), the basis of modern predicate logic.

## The parts of a proposition

- **Subject**: the thing spoken about (*Socrates*, *the triangle*, *God*).
- **Predicate**: what is said of it (*is wise*, *has three sides*, *is good*).
- **Copula**: the "is" that joins them in the traditional form *S is P*.
- **Quality**: whether the predicate is affirmed (*S is P*) or denied (*S is not P*).
- **Quantity**: whether it is said of all or some of the subject (*all S*, *some S*). Quality and quantity together give the four forms of [the square of opposition](/codex/categorical-propositions-and-the-square-of-opposition/).

## Essential and accidental predication

- **Essential** (*per se*): the predicate belongs to what the subject is. "A triangle has three sides." Remove it and the subject is no longer that kind of thing.
- **Accidental** (*per accidens*): the predicate belongs to the subject but could be absent. "The triangle is red." Repaint it and it is still a triangle.

Many debate confusions come from treating an accidental predicate as essential, or the reverse. "Christians have done evil, so Christianity is evil" moves an accidental predicate of some Christians onto the essence of the faith.

## The five predicables

Porphyry's list, built on Aristotle's *Topics* I.4-8, names the ways a predicate can relate to a subject:

| Predicable | What it says | Example (subject: human) |
|---|---|---|
| **Genus** | the wider kind it belongs to | animal |
| **Species** | the specific kind it is | human |
| **Difference** | what marks it off within the genus | rational |
| **Property** | what always goes with the kind without defining it | able to laugh |
| **Accident** | what may or may not belong to it | tall, seated, sunburnt |

## The ten categories

Aristotle's highest kinds of predicate (*Categories* 4, 1b25-2a4): **substance** (what it is), **quantity** (how much), **quality** (what kind), **relation** (toward what), **place** (where), **time** (when), **position** (how situated), **state** (how equipped), **action** (doing) and **passion** (being acted on). Every real feature of a thing falls under one of them.

## Univocal, equivocal and analogical

1. **Univocal**: the word means exactly the same in both uses. "Fido is a dog" and "Rex is a dog."
2. **Equivocal**: the word means something unrelated in each use. A river *bank* and a savings *bank*.
3. **Analogical**: the word means something truly related but not identical in each use. A *healthy* person and a *healthy* diet; the diet is called healthy because it causes health in the person.

Aquinas argues that words like *good*, *wise* and *living* are said of God and creatures analogically (*ST* I q.13 a.5). If they were univocal, God would be one more creature with the same goodness we have. If they were equivocal, "God is good" would tell us nothing. Analogy keeps revelation informative without making God finite. This is the formal basis for how the codex handles [Anthropomorphism](/codex/anthropomorphism/): corporeal predicates (hand, eye, walking) are figurative, and personal predicates (knows, wills, loves) are true and analogical. See also [Divine Simplicity](/codex/divine-simplicity/).

## Privations: true predicates that name a lack

A privation is the absence of something a subject ought to have: blindness in an eye, sickness in a body, evil in a will. Can it be predicated?

Aquinas answers with two senses of "is" (*ST* I q.48 a.2 ad 2, following Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V.7):

- **"Is" as the being of a thing.** In this sense only what falls in the ten categories *is*. Blindness is no extra quality sitting in the eye, and evil is no substance or quality alongside the good ones.
- **"Is" as the truth of a proposition.** In this sense anything *is* about which a true affirmative statement can be made. "The man is blind" is true. "There is evil in the world" is true.

So privations can be predicated truly, and what the predicate signifies is a lack. "The man is blind" means that he lacks the sight his nature calls for. This is the logical backbone of the [Privation](/codex/privation/) theory of evil, and it disarms the common objection "if evil is merely an absence, then evil does not exist." Evil exists in the second sense, as a real truth about a damaged good, without existing in the first sense, as a created thing. See [Evil as Privation of Good](/codex/evil-as-privation-of-good/).

A term with no referent at all is a different case. "The square circle is blue" fails before predication begins, because its subject cannot exist (see [Law of Non-Contradiction](/codex/law-of-non-contradiction/)).

## "Existence is not a predicate"

Kant's objection to the [ontological argument](/codex/ontological-arguments/) is a claim about predication: "Being is obviously not a real predicate," that is, not a concept that adds anything to the concept of a thing (*Critique of Pure Reason* A598/B626). A hundred real dollars contain no more than a hundred possible ones; existence posits the thing, it does not describe it. If that is right, Anselm's step from "God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived" to "God exists" fails, because existence was never a perfection to include.

Replies run along three lines. Modal versions of the argument (Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity*, 1974) use *necessary existence*, which arguably is a real property, since it distinguishes one kind of being from another. Anselm's second argument (*Proslogion* 3) already argues from the impossibility of non-existence. And in classical theism God's existence is no added predicate in any case, because God's essence *is* his existence (Aquinas, *De Ente et Essentia* 4; *ST* I q.3 a.4; see [Divine Simplicity](/codex/divine-simplicity/)), which fits the name "I AM THAT I AM" in [Exodus 3:14](/codex/exodus-3-14/). See [Kantian Critique of Natural Theology](/codex/kantian-critique-of-natural-theology/) and [Immanuel Kant](/codex/immanuel-kant/).

## Christological predication

The [Hypostatic Union](/codex/hypostatic-union/) puts the rules of predication to their hardest test. Christ is one person (one subject) with two natures. The ancient rule, the [communication of properties](/codex/communicatio-idiomatum/), is that what belongs to either nature is predicated of the one person. So Scripture can say God purchased the church "with his own blood" ([Acts 20:28](/codex/acts-20-28/)) and that rulers "crucified the Lord of glory" ([1 Corinthians 2:8](/codex/1-corinthians-2-8/)).

Most objections to the deity of Christ attach a predicate to the wrong subject or the wrong nature. "Jesus died, and God cannot die" treats a predicate true of the person *according to his human nature* as if it were said of the divine nature. "Jesus did not know the hour" does the same with knowledge. The repair is always the same pair of questions: *who* is the subject, and *according to which nature* is the predicate said? See [Fully God and Fully Man Is a Contradiction Objection Defeater](/codex/fully-god-and-fully-man-is-a-contradiction-objection-defeater/) and [How Can Jesus Be God Objection Defeater](/codex/how-can-jesus-be-god-objection-defeater/).

## Predicates in modern logic

Frege treated a predicate as an incomplete expression with a gap: "\_\_ is wise" becomes true or false when a name fills the gap. Modern predicate logic writes this as *W(s)*, and adds quantifiers: *for all x* and *there exists an x*. This lets logic express what the old subject-predicate form could not, such as relations between several things ("*x* loves *y*") and nested quantifiers ("everyone loves someone"). The traditional and modern accounts are compatible for most debate purposes; the modern one is the language of analytic philosophy of religion, including [Modal Logic](/codex/modal-logic/).

## Apologetic deployment

- **On evil.** "Evil is an absence" does not mean "evil is unreal." It is truly predicated, as a lack. The objector who says otherwise has merged the two senses of "is."
- **On God-talk.** When someone says "if God were good, he would act as a good human would," ask whether *good* is being used univocally. Classical theism says it is analogical, which changes what follows.
- **On Christ.** Ask *who* and *according to which nature*. Almost every "contradiction" in the incarnation dissolves into a misattached predicate.
- **On the ontological argument.** Grant Kant's point about ordinary things; then ask whether *necessary* existence is in the same position as contingent existence.
- **On equivocation generally.** A word used in two senses inside one argument breaks it. Track every predicate through every premise.

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## Scholarship

Published academic works this page draws on, each matched to a publisher, index or library catalog record.

- Immanuel Kant and J. Meiklejohn, *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781). [Open Library](https://openlibrary.org/works/OL40727153W)
- Alvin Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity* (Clarendon Press, 1974). [Open Library](https://openlibrary.org/works/OL1875214W)

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## See also

- [Logic](/codex/logic/), the hub for every reasoning tool in the codex
- [Categorical Propositions and the Square of Opposition](/codex/categorical-propositions-and-the-square-of-opposition/), the four subject-predicate forms and how they relate
- [Privation](/codex/privation/), the theory of evil that depends on predicating a lack
- [Anthropomorphism](/codex/anthropomorphism/), where analogical predication sorts figurative language from literal
- [Communicatio Idiomatum](/codex/communicatio-idiomatum/), the rule for predicating of Christ's one person
- [Divine Simplicity](/codex/divine-simplicity/), why God's existence is no added predicate
- [Kantian Critique of Natural Theology](/codex/kantian-critique-of-natural-theology/), the source of "existence is not a predicate"
- [Act and Potency](/codex/act-and-potency/), the metaphysics behind essential and accidental predicates

## Common questions this page answers

**Q: What is a predicate in logic?**

A predicate is what a proposition says about its subject. In "God is good," *God* is the subject and *good* is the predicate. Predication is the act of affirming or denying something of something, which Aristotle made the basic unit of a statement.

**Q: What is the difference between essential and accidental predication?**

An essential predicate belongs to what a thing is ("a triangle has three sides"), so the thing could not lack it and stay the same kind of thing. An accidental predicate belongs to the thing but could be absent ("the triangle is red").

**Q: What does analogical predication mean?**

It means a word is used of two things in senses that are truly related but not identical, as a diet and a person are both called healthy. Aquinas held that words like *good* and *wise* are said of God and creatures analogically, so they tell us something true about God without making him one more creature.

**Q: If evil is a privation, does evil exist?**

Yes, in the sense that statements like "there is evil in the world" are true. Following Aristotle, Aquinas distinguished the being of a thing from the truth of a proposition. Evil is real as a lack in a good thing, which is why it can be truly predicated, but it is not a created substance or quality in its own right.

**Q: What did Kant mean by "existence is not a predicate"?**

Kant argued that existence adds nothing to the concept of a thing; it posits the thing rather than describing it. He used this against the ontological argument. Defenders reply that necessary existence is a real property and that in classical theism God's essence just is his existence.

**Q: How does predication explain statements like "God died on the cross"?**

Christ is one person with two natures, and what is true of either nature is predicated of the one person. So it is correct to say the Lord of glory was crucified, since the person who died is divine, while the dying belongs to him according to his human nature, not his divine nature.

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