# Laws of Logic Do Not Exist Objection Defeater

<!-- type: argument | created: 2026-11-14 | updated: 2026-11-14 -->

## Intro

In a live debate on whether God is real, a skeptic sometimes says: **"Things that don't have ontic status don't exist. The laws of logic have no effect on anything. So the laws of logic don't exist."** "Ontic status" just means a place on the list of real things. The skeptic's point is that logic does not push, pull or cause anything, so it should not be on the list.

Here is the problem. To reach his conclusion he has to reason from premises to a conclusion, and that reasoning only works if the laws of logic hold. If they do not hold, his argument proves nothing. If they do hold, then something real is governing his reasoning even though it causes nothing. Either way his conclusion is in trouble.

He has also slipped in a hidden rule: *only things with causal effects exist.* He never proved that rule, and he cannot prove it by observation, because no experiment shows that nothing exists except what causes things. The same rule would erase numbers, meanings, truth, and the rule itself.

The Christian answer is that logic is real without being physical. It reflects the mind of the God who made an orderly world and made us able to reason about it.

![Marble portrait bust of Aristotle with curly hair and a full beard, set on an alabaster mantle](/codex/assets/aristotle-bust-altemps-after-lysippos.jpg)

*Aristotle, who called non-contradiction the most certain of all principles. Roman marble copy after a Greek bronze by Lysippos (about 330 BC); the alabaster mantle is a modern addition. Palazzo Altemps, Rome. Photo: Jastrow, public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.*

## In full

The objection runs:

1. Whatever lacks ontic status does not exist.
2. Whatever has no causal effect on existence lacks ontic status.
3. The laws of logic have no causal effect on existence.
4. Therefore the laws of logic do not exist.

The argument is valid only because of premise 2, which is usually left unstated. It is a version of the **Eleatic principle** (to be is to have causal power), whose root is the Eleatic Stranger's proposal in Plato's *Sophist* (247d-e) that the mark of being is power to act or be acted upon. The defeater does five things:

- **Disambiguates "exist."** Physical existence, abstract existence, existence as a content of minds, and objective validity are different claims. Denying the first does not deny the others.
- **Exposes premise 2** and asks for its defense. As a universal claim about everything that exists it is neither observed nor derived, and it eliminates far more than logic.
- **Applies the self-reference test.** An empiricist who holds that every justified claim about existence must be empirically established cannot empirically establish premise 2, and cannot empirically establish the necessity of the logic his argument uses.
- **Presses parity.** Whatever account the objector gives of language, meaning, number and truth, all of which he uses and none of which is a causal object, is available for logic. If he grants those, logic returns; if he denies them, his own sentences lose their content.
- **Separates causing from governing.** Logical laws are normative and constitutive: they settle what counts as a valid inference and what states of affairs are possible. They do that work without being efficient causes.

It then answers the usual follow-ups: the parsimony charge that God is an extra entity, the deflationist claim that truth has no nature, the reductionist claim that logic is brain activity, and the side question of whether God is "in motion."

## Cheatsheet

**30-second reply:** "You just gave me an argument. Premises, then a conclusion that follows. If the laws of logic don't exist, nothing follows from anything and your argument is noise. And you've assumed that only things with causal effects exist. Show me the experiment that proves that, because if it's true, numbers, meanings, truth and that very rule don't exist either."

**Fast facts:**
- **Ontic status** = standing in an account of what is real. **Causal efficacy** = power to produce effects. **Logical necessity** = cannot be false. Three different things.
- The hidden premise is "everything that exists has causal powers": ∀x(E(x) → C(x)). Without it, "logic causes nothing, so logic does not exist" is invalid.
- Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV.3: "the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect" (Ross translation). He calls it the most certain of all principles.
- The verification principle ("only empirically verifiable claims are meaningful") is not empirically verifiable. The causal criterion has the same defect.
- **Empiricism** is a theory of knowledge. **Naturalism** is a theory of what exists. **Deflationism** is a theory of the word "true." None of the three entails the others.

**Counter-moves:**
- "Logic is just a description of how things behave." Then can reality violate it? If not, the description states a necessity, and necessity is what needs a ground.
- "Logic is just a human convention." Was anything both existing and not existing, in the same respect, before humans existed? If not, the law held before the convention.
- "Logic is analytic, true by the meaning of the terms." Then meanings exist and fix truths independently of anyone's opinion, which is a realism about meaning the objector said he did not hold.
- "God isn't parsimonious." Parsimony is a tiebreaker between equally adequate explanations, and it is not itself an empirical object or a cause. See the parsimony section below.

**Concessions (with their reciprocals):**
- Grant: logic is not a physical object and has no mass or location. Collect: then "not physical" and "not real" are different claims, and only the second was in dispute.
- Grant: a nominalist can hold that logic is objectively valid without believing in abstract objects. Collect: then the objector has abandoned "logic does not exist" for "logic exists, but not as an abstract object," and owes an account of its necessity.
- Grant: the self-reference point does not by itself prove God. Collect: it does defeat the argument for "logic does not exist," which is the claim on the table.

**Closing line:** "You can't argue that logic doesn't exist without logic doing the work. The question is what grounds it. My answer is the rational God who made the world and the minds that read it. What's yours?"

## Argument structure

| | Premise | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| **P1** | The objection is valid only with the hidden premise that whatever exists has causal powers | The Eleatic principle; Plato, *Sophist* 247d-e |
| **P2** | Every argument for the conclusion uses the laws of logic as binding on its own inferences | Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV.4; [Self-refutation](/codex/self-refutation/) |
| **P3** | The causal criterion is not empirically established and cannot be, so an empiricist cannot hold it on his own terms | Self-reference test; [Empiricism](/codex/empiricism/) |
| **P4** | The causal criterion also eliminates language, meaning, number and truth, which the objector uses | Parity |
| **P5** | Logical laws govern normatively and constitutively without causing; causal inertness does not entail non-existence | Causing vs governing |
| **C** | The argument fails, and logic is real in a non-physical way; whether its necessity needs a personal ground is the remaining question, and theism answers it | [Transcendental Argument for God](/codex/transcendental-argument-for-god/), [Syllogisms for Logic Itself](/codex/syllogisms-for-logic-itself/) |

## Form

Defensive. A validity check that exposes a hidden premise, a performative self-refutation against the strong conclusion, a self-reference test against the empiricist criterion, and a parity argument. The theistic grounding is offered as the best explanation once the objection is cleared.

## Steel-manning the objector

The objection has serious versions, and the strongest one should be answered.

1. **The nominalist.** Abstract objects (numbers, propositions, laws of logic considered as entities) do not exist. Logical truths are true, but nothing extra in reality makes them so. Hartry Field's program of rewriting physics without numbers is the standard example of nominalism done with rigor.
2. **The conventionalist.** Logical systems are frameworks we adopt for their usefulness. Carnap's "principle of tolerance" in *The Logical Syntax of Language* (1934) allowed anyone to build the logic they wish, provided they state its rules.
3. **The analytic empiricist.** Ayer in *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936) held that logical and mathematical truths are analytic: true by the meanings of the symbols, telling us nothing about the world, and so no threat to empiricism.
4. **The causal-access objector.** Paul Benacerraf ("Mathematical Truth", 1973) argued that if numbers are causally inert abstract objects, it is hard to see how we could know about them, since knowledge usually involves causal contact. The objector extends this: what cannot be causally contacted should not be posited.
5. **The revisionist.** Quine ("Two Dogmas of Empiricism", 1951) held that no statement is immune from revision, logic included, in principle.

Each of these is a respectable position. None of them actually says "the laws of logic do not exist" in the sense the debate needs, which is the claim that logic does not bind reasoning or constrain reality. That is where the reply starts.

## Premise 1, The hidden premise

### Affirmative case

1. From "L has no causal effect" alone, "L does not exist" does not follow. The inference needs: everything that exists has causal powers.
2. That premise is a sweeping metaphysical thesis about all of reality. It is the claim most in need of argument, and it is usually assumed.
3. Ask: *"Are you saying something must produce a physical effect in order to exist?"* Then: *"Does the number two cause anything? Does 'two plus two equals four' cause anything? Are those not true?"*

### Anticipated objections

1. "Causal power is the best test we have for what's real. It is how science decides electrons exist."
2. "Benacerraf showed that causally inert things can't be known."

### Rebuttals

1. Causal detection is a good test for *physical* things, since physical things are the kind that interact. Using it to rule on non-physical things assumes the conclusion. A metal detector is a fine test for coins and a poor test for whether a promise exists.
2. Benacerraf raised a problem about *knowledge* of abstract objects, which is an epistemic question. Moving from "it is hard to explain how we know X" to "X does not exist" swaps epistemology for ontology. It also cuts against the objector: he claims to know the laws of logic well enough to use them in every sentence.

## Premise 2, The argument uses what it denies

### Affirmative case

1. The objector offers premises and claims a conclusion follows. "Follows" means: it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. That is a logical relation.
2. If the laws of logic do not hold, the conclusion does not follow, and the argument establishes nothing.
3. If the laws do hold, then something governs his reasoning objectively, whatever he calls it. So the claim "logic does not exist" is either self-defeating or, once qualified, no longer the claim that was made.

Aristotle made the point in *Metaphysics* IV.4: whoever denies non-contradiction must, to say anything at all, signify something definite and not its opposite, and in doing so relies on the principle.

### Anticipated objections

1. "I'm not denying that logic *works*. I'm denying that it *exists* as a thing."

### Rebuttals

1. Good, that is a different and weaker claim, and it concedes most of the debate. Now the question is what kind of reality something has that works everywhere, binds every mind, and held before any mind existed. That is the question the [Transcendental Argument for God](/codex/transcendental-argument-for-god/) asks.

## Premise 3, The empiricist cannot hold the criterion

### Affirmative case

The objector in this debate described himself as an empiricist: knowledge comes from sense experience.

1. If every justified claim about what exists must be empirically established, then "only causally effective things exist" must be empirically established.
2. No observation, or set of observations, establishes a claim about everything that exists, including what has never been observed.
3. So, on his own epistemology, he is not justified in holding the criterion his argument depends on.

The same test applies to logic itself:

1. Observation tells us what has happened, not what *must* happen in every possible case.
2. The laws of logic claim necessity: no contradiction can obtain anywhere.
3. So observation alone cannot establish the laws of logic, yet the empiricist uses them to interpret every observation he makes.

Cross-examination, in order:

1. "Have you observed the law of non-contradiction, or only things that conform to it?"
2. "What experiment could show that a contradiction is impossible, as opposed to merely unobserved?"
3. "Is your principle that only causally effective things exist something you have empirically demonstrated?"
4. "Is empirical verification what makes something exist, or how you find out that it exists?"

The last question is the hinge. "I have no empirical evidence that X exists" is about the knower. "X cannot be empirically verified" is about the limits of a method. "X does not exist" is about reality. Moving from either of the first two to the third needs a further premise, and the empiricist has not supplied one. See [Unverified Is Not False](/codex/unverified-is-not-false/).

### Anticipated objections

1. "Logical truths are analytic. They don't need empirical support; they're true by definition."
2. "I'm a moderate empiricist. I allow inference to unobserved things like electrons."

### Rebuttals

1. Then some truths are known without sense experience, which is what strict empiricism denied. And "true by definition" raises its own question: why do definitions we choose turn out to bind a world we did not define? A convention cannot explain why reality never contains a contradiction.
2. Then empiricism no longer excludes inference to what cannot be directly observed, and it cannot exclude an inference to God on principle. Whether that inference succeeds becomes an argument about evidence, which is where the theist wants the debate. George Berkeley is the historical proof that a committed empiricist can be a theist: he held that all knowledge of sensible things comes through perception and that reality depends on God. See [Empiricism](/codex/empiricism/).

## Premise 4, Language, number and truth on the same view

### Affirmative case

1. **Language.** Ask: "Does language exist?" The sound waves and ink marks do. But two different sentences in two languages can say the same thing, and the same sentence on two screens is made of different pixels. What they share is meaning. Meaning causes nothing physical by itself, yet the objector's whole argument is made of it.
2. **Number.** "Two plus two equals four" is true, necessarily, and causes nothing.
3. **Truth.** His conclusion, "God does not exist," is offered as *true*. Truth is not a force or an object that does things.

The parity question: *"If meaning has ontic status without being a physical object, why can't logical relations?"* Whatever account the objector gives of meaning (as mental, social, or abstract), the same type of account is available for logic. If he denies meaning any status, his own sentences lose their content.

Two illustrations that work live:

- **The song and the recording.** Many recordings, one song. What makes them performances of the same composition is not any single physical recording.
- **The courtroom.** A judge rules that testimony is inconsistent. The inconsistency has no weight or location, yet it decides the case.

### Anticipated objections

1. "Language is a physical and social phenomenon. Brains and communities."

### Rebuttals

1. Then language exists, as a physical and social phenomenon, and it has the ontic status the objection said only causal things have. Fine. But a social account of meaning still has to explain why some inferences are *correct* and others are not. Brain activity explains why a person reached a conclusion; logic evaluates whether the conclusion follows. Those are different questions, and the second is the one that matters here. See [Intentionality](/codex/intentionality/).

## Premise 5, Causing and governing are different jobs

### Affirmative case

| Concept | What it means | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Causal efficacy | Power to produce an effect | A ball breaks a window |
| Ontic status | Standing in what is real | Numbers, minds, rocks, on various views |
| Logical necessity | Cannot be false | No proposition is both true and false in the same sense |

1. The law of non-contradiction does not physically stop contradictions the way a wall stops a ball. It states that contradictions *cannot obtain*. That is a constraint on what is possible, which is a more basic job than causing.
2. The rules of chess cause no move. A player causes the move. Yet the rules decide which moves are legal. Logical laws relate to reasoning in a similar way: they settle what counts as valid.
3. So "logic has no effect on existence" is half right. Logic does not push things around. It does settle what can exist at all: nothing can both be and not be in the same respect.

Ask the follow-up: *"Can reality violate the law of non-contradiction?"* If no, ask what makes that impossibility objective on his view.

### Anticipated objections

1. "That's just a fact about our concepts, not about reality."

### Rebuttals

1. Then reality *could* contain a contradiction and our concepts merely fail to represent it. Almost no one, including the objector, believes that, and his argument against God assumes reality is consistent. If his concepts are the only thing that is consistent, he has no reason to think his conclusion is true of the world.

## Follow-up 1, "A transcendent God wouldn't be parsimonious"

The objector's next move is often: "Under a correspondence view, naturalism can explain why our beliefs are true, and adding a transcendent God isn't parsimonious, so there's no God."

1. **Parsimony is a tiebreaker.** It prefers the simpler of two explanations *that account for the same evidence equally well*. It never shows an entity does not exist. At most it gives a defeasible reason to prefer one theory. See [Occam's Razor](/codex/occams-razor/).
2. **Adequacy first.** Before counting entities, the objector has to show naturalism actually explains the necessity of logic, the intelligibility of the world, and why our minds track it. If those are left as brute facts, there is no tie for the razor to break.
3. **Parsimony is itself not empirical and not causal.** It is a methodological principle for evaluating explanations. If he can use a non-causal, non-observed principle to decide what to believe, he cannot require causal efficacy for logic to be real.
4. **Correspondence answers a different question.** It says what truth *is* (agreement with reality). It does not explain why reality is intelligible or why human faculties reliably grasp it. A theory of truth is not a theory of knowledge.
5. **God is not one more object in the universe.** Classical theism proposes a necessary being as the ground of contingent reality and of rational order. Counting him as an extra item on the same shelf as planets misunderstands the hypothesis being rejected.

Syllogism for live use:

1. Explanatory parsimony is a criterion for comparing adequate theories, not a sufficient condition for non-existence.
2. The argument against God here rests on parsimony.
3. Therefore the argument cannot establish that God does not exist.

## Follow-up 2, "Does truth have ontological status?"

A good answer when asked directly: "Yes. Truth is grounded in how reality is, and ultimately in God's rational nature. I distinguish truth as a property of propositions from truth as a free-floating object. Truth doesn't need to be a physical thing to be objectively real."

Then turn it back: "Is your conclusion that God doesn't exist objectively true, or only something you believe? If true, truth has objective standing without causal power, and you've given up the causal criterion."

**The deflationist reply.** A deflationist (Paul Horwich, *Truth*, 1990) says that "'Snow is white' is true" says no more than "Snow is white." Truth has no hidden nature and does not exist "in a vacuum." This is a fair position, and the reply should be precise:

1. A theory of how the *word* "true" functions does not, by that alone, say what makes each truth true.
2. Deflationism is that kind of theory.
3. So deflationism leaves open what grounds necessary truths, including logical ones.

The deflationist still asserts that some propositions are true and others false, still uses valid inference, and still owes an account of why necessary truths could not have been otherwise. Ask: "Are you denying that truth is a separate entity, or denying that propositions can be objectively true?" The first is compatible with everything the theist needs. See [Theories of Truth](/codex/theories-of-truth/) and [Hofweber Internalist Deflationism Objection Defeater](/codex/hofweber-internalist-deflationism-objection-defeater/).

## Follow-up 3, "Isn't this all reducible to the brain?"

Reductionism comes in three kinds, and the objector should say which he means:

| Kind | Claim |
|---|---|
| Ontological | Complex things are nothing over and above their physical parts |
| Epistemological | Knowledge in one domain is justified by knowledge in another |
| Explanatory | Complex phenomena are explained by simpler processes |

Accepting explanatory reduction in biology does not commit anyone to ontological reduction of meaning, truth or logic. The question for the reductionist is: *"Give a purely physical account of what makes an inference valid."* Neural events explain why someone believed a conclusion. They do not say whether the conclusion follows. See [Argument from Reason](/codex/argument-from-reason/) and [Materialism](/codex/materialism/).

## Follow-up 4, "Is God in motion?"

In classical theism, no. Following Aristotle, *motion* in the broad sense means change: the actualization of a potential, as water goes from potentially hot to actually hot. God is pure actuality (*actus purus*), with no unrealized potential to be actualized, so he does not undergo change (Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I q.9 a.1). He is the unmoved mover of the [First Way](/codex/first-way-motion/).

1. Whatever undergoes intrinsic change passes from potentiality to actuality.
2. God has no passive potentiality to be actualized.
3. Therefore God does not undergo intrinsic change.

That does not make God inactive. He creates, sustains and acts in history; the effects occur in time while his will is eternal. Aquinas puts it this way: willing that things change is different from changing one's will (*Summa Theologiae* I q.19 a.7). In the Incarnation the Son moved, grew, suffered and died according to his human nature, while the divine nature remained unchanged ([Hypostatic Union](/codex/hypostatic-union/)). If the objector says "everything that acts must be in motion," ask him to define motion and to show that every cause must itself change. See [Divine Immutability](/codex/divine-immutability/) and [Actus Purus](/codex/actus-purus/).

## The Christian account

- **Logic is real and not physical.** It belongs with truth, meaning and number as features of a rational order, a category the objector already uses.
- **Its necessity is grounded in God's nature.** Classical theism holds that logical truths reflect the eternal, unchanging rational nature of God. James Anderson and Greg Welty ("The Lord of Non-Contradiction", 2011) argue that the laws of logic are best understood as necessary truths that are thoughts of a necessarily existing divine mind.
- **Augustine's route.** In *On Free Choice of the Will* II, Augustine argues that some truths are common to every mind, judged by no mind, and unchangeable, so they stand above the human mind, and that what is above our minds and unchanging is God or points to God.
- **Why it fits.** "In the beginning was the Word" ([John 1:1](/codex/john-1-1/), ASV), and "All things were made through him" ([John 1:3](/codex/john-1-3/), ASV). If the world was made through the divine *Logos*, minds made in God's image can grasp a world that never contradicts itself.

The Christian epistemic base can be stated in one breath: "Sense experience gives knowledge of the created world, reason grasps necessary truths, revelation tells us what God has disclosed, and God's rational nature is the ground that makes all three possible." That distinguishes the *source* of a belief from the *ground* of its truth, which is the distinction the objection blurred. See [Christian Theories of Knowledge](/codex/christian-theories-of-knowledge/).

## Master objections

1. **"This is presuppositionalism; you're assuming God."** The defeater assumes only what the objector uses: valid inference and true conclusions. The theistic ground is offered after his argument fails, as the best account of what remains.
2. **"Platonism grounds logic without God."** Platonism grants the main point (logic is real and not physical) and then has to explain why causally inert abstract objects are knowable and why they apply to a physical world. Theism explains both through a mind that thinks the truths and made the world. See [Universals](/codex/universals/).
3. **"Non-classical logics show logic is optional."** Paraconsistent and intuitionist systems are stated, proved and compared using a metatheory that itself does not tolerate contradiction. Restricting a law for a technical purpose is not showing it false. See [Laws of Logic](/codex/laws-of-logic/).

## Tactical opening and closing

**Opening:** "When you say logic doesn't exist, do you mean it isn't a physical object, or that it doesn't bind your reasoning?"

**Closing:** "Your argument needed logic to get to its conclusion and a rule about existence you can't observe. I'd rather ask what makes logic necessary at all. I say it's the mind of God. What do you say?"

## Live-cite kit

**Scripture:**
- "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God" ([John 1:1](/codex/john-1-1/), ASV).
- "Come now, and let us reason together, saith Jehovah" ([Isaiah 1:18](/codex/isaiah-1-18/), ASV).
- "For I, Jehovah, change not" ([Malachi 3:6](/codex/malachi-3-6/), ASV).

**Scholarly:**
- Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV.3 1005b19-20: the most certain of all principles.
- Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will* II: unchangeable truth above the human mind.
- Plato, *Sophist* 247d-e: the "power" criterion of being, the ancestor of the objection.
- A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936): logic as analytic convention.
- Anderson and Welty, "The Lord of Non-Contradiction" (2011).

**Aphorism:** "Not causal is not the same as not real."

## Connection to Scripture

Scripture does not argue about abstract objects, but it consistently places reason and word before matter. John's prologue grounds creation in the *Logos*, a word that in Greek carries reason and meaning as well as speech ([Logos Christology](/codex/logos-christology/)). Isaiah has God invite people to reason with him, which assumes a shared standard of reasoning between God and humans. And the God who "changes not" ([Malachi 3:6](/codex/malachi-3-6/)) is the kind of ground an unchanging logical order needs.

## Patristic and scholarly note

The question of what logical and mathematical truths are has a long Christian history. Augustine treated unchanging truths as a path to God. Aquinas held that truth is the conformity of intellect and thing (*De Veritate* q.1 a.1) and that the measure of all things is the divine intellect. Modern Christian philosophers divide between theistic Platonism, divine conceptualism and Thomist moderate realism, but agree that logic is real and that its ultimate ground is God. The atheist side divides among nominalism, Platonism without God, conventionalism and brute necessity, each of which this page engages.

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## Scholarship

Published academic works this page draws on, each matched to a publisher, index or library catalog record.

- James N. Anderson, Greg Welty and Evangelical Philosophical Society, "The Lord of Noncontradiction: An Argument for God from Logic," *Philosophia Christi* 13 (2011). [doi:10.5840/pc201113229](https://doi.org/10.5840/pc201113229)
- A. J. Ayer, *Language, truth and logic* (1936). [Open Library](https://openlibrary.org/works/OL1157990W)
- Hartry H. Field, *Science without numbers* (1980). [Open Library](https://openlibrary.org/works/OL4086247W)

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## See also

- [Laws of Logic](/codex/laws-of-logic/), the three classical laws and their status
- [Law of Non-Contradiction](/codex/law-of-non-contradiction/), the most-cited law in this debate
- [Syllogisms for Logic Itself](/codex/syllogisms-for-logic-itself/), the positive argument from logic to God
- [Transcendental Argument for God](/codex/transcendental-argument-for-god/), logic as a precondition of intelligibility
- [Concepts Do Not Exist Objection Defeater](/codex/concepts-do-not-exist-objection-defeater/), the sister objection about concepts
- [Empiricism](/codex/empiricism/), why the strict version fails its own test
- [Problem of Induction](/codex/problem-of-induction/), why observation alone cannot deliver necessity or the future
- [Theories of Truth](/codex/theories-of-truth/), correspondence, deflationism and the status of truth
- [Occam's Razor](/codex/occams-razor/), what parsimony can and cannot do
- [Divine Immutability](/codex/divine-immutability/), why God is not "in motion"
- [Argument from Objective Truth](/codex/argument-from-objective-truth/), truths as thoughts of an eternal mind

## Common questions this page answers

**Q: Do the laws of logic exist if they have no physical effect?**

Yes, in the sense that matters. They are not physical objects and do not push things around, but they settle what counts as a valid inference and what can be the case at all. Saying they do not exist because they cause nothing assumes that only causal things exist, which is a claim no one has shown and which would also erase numbers, meanings and truth.

**Q: Is it self-refuting to say the laws of logic do not exist?**

It is if the claim means logic does not bind reasoning, because the person making the argument relies on logic for the conclusion to follow. If the claim only means logic is not an abstract object, it is not self-refuting, but it then concedes that logic is real in some way and owes an account of its necessity.

**Q: Can something exist that cannot be empirically verified?**

Yes. Empirical verification is a way of finding out what exists, and the limits of a method are not the limits of reality. Other minds, past events, numbers and the laws of logic are all accepted without direct observation, and the rule "only the empirically verifiable exists" cannot itself be empirically verified.

**Q: Can you be an empiricist and not a naturalist?**

Yes. Empiricism is a view about how we know; naturalism is a view about what exists. George Berkeley was an empiricist and a Christian theist. Empiricism alone does not tell you that nothing supernatural exists, and a moderate empiricist who allows inference to unobserved causes cannot rule out inference to God in principle.

**Q: Isn't God an unnecessary extra entity under Occam's razor?**

Occam's razor only chooses between explanations that account for the evidence equally well, and it can never show that something does not exist. Naturalism would first have to explain the necessity of logic, the intelligibility of the world and the reliability of reason. The razor itself is also a non-empirical, non-causal principle, which undercuts the demand that logic have causal power to be real.

**Q: Does truth have ontological status?**

Truth is grounded in how reality is, and on classical theism ultimately in God's rational nature. One does not need to treat truth as a free-floating object to hold that it is objective. Even a deflationist about the word "true" still holds that some propositions are true and owes an account of necessary truths.

**Q: Is God in motion?**

On classical theism, no. Motion in the philosophical sense is change from potential to actual, and God is pure actuality with nothing left to actualize. God still acts, creates and sustains the world; the effects happen in time while his will is eternal. In the Incarnation, Christ moved and grew in his human nature while his divine nature remained unchanged.

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