# Justified True Belief

<!-- type: concept | created: 2026-04-25 | updated: 2026-04-25 -->

## Intro

What does it mean to *know* something?

Plato proposed an answer in the *Theaetetus* around 2,400 years ago, and most of Western philosophy went along with it for the next two thousand years. To know that some claim *p* is true, you need three things at once:

You have to *believe* it. You cannot know something you do not believe; if you actively disbelieve global warming, you cannot also be said to know it.

It has to actually *be true*. You cannot know a falsehood. If you confidently believe the earth is flat, that is not knowledge; it is delusion.

You have to be *justified* in believing it. Random guessing does not count, even when you happen to be right. If you flip a coin to decide whether your bus will be on time and the coin says yes and the bus is on time, you did not *know* the bus would be on time; you got lucky.

The combination is *justified true belief*, JTB for short. It was the textbook account of knowledge until 1963, when a short, three-page paper by a philosopher named Edmund Gettier blew it apart. Gettier showed cases where someone has a belief that is true, and is justified, but where we would not say they *know*, because the justification just happened to land on a true conclusion by accident.

That sounds technical. The Gettier examples are the kind of puzzle philosophers have been arguing about ever since, and they matter because they force a more careful account of what *knowing* really requires.

For Christian apologetics this matters in two directions. First, when someone says *"I don't know whether God exists,"* the right question back is, *what would count as knowing?* If they are demanding mathematical certainty, almost nothing about the real world counts as knowledge, including most of what they confidently believe. The honest standard for serious belief is something like *justified true belief* with the Gettier qualifications worked in, which is the same standard you would apply to history, science, or trust in another person.

Second, the question of *how Christians know* God, through Scripture, through the Holy Spirit's witness, through reason, through experience, has been the subject of major work in Christian epistemology (Alvin Plantinga's *Warranted Christian Belief* is the landmark). Plantinga argues Christian belief is rationally appropriate even apart from the standard JTB framework, on something he calls *warrant*.

The page below walks the JTB account, the Gettier counterexamples, the contemporary alternatives (reliabilism, virtue epistemology, Plantinga's proper-function account), and the application to religious knowledge.

## In full

Justified True Belief (JTB) is the classical analysis of knowledge, 
discussed by [Plato](/codex/plato/) in the *Theaetetus* and dominant in Western
epistemology, that holds a person knows a proposition *p* when
three conditions are jointly met: the person believes *p*, *p* is
true, and the belief is suitably justified. JTB sits at the head of
ris3n's epistemology stream and is the framework against which
later theological accounts of knowledge (revelation, proper
basicality, self-authentication) are positioned.

## The three conditions

1. **Belief.** The knower must hold the proposition to be true.
2. **Truth.** The proposition must in fact be true.
3. **Justification.** The knower must have adequate grounds, reason,
 evidence, testimony, or some other warrant, for holding it.

## The Gettier problem

[Edmund Gettier](/codex/edmund-gettier/)'s 1963 counterexamples show that JTB is *insufficient*
for knowledge: a belief can be justified and true but only true by
luck, in which case it falls short of genuine knowledge. The Gettier
literature has driven epistemologists toward additional conditions
(no-defeaters, reliable-process, virtue-theoretic, etc.) or toward
abandoning the JTB framework entirely.

## Tensions

- **Pragmatic vs objective truth.** *Ingredients in the Truth* absorbs pragmatic and constructivist framings into a unified picture, while the theological extension in [Belief Vs Knowledge](/codex/belief-vs-knowledge/) treats truth as objective, revelation-grounded. The "T" in JTB is doing different work in each note.
- **Faith and JTB.** [Belief Vs Knowledge](/codex/belief-vs-knowledge/) argues theological faith satisfies JTB through revelation as justification. Whether revelation counts as "justification" in the same sense as empirical evidence is contested across traditions.

## See also

- Plato, the *Theaetetus* origin.
- Edmund Gettier, the canonical counterexample.
- [Empiricism](/codex/empiricism/), [Rationalism](/codex/rationalism/), [Presuppositionalism](/codex/presuppositionalism/), competing theories of what makes a belief justified.
- [Foundationalism](/codex/foundationalism/), the structural view that justification rests on basic beliefs.
- [Revelation](/codex/revelation/), divine self-disclosure proposed as a route to justification.

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## Common questions this page answers

**Q: What is justified true belief?**

The classical Platonic definition of knowledge: a person knows X if (1) they believe X, (2) X is true, and (3) they have justification for believing X. Without all three, you do not have knowledge. With all three, you have what philosophy called *episteme*.

**Q: What is the Gettier problem?**

In 1963, Edmund Gettier published a three-page paper showing cases where someone has a true, justified belief that we hesitate to call knowledge because the justification just happens to land on a true conclusion by accident. The cases forced philosophy to refine the JTB account.

**Q: How does this apply to Christianity?**

Christianity has classically held that faith is a form of knowledge with grounds (general revelation, special revelation, the inner witness of the Spirit), not blind belief. See [Belief Vs Knowledge](/codex/belief-vs-knowledge/) and [Reformed Epistemology](/codex/reformed-epistemology/) for the warrant-based account.

**Q: What counts as justification?**

Competing theories include foundationalism (some beliefs are basic, others are justified by them), coherentism (beliefs justify each other in a web), reliabilism (beliefs are justified when produced by reliable cognitive processes), and Plantinga's warrant account (proper function in the right environment).

**Q: Is faith a kind of knowing?**

Christianity has historically said yes. [Romans 1:18-21](/codex/romans-1-18-21/) says God's existence and power are *plain*. [Hebrews 11:1](/codex/hebrews-11-1/) uses Greek terms for substance and proof, not guesswork. Plantinga's [Reformed Epistemology](/codex/reformed-epistemology/) develops Christian belief as properly basic and warranted.

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