# Gilles Deleuze

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French philosopher (1925-1995), author of *Difference and Repetition* (1968) and, with Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* (1972) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980). The most systematic twentieth-century metaphysician of **difference**, **becoming** and **immanence**: reality has no transcendent ground, and stable identities are products of deeper processes of differentiation.

## Intro

Most philosophy starts with things that have an identity (a tree, a person, the number two) and then asks how they differ. Deleuze turned that around. He argued that **difference comes first**, and that the stable things we recognize are temporary results of differences working underneath them, the way a whirlpool is a stable shape produced by moving water.

He also insisted that everything that explains the world lies **inside** the world. There is no Creator above it and no realm of perfect forms behind it. Philosophers call this a philosophy of **immanence**.

Christians have good reasons to take him seriously. He was a realist who believed the world has objective structure whether or not anyone notices it, and his key idea of the "univocity of being" came from a medieval Christian theologian, John Duns Scotus. The disagreement is about foundations. Deleuze describes how things come to be within reality. The Christian asks why there is any reality at all, and whether a world of pure becoming can explain itself.

![Diagram: ten liters of water at 80 degrees poured into two containers gives five liters each, but each is still at 80 degrees, illustrating that extensive quantities divide and intensive ones do not](/codex/assets/deleuze-intensity-extensity-diagram.svg)

_Intensive and extensive quantities. Pour 10 liters at 80 °C into two containers and the volume divides, but the temperature does not. Deleuze built much of his metaphysics on this difference. Diagram drawn for the codex._

## In full

Deleuze's mature ontology, set out in *Difference and Repetition*, holds that being is univocal (said in one and the same sense of everything that is) and that what being is said of is difference itself. Classical metaphysics, on his reading, subordinated difference to four forms of "representation": identity in the concept, analogy in judgment, opposition among predicates, and resemblance in perception. He proposes instead a **difference in itself**, conceived without reference to a prior identity. Reality has three registers: the **virtual** (a fully real field of differential relations and singularities, structured but not yet actualized), the **intensive** (differences of degree, such as gradients of temperature or pressure, that drive processes of individuation), and the **actual** (the extended, qualified things and states of affairs we perceive and measure). Individuation, a concept he takes from Gilbert Simondon, is the process by which intensive differences actualize virtual structures into metastable individuals.

His epistemology is a **transcendental empiricism**: the conditions of experience are real, not merely conceptual, and thought is provoked by an **encounter** with something that our existing categories cannot recognize. His ontology is a philosophy of **immanence**: the plane on which things are produced has nothing outside it.

The Christian assessment, developed below, grants Deleuze's realism and much of his phenomenology of learning, presses the gap between explaining how things become and explaining why anything is, argues that difference without identity cannot be stated or known, and answers that the Triune God grounds unity and difference together, with neither subordinated to the other.

## Life

- **Born** 18 January 1925 in Paris. Studied philosophy at the Sorbonne in the 1940s.
- **Early monographs** on the history of philosophy: Hume (*Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 1953), Nietzsche (*Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 1962), Kant (1963), Proust (1964), Bergson (*Bergsonism*, 1966) and Spinoza (*Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, 1968). He read each figure as an ally against the philosophy of identity.
- **1968:** *Difference and Repetition*, his doctoral thesis and major work, followed by *The Logic of Sense* (1969).
- **1969-1987:** taught at the experimental University of Paris VIII (Vincennes, later Saint-Denis). Began the collaboration with the psychoanalyst Félix Guattari.
- **Later works:** *Anti-Oedipus* (1972) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980) with Guattari; *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (1981); two books on cinema (1983, 1985); *Foucault* (1986); *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (1988); *What Is Philosophy?* (1991, with Guattari); the late essay "Immanence: A Life" (1995).
- **Death:** after years of severe respiratory illness, he took his own life in Paris on 4 November 1995.

Michel Foucault, reviewing two of his books in 1970, suggested that the century might one day be known as Deleuzian.

## Key ideas

### 1. Difference in itself

Ordinary thought treats difference as a relation between things that already have identities: A differs from B. Deleuze argues this makes difference secondary and tame. He wants a concept of difference that is primary and productive, from which identities emerge as effects. Repetition, likewise, is for Deleuze the return of difference, which is why no two repetitions are identical.

### 2. Thought begins with an encounter

In chapter 3 of *Difference and Repetition*, "The Image of Thought," Deleuze argues that something in the world forces us to think, and that what forces us is an object of **encounter** rather than recognition. **Recognition** applies categories we already have (this is an apple). An **encounter** disrupts our categories and compels new thought. Genuine thinking, on his view, is involuntary and begins in a shock to the faculties.

### 3. Intensity and extensity

Physics distinguishes **intensive** quantities (temperature, pressure, density, which do not add up or divide when you split a system) from **extensive** ones (length, volume, mass, which do). Deleuze gives intensive differences the generative role in individuation: a temperature gradient drives convection, and convection produces organized patterns. Extended, measurable things are where intensive processes settle into stable form. He also notes that intensity tends to cancel itself in what it produces, the way heat differences even out.

### 4. Virtual, intensive, actual

The **virtual** is real but not actual: a structure of differential relations, like the field of possible solutions a problem defines. It becomes actual through differentiation, the way a problem is answered by solutions that do not resemble it. Applied to buoyancy, the result looks like this. The application is ours, not Deleuze's own example:

| Register | Buoyancy |
|---|---|
| Virtual | The differential relations among fluid density, gravity and displaced volume that condition the process |
| Intensive | The pressure gradient with depth that actually pushes up on a submerged body |
| Actual | The measurable upward force and the floating ball |

On this reading Deleuze is a robust realist. Buoyancy operates in an empty pool; the relations Archimedes' principle describes hold whether or not anyone formulates the equation.

### 5. Univocity of being

Deleuze writes that there has only ever been one ontological proposition, that being is univocal, and he traces it through three moments: **John Duns Scotus**, who held that the concept of being applies in one sense to God and creatures; **Baruch Spinoza**, who made the one substance express itself in all its modes; and **Nietzsche**, whose eternal return affirms difference. Scotus's univocity was a thesis about the concept of being, held alongside the infinite difference between God and creatures. Deleuze turns it into an ontology with no transcendence at all: being is said in one sense of everything, and what it is said of is difference. See [Baruch Spinoza](/codex/baruch-spinoza/) and [Friedrich Nietzsche](/codex/friedrich-nietzsche/).

### 6. Immanence

In *What Is Philosophy?* and "Immanence: A Life," Deleuze defends a **plane of immanence**, a field of production that is not immanent *to* anything else (not to God, not to a subject, not to consciousness). Transcendence, for Deleuze, is always an illusion that freezes the flow of becoming into fixed identities and imposes judgment from outside.

## Christian assessment

### Where Deleuze and classical theism agree

| Principle | Deleuze | Classical Christian theism |
|---|---|---|
| Mind-independent reality | Yes | Yes |
| Objective relations in nature | Yes | Yes |
| Reality has intelligible structure | Yes, in differential relations | Yes, grounded in the divine intellect |
| Real causal powers in things | Yes | Yes |
| Reality exceeds human perception | Yes | Yes |
| A transcendent Creator | No | Yes |
| Ultimate reality is personal | No | Yes |

The overlap is real and useful. Deleuze is no relativist about nature. He affirms that the world has structure we discover. That puts the debate where it belongs: what grounds that structure?

### 1. How things become versus why anything is

Deleuze's account of actualization explains how determinate things emerge **within** reality. It does not explain why there is a reality of virtual relations and intensive differences at all. Three answers are available to him, and each needs a defense:

- **Necessary existence:** the plane of immanence could not have failed to be. Then what establishes its necessity, given that its contents are constantly changing and contingent?
- **Brute fact:** it just is, with no explanation. Then the system stops explaining exactly where explanation is most wanted. See [Principle of Sufficient Reason](/codex/principle-of-sufficient-reason/).
- **Rejecting the question:** asking why there is anything presupposes the transcendence Deleuze rejects. This is his most likely answer. The reply is that the question arises from the dependence visible in every actual thing, which anyone can observe whatever their prior commitments.

This establishes a legitimate explanatory burden. It does not by itself show that Deleuze contradicts himself. The full form of the argument, and the distinction between causal and explanatory accounts it relies on, is set out in [Nothing Is Fixed Only Metastable Objection Defeater](/codex/nothing-is-fixed-only-metastable-objection-defeater/). See also [Contingency Argument](/codex/contingency-argument/).

### 2. Difference cannot float free of identity

To say "A differs from B" you must be able to pick out A and B. Deleuze's own key terms (difference, intensity, the virtual, univocity) each have a stable meaning across his books, or the books could not be read. A philosophy that makes identity a mere effect still trades on identity in every sentence. The [One and the Many Problem](/codex/one-and-the-many-problem/) has two horns, and Deleuze, like Parmenides in reverse, takes one of them as ultimate. See [Argument from the One-and-the-Many Convergence](/codex/argument-from-the-one-and-the-many-convergence/).

### 3. The Trinity grounds unity and difference together

The strongest Christian reply goes deeper than putting identity first. In the Trinity, real distinction (Father, Son and Spirit, distinguished by eternal relations of origin) and real unity (one divine essence) are equally ultimate. Neither is derived from the other. This is why Christian thinkers from the Cappadocians to recent writers such as David Bentley Hart in *The Beauty of the Infinite* (2003) have argued that Christianity already contains a positive account of difference that is peaceful and grounded, whereas Deleuze's difference is ungrounded. See [Trinity](/codex/trinity/) and [Perichoresis](/codex/perichoresis/).

### 4. Encounter generates thought, but does not constitute being

Deleuze's account of the encounter is a good description of how real learning begins. It tells us how thought arises, which is a different question from what exists. A mathematical truth such as 2 + 2 = 4 may first come home to a child through an encounter with counting blocks, yet the truth does not change when it is discovered. The act of knowing can be dynamic while the object known is invariant. Deleuze would answer that his transcendental empiricism concerns the real conditions of experience, not mere psychology, and that answer deserves a hearing. It still leaves open why those conditions should be self-explaining.

### 5. Knowledge needs stability

An encounter provokes thought; learning organizes it; pattern recognition finds regularities; knowledge is a stable, justified grasp of what the patterns are. Even recognizing change requires a stable standard of comparison: you know the river is changing because you can identify it as the same river across the changes. Deleuze accepts habit and repetition in his three syntheses of time, so he does not simply abolish stability. The open question is what makes a recognized pattern *true* rather than a persistent habit of the mind. Stability, accuracy and justification are three different requirements, and a philosophy of difference must supply the last two.

### 6. Univocity and analogy

Thomas Aquinas held that "being" is said of God and creatures **analogically**: truly of both, but not in exactly the same sense, because God is being itself and creatures have being from him. Deleuze shows where Scotus's univocity can lead once the Creator is removed: a single plane on which everything is equally being and nothing is above it. Some theologians in the "Radical Orthodoxy" circle, notably John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, have argued that the turn to univocity in late medieval thought prepared the way for secular ontology. That historical thesis is contested among Scotus scholars, but Deleuze's own genealogy is evidence that the doctrine matters. See [Thomas Aquinas](/codex/thomas-aquinas/) and [Classical Theism](/codex/classical-theism/).

## Cross-examination questions

1. "When you say reality must be encountered through difference, do you mean the encounter makes the object exist, or makes us know it? Establishing the second does not establish the first."
2. "If the buoyancy relation holds in an empty pool, its reality is prior to our recognition. What grounds its validity independently of any encounter?"
3. "Is the plane of immanence necessary, contingent, or beyond that distinction? If necessary, how do you know? If contingent, what explains it?"
4. "Does immanence explain why reality exists, or does it name reality as its own ground?"
5. "How do you state 'difference is prior to identity' without relying on the identity of the terms in that sentence?"

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## Scholarship

Published academic works this page draws on, each matched to a publisher, index or library catalog record.

- Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in philosophy: Spinoza* (Zone Books, 1990). [Open Library](https://openlibrary.org/works/OL18483252W)
- David Bentley Hart, *The beauty of the infinite* (2003). [Open Library](https://openlibrary.org/works/OL5848499W)
- John Milbank, *Theology and social theory: beyond secular reason* (1991). [Open Library](https://openlibrary.org/works/OL754361W)

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## See also

- [Nothing Is Fixed Only Metastable Objection Defeater](/codex/nothing-is-fixed-only-metastable-objection-defeater/), the process-metaphysics objection and its defeater, including the causal versus explanatory distinction
- [Baruch Spinoza](/codex/baruch-spinoza/), Deleuze's "prince of philosophers" and model of immanence
- [Friedrich Nietzsche](/codex/friedrich-nietzsche/), the third moment of univocity
- [Priority Monism](/codex/priority-monism/) and [Pantheism](/codex/pantheism/), other ways of making reality its own ground
- [One and the Many Problem](/codex/one-and-the-many-problem/), the ancient puzzle Deleuze resolves on the side of the many
- [Trinity](/codex/trinity/), unity and difference as equally ultimate
- [Principle of Sufficient Reason](/codex/principle-of-sufficient-reason/) and [Contingency Argument](/codex/contingency-argument/), the question of why anything exists
- [Reductionism](/codex/reductionism/), a different way of explaining wholes by what lies beneath them

## Common questions this page answers

**Q: Who was Gilles Deleuze?**

Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) was a French philosopher best known for *Difference and Repetition* and, with Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. He argued that difference and becoming are more basic than fixed identities, and that reality needs no transcendent ground.

**Q: What does Deleuze mean by immanence?**

Immanence means that everything which explains the world lies within the world. For Deleuze there is no Creator above reality and no realm of ideal forms behind it. The processes that produce things are internal to reality itself, on what he called a plane of immanence.

**Q: What is the difference between intensity and extensity in Deleuze?**

Intensive quantities, like temperature or pressure, do not divide when you split a system: half of a pot of water at 80 °C is still at 80 °C. Extensive quantities, like volume or length, do divide. Deleuze argued that intensive differences drive the formation of things, and extended, measurable objects are where those processes settle.

**Q: How does Deleuze's philosophy relate to Christianity?**

Deleuze borrowed his doctrine of the univocity of being from the medieval theologian John Duns Scotus and shares with classical theism a belief in objective, mind-independent structure in nature. He rejects a transcendent, personal Creator. The main Christian challenge is that explaining how things become within reality does not explain why reality exists at all.

**Q: What is the Christian answer to the philosophy of difference?**

Christianity holds that in the Trinity real distinction among the Father, Son and Spirit and the real unity of the one God are equally ultimate. That gives a grounded account of both unity and difference, while a philosophy of pure difference still has to use stable terms to state itself.

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